

| | |
|-------------------|--------|
| 379.43 | R53r |
| Richter | \$3.50 |
| Re-educating Ger- | |
| many | |
| JAN 29 1945 | |

379.43 R53r

Keep Your Card in This Pocket

Books will be issued only on presentation of proper library cards.

Unless labeled otherwise, books may be retained for two weeks. Borrowers finding books marked, defaced or mutilated are expected to report same at library desk; otherwise the last borrower will be held responsible for all imperfections discovered.

The card holder is responsible for all books drawn on this card.

Penalty for over-due books 2c a day plus cost of notices.

Lost cards and change of residence must be reported promptly.



Public Library
Kansas City, Mo.

Keep Your Card in This Pocket

BERKOWITZ ENVELOPE CO., K. C., MO.

KANSAS CITY, MO. PUBLIC LIBRARY



0 0001 0192517 0

RE-EDUCATING GERMANY

KARSBAS C

RE-EDUCATING GERMANY

By WERNER RICHTER

TRANSLATED BY PAUL LEHMANN

Who would have suspected that in the German soul are hidden such ominous things as have been brought to light before our very eyes?—Erasmus to Johann Caesarius.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS
CHICAGO · ILLINOIS

University of Chicago Press · Chicago 37

Agent: Cambridge University Press · London

Copyright 1945 by the University of Chicago. All rights reserved. Published January 1945. Composed and printed by the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.

TO

OSCAR AND PAULA SCHULTHESS

HERMANN AND RUTH FISCHER

*trusted friends in Switzerland and Canada
whose affection and solicitude have brought
me to a new homeland and a new perspective*

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

THE FORTHCOMING PEACE, LIKE THE WAR ITSELF, WILL be a historic experience of critical duration; and the permanence of the peace will depend upon the foundations on which it rests. Like the nature and conduct of the war, the nature and conduct of the peace will require, on the one hand, the constant correlation of principle and strategy and, on the other, the total and persistent mobilization of the resources and energies of human beings around the world.

The motives and resources of men and of nations cannot be marshaled in support of war by an appeal to self-interest alone. It is always necessary to relate them to ends which transcend the immediate occasion and the nearer purposes of the conflict. Consequently, the danger to which any subsequent peace is exposed is the triumph of the nearer over the transcendent aims of the struggle because the passion and fatigue of battle have blinded the peoples and their responsible leaders to reconstructive insight and direction.

The immediate occasion of peril in the coming peace is, like the immediate occasion for the war itself, the Germany of national socialism. As the hour of National Socialist defeat draws near with the increasing triumphs of the United Nations, it is inevitable that the question "What shall be done with Germany?" should dominate the concern and the discussion of responsible and thoughtful people.

Nor is it accidental that the debate over the fate of Germany after the war sooner or later turns into a debate over the possibility of the re-education of Germany. The vigor of the discussion is a measure not only of the undisguised doubt that has over-

taken many sincere people as to whether or not Germany could be re-educated but also of the recognition that the German problem is the focal problem of the peace. The democratic aims of the war seem somehow to be sharply at stake in the disposition of the German problem by the United Nations. If Germany could be dealt with only in punitive terms, the democratic faith in the self-governing possibilities of men and nations seems to face glaring and fateful frustration. On the other hand, if Germany is somehow to be included within the world community of free peoples, the possibility of redirecting the German people from the cultural and political autarchy of national socialism toward such a world community must be counted upon. Slender as difficult though this possibility may be, it is indispensable to the United Nations peace of responsible rather than merely victorious power.

Dr. Richter's discussion of the German problem is evident that the prospect for a democratic world community is less dismal than it seems. He believes that Germany can be re-educated, and his conviction is based upon an intimate and responsible knowledge of German life and education. Since he writes as a German who has found a new and welcome home in the United States, his work is a vindication of the democratic character of the war and the peace. It means that there are Germans who have become exiles because they believed in and labored for democracy in Germany before the second World War; and it means that there are at the disposal of the United Nations resources of thought and experience the use of which would significantly prove that the democratic aims of the victorious powers had already been culturally applied in a discussion of the peace which transcended the lines of battle and of victory and defeat.

Werner Richter was an undersecretary in the Prussian Ministry of Education during the Weimar Republic. As such, he was the close associate of Carl Heinrich Becker, whose ideas concerning the reform of German education after 1918 were far-reaching and genuinely democratic. As minister of education of the state of Prussia, Becker exercised a commanding influence upon the educational policies of the democratic government

Germany between 1918 and 1933. Professor Richter is himself a philologist and a scholar in the field of Germanic language and literature. He was called by Becker from a professorship in the University at Greifswald to the Ministry of Education, where he became the administrator in charge of university affairs. At the same time, the faculty of the University of Berlin called him to a professorship, which he held until Hitler's seizure of power.

It was Professor Richter's responsibility to oversee the relations between the state government and the universities, not the least important aspect of which concerned professorial appointments and promotions. But even more important during those turbulent days were the relations which were to be established not only between the universities and the governments of the several German states but between the German universities and the central government of the Reich. Since the whole educational structure was in transition and since the German universities crowned this structure, besides having achieved world-wide eminence in scholarship and research, it became a matter of utmost importance how these constitutional questions were conceived and executed. There were constitutional questions covering not only the relations between the universities and the state but also the relations between the universities and the church, both Protestant and Roman Catholic. By virtue of his office, Dr. Richter took a leading part in shaping the regulations between the universities and the German ministries of education and in formulating the educational aspects of the concordat between the Prussian government and the Catholic church. Surely no one could bring to the discussion of the re-education of Germany a more competent grasp of the educational aims and problems of German democracy than Dr. Richter. And surely no discussion of the re-education of Germany in the interest of a democratic world community can wish to ignore Germany's own historical attempt at education for democracy.

Professor Richter's thesis is that the educational aims and policies of the German Republic were deliberately democratic and that the failure of those policies was due both to certain very real difficulties within Germany and to certain fundamental changes affecting the relations between culture and society

in Europe as a whole. He thinks that the link between culture and society is forged by the educational system and that the educational experience of the German Republic is particularly instructive for a world in which a democratic culture and a democratic society are struggling to survive the shattering impact of a global war. It is his conviction that the failure of the German democratic educational attempt points not only to critical mistakes in thinking and administration but also to two educational problems which are fundamental to the establishment of a democratic culture in a democratic society. The first of these problems has to do with the relations between the secondary school and the university; the second concerns the relation between educational and economic opportunity. Thus, the question of the re-education of Germany is intimately involved in the wider question of the relations between democracy and socialism.

Since 1939, Dr. Richter has been teaching at Elmhurst College, Elmhurst, Illinois. The controversy over educational aims and methods in America has been sharpened by the war. The dependence of American education upon the philosophy of Professor John Dewey is being forcibly challenged. Dr. Richter's appraisal of the issues in the light of his own reflection and experience suggestively underlines both the international character of educational questions and the positive contribution of American educational theory and practice to the present need of the world for social and cultural reconstruction.

Current proposals for disposing of the German problem are divided between those which advocate the rigorous application of victorious power and those which advocate the resolute application of responsible power. These two uses of power will lead to two quite different kinds of peace.

A peace established and maintained by responsible power would be based on two conditions at the very last. The first is that the vanquished are not devoid of their own resources of reconstruction. The second is that a global war is the fruit of forces of integration and disintegration common to all nations and peoples. The peace, therefore, must be viewed as a global problem which imposes upon all who are concerned about it the

task of defining and disseminating a constructive understanding of the nature and meaning of history. It is this task which makes the problem of the coming peace primarily a problem of educational aim and educational method. If education has any effective relation to life, historical crises cannot be abandoned to the dismal exigencies of circumstance and power, but must be faced and fashioned by the educational policies of men and nations.

The importance of Dr. Richter's contribution to a pressing contemporary problem has insistently demanded a wider acquaintance with his thought. This translation has, therefore, been undertaken out of necessity as well as out of esteem. But the translation has been made possible by two acts of generosity which the translator is gladly and gratefully eager to acknowledge. A grant from Wellesley College has facilitated the preparation of the manuscript for publication. As to my colleague, Professor Louise Pettibone Smith, there is no word of thanks adequate for her painstaking reading of the manuscript.

PAUL LEHMANN

WELLESLEY COLLEGE
WELLESLEY, MASSACHUSETTS

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

MANY AMERICAN READERS WILL ALLEGE THAT THIS BOOK is too "pro-German." And if after the collapse of Hitler it falls into the hands of Germans who have never supported the Nazis, they will declare that it is too severe in its judgment of the German people. The author would regard both reactions as a sign that it is extraordinarily difficult to view with detachment the revolutionary events which have overwhelmed us with breath-taking intensity for the last thirty years.

This book sees both world wars as stages in a general world crisis, the limits of which cannot yet be discerned. The forthcoming peace will bring this crisis nearer to its end only if those who make the peace attempt to transcend the times, if they not only look backward toward the immediate past but sense, as well, the spirit of the times to come. The construction of the peace imposes upon statesmen a vastly more difficult task than the conduct of the war.

The following pages are concerned with spiritual decisions about a problem which has come to public attention with unusual vehemence. The attempt is made here to co-ordinate with the general course of world events the tasks which are set for the future education of Germany. The achievements of the first German Republic have been distorted by the Nazis with cynical falsification—but they have also been minimized or misunderstood abroad since Hitler's accession to power. The first German Republic really existed; it was not an illusion. The legend according to which the leaders of the Republic were merely tools in the hands of the Junkers is quite super-

ficial. The educational efforts of the Republic bear witness to the democratic spirit which animated Germany after the first World War. They disclose a passionate attempt to arrest the cultural and political crisis which Germany experienced in an acute form in consequence of her defeat and at least to point German youth toward new directions. This attempt at re-education, not even fourteen years in the making, had to be abandoned because the German military caste was so devoid of conscience as to betray the nation into the hands of uprooted and frustrated people.

Germany is on the threshold of a new effort at re-education. This effort will not succeed unless the positive as well as the negative experiences with educational reform after the last war are utilized. My discussion has to do with the educational policies of the twenties as an important element in the formulation of new plans which seek the ultimate restoration of Germany to the community of nations. Without the practical experience which came to me during thirteen years of service in the educational administration of the largest German state, I should not have felt myself called upon to set down ideas about the past and recommendations about the future of German education.

I wish to join with the translator in sincere gratitude to Wellesley College for its assistance.

In the preparation of this book and for its form, Professor Paul Lehmann of the department of biblical history in Wellesley College has been indispensable. He has found it possible in the midst of a most preoccupying career as a teacher to give of both time and rich endowment to the translation of these pages. He has made innumerable improvements both in the form and in the substance of the manuscript. But more especially his grasp of European and German cultural development has enabled him to bring to this book an intuitive and incisive understanding. In so far as the reader finds the thoughts of the author easily accessible without the sense of reading a translation, he can only gladly share with the author his own unspeakable debt.

During the course of these labors the author has enjoyed the unfailing encouragement and constant solicitude of President

Timothy Lehmann of Elmhurst College, whose deep humanity and discerning academic perspective have placed him under heavy obligation. The author is grateful for this opportunity to make public acknowledgment of how much he owes to the stimulating support of this unusually imaginative administrator and forthright and farsighted churchman.

The translator has already referred to the inestimable collaboration of his colleague, Dr. Louise Pettibone Smith, professor of biblical history in Wellesley College. I simply cannot forego adding my own inexpressible thanks for Miss Smith's remarkable skill and generosity.

W. R.

ELMHURST COLLEGE
ELMHURST, ILLINOIS
January 1, 1945

FOREWORD

REVOLUTIONS DO NOT MAKE MEN PERMANENTLY HAPPIER, which is apparently a discovery that each nation must make in its own way and only after difficult experiences. When Bismarck, on the occasion of his reconciliation with William II, suddenly and briefly pointed out that even in Germany the monarchy was not forever guaranteed, it must have seemed to the Kaiser, who had not, like Bismarck, lived through the years around 1848 and Germany's laborious rise, as though "the old man from Sachsenwalde" wanted to frighten him with ghosts. The German of those days was worlds removed from imagining that revolutionary periods could return. Those who rule bear the sign of Cain in the conviction that the system which they represent is indestructible; and when revolutionaries take power, they tend to be even more blind and unteachable than other rulers.

But world history—which, in Hegel's famous phrase, is not the domain of happiness—imposes repeatedly a characteristic pattern of decline and expiation. The more turbulently and resolutely power is assumed, the more inexorably that power, when it has fulfilled the law of its existence, is destined to be expelled into the silence of extinction. Precisely for the revolutionary, the dictum is as appropriate as ever: "Not one have I ever seen end well." If, in exceptional instances, personal fortunes find an apparently natural and satisfying end, nevertheless the power itself which revolutionaries exercise and establish is quickly destroyed or at least transformed. In the words of Jakob Burckhardt, the celebrated Swiss historian and philosopher of revolutions, "The permanent result of revolutions seems to be

astonishingly slight compared with the great tensions and tortures which come to the fore during the crisis itself."¹

Those who hold power have a sense of time different from their contemporaries. Almost every ruler makes the fatal mistake of supposing that his activity is of more than momentary significance. On the wings of success he tends to rejoice in his schemes and to forget that the mills of the gods grind slow but they grind exceedingly fine. He hopes confidently for the continuing and permanent success of his activity and plans; and when his own day is done, he still complains that fortune has not favored him with sufficient time. Nevertheless, what the ruler does is for the most part only for the moment; when his days are fulfilled, history passes quietly over his activity. Even those who have changed the face of the world have scarcely been allotted more than twenty years. And, despite all this, every successor and epigonus hero imagines that it will be otherwise with him, that this time he can drink the cup of desire, which is power, without exhausting it.

The educational politics of Germany to be discussed in these pages encompass more than half a generation. To the American ear the word "politics" does not have a wholly commendable sound, because it has associations which the European does not connect with the word in the same way. Educational politics derived from the nature of the state might at once arouse suspicion in an American who treasures freedom and decentralization in educational matters above everything else. At the same time, however sympathetically the structural variety of the American educational system is regarded and however greatly the unlimited cultural and pedagogical possibilities afforded by this spacious country are admired, it nevertheless remains true that in America, too, the educational program cannot contribute to the development of culture without a clear and definite educational policy. In Europe, and particularly in Germany, such an educational policy was always partly determined by the special position of the state, which felt itself primarily responsible for education. The phrase "educational politics," therefore, signifies nothing more than the policy of education and instruction by which the responsible authorities of a given period were

guided. Of the significance of the fact that educational policy is assumed by the state and consequently tends markedly to be unified, we must speak later. Meanwhile, it is well worth while to pause over the fact that the spirit of a people is very infrequently affected directly by internal administrative procedures.

Public opinion focuses upon results, upon the obviously great and far-reaching political events. In politics, power, not administration, is decisive; but, unless tyranny is to hold the whip hand, all questions of culture and education must be matters of administration as well as of power. Nations vary greatly in their attitude toward their rulers; and, as between peoples governed easily and those governed with difficulty, the German people would certainly not be counted among the easily governed. But clearly this has nothing to do with the form of government: in a democracy there are also rulers and ruled. A profound observer of German history has suggested that the German people suffered spiritually from the misery of the Thirty Years' War and that they have retained since then that "miserable envy" which makes life largely unhappy and affects adversely the social life of the community.² Those who were called in 1918 to take the fortunes of a conquered people in hand had almost continually to face the incalculable difficulty of winning the understanding of their own people for decisive measures. The newly established democracy was endangered from the first by the most intense birth pangs. In the field of education this required a particularly acute leadership.

If it is inherent in democracy that the government knows and executes the will of the people, it may fairly be said that, during this period of disintegration, the German people knew much more definitely what it no longer wanted than what it did desire. The men who attempted to implement the new educational policy of the German people stood on the foundation of democracy; they were informed by a firm determination to learn from the educational policies of other democracies; but they were, to be sure, also persuaded that the great German educational tradition of the past was not entirely iniquitous. The present discussion is the fruit of the experiences which these men had to undergo within the life of their own people.

It would be erroneous to assume that this determination of the direction of education by the state necessarily paralyzes the freedom of educational development and that under such state control all educational ideas are necessarily dictated from above. It is noteworthy that the freedom and autonomy of the universities in imperial Germany were very much greater than in the French Republic, in which the universities have to this day retained the tendency toward dependence upon the state imposed by Napoleon. When we, then, undertake in the following pages to deal with German education and instruction, we shall not be concerned with ideas and measures imposed upon a democratic people by a bureaucracy. The representatives of the German people during the years of the German Republic were aware of their responsibility; consequently, what happened to German education is an accurate reflection of the educational activity and the educational desires of the German people. In so far as difficulties and opposition proved to be insurmountable, the causes must be sought in the ambiguity of the position of Germany and of the alignment of powers created by the Armistice of 1918.

Let it be emphasized once more that the handling of educational questions by the unifying administration of the state need not be identical with a political determination of educational policies. Whether or not education shall be disturbed and limited by politics depends upon the structure of the state. Under certain circumstances, education in countries which do not commit such matters to the state but intrust them largely to private initiative can be more affected by political considerations than in countries which have a state educational administration. There have been states which unwittingly came to depend upon political authorities for educational policies. And there can be no doubt that in the democracies economic influences, however indirect and cautious they may have been, have sometimes also hindered and complicated the operation of the educational system.

The following chapters are initially devoted to some reflections upon the past. But this historical analysis is not an end in itself; the aim is to establish thereby the basis for recommenda-

tions looking toward the solution of the educational problem of Germany after the war. The educational policies of the Weimar Republic were directed toward the democratization of all the educational resources of German culture. Those who undertook the difficult task of the reorientation of the German people were inspired by high ideals, but they were confronted by a responsibility which cannot be compared with the educational achievements of the established democracies in which there was a reliable tradition upon which to build.

The first attempt at a re-education of Germany was not a total loss. The current fashion is either to pass over the educational achievements of the first Republic in silence or to represent them as fruitless. Matters in the field of education are, of course, not so simple as to justify appraising the results of an educational philosophy with a political yardstick. Surely, no one would hold American education responsible for the emergence of a Huey Long; the two Napoleons did not come to power because the French educational system had failed. The future of education is not served by making the educational efforts of the first German Republic responsible for the coming of Hitler.

Bitter disappointment over the fact that after fourteen years the German Republic did not survive the criminal attack of political gangsters and soldiers of fortune has even blinded some German *émigrés* who owe the foundations of their own intellectual development to German education and has led them to a gross misrepresentation of historical facts. An understandable revulsion against the underworld of murderers which has dominated Germany since 1933 has betrayed even competent educators into primitive and superficial generalizations. The moment one speaks about "forcing" education upon the German people, one admits that the German people have been and will remain evil from their youth up.

Every attempt at the democratic re-education of Germany must start from the experiences of the Republic. No program of reform can ignore them or regard them as inconsequential if it is to avoid dilettantism; hence this discussion enters upon a closer analysis of the aims, the presuppositions, and the general circumstances of the efforts at reform between 1918 and 1933.

The treatment of the future of German education is preceded by a section which explores the fundamental differences between American and German education. What is said about American education makes no claim to be exhaustive and is not offered in a contentious spirit, since a critical appraisal of American education is far removed from the purpose of this book. The comparison is pursued only to the extent that seemed necessary for the interpretation of the educational system of Germany.

Education cannot work miracles. On the other hand, education is not a mechanical device which, by pressing a button, can automatically set off a movement and get results. Education can as little prevent the outbreak of revolutions as good will can command the forces of nature. No mortal has yet been able decisively to alter the course of history by rational effort. Those who believe that the political dangers which threaten the future of Europe could be dissipated by pedagogical zeal are living under illusions. But education can liberate energies which fortify the good and, to that extent, weaken the evil. If the future of German education is to prepare for and nourish the spiritual recovery of the German people, it must be based upon a vision of the future which encompasses the restoration—nay, the permanent maintenance—of peace. Such a vision of the future will remain vague unless simultaneously joined to the past, not as that past is seen from afar but as it actually occurred.

The last three chapters seek to outline some suggestions for the kind of educational system which must emerge in Germany against the background of a new Europe. We risk such an undertaking, fully aware of the fact that it is dependent upon the achievement of peace and that the structure of the peace lies outside the power of any individual. The world situation is so unique that all conventional and traditional schemes of educational philosophy can be of only limited use. The picture to be painted here will convey the impression to the reader that the situation is extremely complex. Against the oversimplifications which depict—often with good intent—the situation as either white or black, we should like to emphasize that the effort to reconstruct Europe, and thus also the attempt to re-educate

Germany, is one of the most difficult and perilous tasks confronting the postwar world. An unimaginative peace will not be a good peace even if the re-education of Germany is undertaken. Moreover, this re-education and the consequent recovery of the nation will succeed only if those who are to be responsible for the peace are delivered from the passions of the moment and can, with discerning and totally unprejudiced eyes, look toward the creation of a world in which peace will be secure for more than one generation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|-----|
| I. POLITICS AND CULTURE BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR . . . | 1 |
| II. FROM GENERALS TO DEMOCRATS | 15 |
| III. STATE, COMMUNITY, AND EDUCATION | 28 |
| IV. THE REFORM OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION . . | 54 |
| V. POLITICS AND YOUTH | 66 |
| VI. THE REFORM OF THE UNIVERSITY | 79 |
| VII. AMERICAN AND GERMAN EDUCATION | 110 |
| VIII. WHAT TO DO WITH GERMANY | 127 |
| IX. A NEW IDEAL FOR GERMAN EDUCATION | 156 |
| X. THE STRATEGY OF REBIRTH | 188 |
| NOTES AND REFERENCES | 215 |
| INDEX | 221 |

CHAPTER ONE

POLITICS AND CULTURE BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR

WHEN GERMANY WENT TO WAR IN 1914, THERE WAS NO longer any political or general ideology which could have pointed the way ahead; one lived by the ideas of the past. Every chancellor of the Reich who took office between 1890 and the outbreak of war assured the Reichstag that a people could not be indefinitely blessed by statesmen of the stature of Bismarck, and the new incumbent would then feel called upon to add that he would endeavor faithfully and conscientiously to uphold the Bismarckian legacy. Bismarck's general conception of the world had become more or less dogma; even the easily aroused ambition of William II for political improvisation was always governed, consciously or unconsciously, by the broad lines of Bismarckian foreign policy.

The economic development of Germany was caught in a dizzyly ascending spiral, which year after year caused England graver and graver concern. Misunderstanding between the two peoples noticeably increased. England took every word of the German sovereign three times more seriously than it was intended. Her instinctive revulsion against the militarization of the German nation was shared by other powers. The pointless enlargement of the German fleet, together with German colonial expansion, disturbed England like a nightmare, so that the German penchant for display seemed sheer subterfuge. Indeed, one could almost believe in fate when one recalls how the tactlessness of the German statesmen and the frivolity of the Austrian statesmen fostered the war and then how the English cabinet, with the connivance of Lord Grey, stumbled into a

conflict which the ruling powers in Russia found by no means unwelcome.

Or perhaps history is chance. Goethe was so annoyed by the accidental in history that from time to time he questioned the merit of any historical reflection. Frederick the Great as a cynic of the Enlightenment regarded "His Majesty, Chance" very highly as the fact which explained the course of things in the world. And certainly, during the critical months of 1914, the German statesmen must have seemed to any observer to lack the skill, however great their desire, to hold the war in check. But the thoughtful observer of history has never contented himself with mere chance; rather he has sought causes which, though perhaps not externally evident, were nevertheless deeply ideological.

The German statesmen were guided by no cultural ideology save merely that the achievements of Bismarck must be safeguarded, that the economic advance of Germany must be continued, and, above all, that Germany was threatened by England because the latter begrudged her every forward step. These were all defensive ideas. During the course of the war the attempt was made outside Germany to hold certain tendencies in German philosophy responsible for the German outlook. The ideas of Kant, Fichte, and especially those of a certain General von Bernhardt were regarded as particularly influential upon the governmental groups and, above all, upon the German military. Actually, only a very small number of those inside Germany who were interested in military affairs could have busied themselves with Bernhardt's reflections, which otherwise were almost unknown.¹ I myself learned Bernhardt's name for the first time during the war and from the foreign press. This supposedly typical general was a grand-nephew of the German Romanticist and translator of Shakespeare, Ludwig Tieck, himself the child of an allegedly illegitimate mother and a Berlin ropemaker—an ancestry scarcely conforming to foreign expectations.

The real situation in Germany, on the other hand, was extraordinarily difficult. No positive and compelling slogan had been found around which to rally the people; it was said merely

that the existence of Germany was threatened by surrounding peoples. Every German child had learned at school that after forty years France still smarted over her defeat and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, and the teaching of history in Germany had also disapproved the tyrannical usurpation of Napoleon III and contrasted it with the rule of the German monarchs. To be sure, the German government was conservative and capitalist. But, compared to what one calls "dictatorship," the government was moved—half-consciously, half-unconsciously—by a will to progress which, though stronger in southern Germany than in the north, was not wholly absent even there. The picture of William II as merely a bloodthirsty tyrant is a political myth which has nothing to do with the historical situation.

The inner dynamic of this situation was liberal in the sense that the average citizen regarded himself as liberal and the crown moved reluctantly under pressure into each liberal advance, while all the time aware of the fact that the course of things inexorably led in the liberal direction. The government was more alert and flexible than the Junkers. It remained too firmly caught, however, in the undertow of heavy industry and committed the telling mistake of treating the Social Democratic forces as enemies of the state instead of trying to win their support, which at that time was still a possibility. The fact that the era of the parents of William II had hovered over the German people like a passing shadow was genuinely and properly regretted. But it was not the personalities of the Emperor Frederick and the Empress—daughter of Queen Victoria—that had promised a new state of affairs; it was, rather, that these sovereigns were strongly influenced by English cultural and political ideas so that Germany would have continued of herself to develop after the pattern of English liberalism.

An unfathomable tragedy has overshadowed the history of Germany since 1815. Much happened too late, and external political successes were almost always immediately obscured by unfortunate internal political developments. The consequences of the French Revolution first affected Germany three-quarters of a century later. The bourgeoisie—the actual bearer of this revolution—was suppressed again and did not

come into its own politically until 1918. Meanwhile, the bourgeoisie had been overtaken by the so-called "fourth estate" of the workers. The revolution of 1918 was partly determined by the fact that the bourgeois and the proletarian struggles for power coincided. The bourgeoisie wished to possess what it had hitherto been denied; and, at the same time, it was rivaled by the workers, who, in turn, were hampered by the bourgeoisie. Since it is now plain that the revolution of 1933 stems from that section of the bourgeoisie whose achievements and well-being were disparaged by the nobility of the nineteenth century, the aspirations of the workers toward a place in the sun have meanwhile had to be postponed.

Germany was in the grip of ominous cultural, as well as political, tensions. The period before 1914 was a time of very limited productivity; all genuine creativity was attacked, and artistic pioneering was not desired. Anyone acquainted with the new Dom or the new state library in Berlin can only view with misgiving the weighted tastelessness of a misguided artistic purpose. Liebermann and the Impressionists flourished beyond the pale of official, governmental encouragement. Ibsen and Gerhart Hauptmann were merely endured, not encouraged. Stefan George and Rilke wrote their poems far removed from public life. Like Nietzsche, they were admired by free-lance painters and journalists but not by those charged with the responsibility for the official cultivation of national art. The emperor himself was especially ill-disposed toward naturalism and waxed enthusiastic over third- and fourth-rate poets.

Although the structure of the German state before the war was fundamentally military, there were essential concessions to broad intellectual and cultural pursuits. Every lieutenant was qualified for the court, i.e., he could appear at court without more ado, but civilians required at least a title, which usually did not come to them before their fortieth year. The minimum rank was that of a so-called "official of the fourth class." For this the full professor could qualify at the court, but no one with a lower academic status. The order of ranks was tightly and minutely established. To be sure, if the emperor wished to see a professor who did not have the appropriate rank, he sim-

ply overruled this order. William II was particularly free about things of this sort and loved to make decisions on the spur of the moment which afterward earned for him the charge of being too democratic. The lower the rank, the more punctiliously one insisted upon the decorum of the state.

This preference of the military over civilians can most directly be ascribed to the historical influence of the autocratic tradition. But there was something more fundamental involved. Since the fortunes of the people had for decades and generations depended upon brief but intermittent wars, honor naturally came to those who most determined victory. Thus the external structure of the state depended less upon the obvious decisions of the present than upon the course of the past and the future. The military looked upon the citizen as a civilian. But the military had cultural interests too. There had always been sensitive and thoroughly educated spirits among high-ranking German officers, which has been attested by the whole of the nineteenth century from Scharnhorst and Clausewitz to Gneisenau and Boyen, the elder Moltke and Schlieffen. The disintegration which overtook the German generals during the last generation was not yet apparent.

On the other hand, in average military circles there had always been an unconcealed distaste for the things of the spirit. The body and the will were the foci of training.² Military or academic efficiency required more than spiritual qualities. The discredited intellectual grind was later to become the philistine with the umbrella, the man without a uniform, the pedantic grumbler and bookworm, who wanted on rational grounds to take the wind out of the sails of boorish and ridiculous adventurers. Titles, ranks, uniforms, seemed to dominate national life. And yet it would be false to assert that this was an uncultured time. It is much more important to grasp how and why, despite all this, men like Mommsen, Helmholtz, Ehrlich, Robert Koch, Ranke, and many other distinguished scholars could work and find highest acclaim.

The Germany of the last two hundred years has always had two souls. This fateful cleavage began with Frederick the Great, who founded a military state, composed flute concertos,

and became the friend of Voltaire. The combination of the life of the spirit with physical prowess has always been short-lived. During the time of Goethe, of the great philosophical era of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, the defense against Napoleon was also successfully undertaken; but even then the latent tensions between the two worlds were recognizably great. Actually, it is a miracle that there were no tragic conflicts of the sort that broke out later. The middle of the century was dominated by the life of the spirit and by political weakness. It was Bismarck's good fortune once more to effect a partial reconciliation between culture and power.

The period between 1918 and 1933 was undoubtedly a richer period spiritually and intellectually than that between 1900 and 1914. Indeed, it is precisely this which the Germany of the present has turned into a reproach. It is maintained that the cultivation of the spirit deadens and weakens and that the vital energies of the nation can be marshaled only by discrediting the spirit. King Frederick William IV of Prussia, on the throne during the unsuccessful revolution of 1848, was a highly cultured person. Bismarck's emperor, William I, was active and interested in military affairs but quite limited, culturally speaking, except for the fact that his wife, a princess from Weimar, had known Goethe and exerted a considerable influence upon her husband. Nor does it seem to be unimportant either that Bismarck, in spite of his gifted politico-historical insights, had little interest in art and music and lived in a Spartan atmosphere which Prince von Bülow has described with malicious humor in his *Memoirs*. For Germany, times of successful foreign politics were seldom days of cultural glory, since spiritual vitality and political impotence were much more often companions. After 1918 this incompatibility found expression in political catch phrases like "the spirit of Potsdam" and "the spirit of Weimar."

It has already been suggested that people outside Germany suspected that the intense aspirations of German philosophy lay behind German militarism and the struggle for power. It is true enough that Kant and Fichte were often quoted during the war in one way or another; portions of their teachings were popularized, even trivialized, i.e., brought within reach of the

general understanding at the price of their true substance. But deliberate and skilful mythologies of this sort did not exist in Germany alone. Surely, there was nothing vastly different about viewing the French army as under the spiritual protection of the Maid of Orleans. Should the French spirit be censured because of the philosophy of Sorel? It is one thing for pretenders to select this or that from a given philosophical system, popularize it, and dispense it as contemporary wisdom; but it is quite another for philosophers to develop their abstract and profound reflections without regard to the kind of trivial application which flatters the commonplace understanding.

The Kantian imperative of duty was transmuted in Germany into a "Prussian sense of obligation." Kant, however, was a pacifist. The exploitation of the Kantian categorical imperative was, of course, undertaken by seekers after political shibboleths. Journalists or naïve military writers watered down ideas which were originally comprehensible only by the philosophically trained. The story is told of Hindenburg that he came to Königsberg after the war (not yet as president of the Republic) in order to receive an honorary degree. His speech of acceptance contained the neat turn: "Here, where Kant discovered his categorical imperative." Such popularizations were tragically amusing. The hero ideology of Fichte was later artificially intensified and deliberately coarsened. Fichte himself may not have been exactly a tender soul, but the pragmatic interpretation of his doctrines as the logical precursors of everything that subsequently happened under Hitler betrays an inadmissible oversimplification of events. Such perversions could arise only at the expense of the actual sense of abstract conceptions; and this was possible because the German people no longer possessed an ideology of their own which would satisfy the aspirations of the politicians. The militaristic doctrine was a thoroughly synthetic product; and that is why the charge of an inner connection between the war aims of Germany in 1914 and the German philosophical tradition is false.

The actual course of events is much more complicated. It is not too much to say that such interpretations mistake the true substance of German philosophy and violate it *ad hoc*. If one

looks through Kant and Hegel for passages which breathe something of the war spirit of 1914 or, now, of naziism, one is certain to exclude other equally influential passages. Hegel, who is currently and very superficially being exploited to such ends, was, after, all a teacher and predecessor of Karl Marx. Suppose, instead of quoting his personal loyalty to the Prussian state, one remembered the following from his *Philosophy of History*, penned under the eyes of the Prussian royal house:

"In the present day, the Constitution of a country and people is not represented as so entirely dependent on free and deliberate choice. The fundamental but abstractly (and therefore imperfectly) entertained conception of Freedom, has resulted in the Republic being very generally regarded—in theory—as the only just and true political constitution. Many even, who occupy elevated official positions under monarchical constitutions—so far from being opposed to this idea—are actually its supporters; only they see that such a constitution, though the best, cannot be realized under all circumstances; and that—while men are what they are—we must be satisfied with less freedom."³

Some comfort may be derived from the fact that a very distinguished American philosopher, who has made Fichte and Kant and Hegel also responsible for the outbreak of the last war, names Heine among the sinners too. In the light of the contemporary German attitude toward Heine, this is peculiar, to say the least. On the whole, it would be the better part of wisdom not to claim the intellectual heritage of German idealism as a source for the popular talk which flourishes everywhere in turbulent times and can be nourished only by the miserable dilution of genuine and original philosophical ideas. Such imposition of propaganda upon philosophy by reputable scholars was, of course, not unaccompanied by an honest and sympathetic desire to comprehend the roots and depths of the German soul.

But what can be said about the German soul? During the second half of the nineteenth century, Prussia dissociated itself from the more liberal population of the southwest and the more Catholic orientation of the southeast. There can be no doubt that the establishment and the strengthening of the German Reich

effectively balanced these variations. Only on this assumption can events since 1933 be understood. Of inestimable importance has been the mixture of German and Slavic blood, which has contributed fundamentally to the character of Prussia and to a large part of northern Germany. Just as the infiltration of Roman blood in the west and of Celtic blood in the south has partly determined the character of the people, so also has the Slavic intermixture in the north and east. The homogeneous character of the German people, like that of so many European peoples, is a wishful dream, an aesthetic ideal, which has no reality. If it is false to declare that the dictum "might makes right" is grounded in German philosophy, it is not improper at least to ask why the opposition between master and servant is so often intensely expressed: "Freedom has disappeared from the earth; only masters and servants remain." Schiller's line in *Wallenstein* was born of a profound revolutionary experience which has characterized German history again and again.

It is worth noting that the emphasis upon masters and servants is particularly pronounced in eastern and southeastern Europe. Typological studies of European peoples have advanced considerably during the last generation. Count Kayserling, Ernst Robert Curtius, and E. Diesel, to mention only a few, have made some observations which are so convincing as to avoid the usual dangers of generalization. I. L. Kandel⁴ has underlined a few decisive points, which have been used in an article by the German educator, Aloys Fischer. According to this article, the greatest difficulty in the way of understanding the German soul is its inner contradiction. Dynamic energy, unpredictability, a certain lack of stability which is only too ready to surrender again what has been laboriously achieved—these are characteristics which have been observed by so many informed students that they are scarcely contestable any longer. Uncommon intellectual power is accompanied by an emotional drive which breaks out in sudden and wholly irrational attitudes. The German thoroughness, which foreigners often ridicule, goes hand in hand with an absorbing preoccupation with the absolute and the transcendent. The German knows less how to play than other peoples and certainly is more deficient in the capacity for

empathy—a fact which has increasingly impressed the world since the last war. German politics have made repeated psychological mistakes, which have seemed strangely out of accord with a sensitiveness and thoroughness which even bitter enemies did not deny.

An inclusive grasp of national peculiarities should lead to the deepening of a people's understanding of itself—but experience hitherto has shown that nations resist such self-comprehension and generally prefer to remain on a level which permits them without further reflection to foster sentiments of love for the fatherland. And yet a heightened self-comprehension on the part of separate nations might be increasingly significant for the determination of the aims of education. Germany was driven by her defeat to such a self-analysis and criticism, only to be catapulted in 1933 into a self-adulation unique in the history of the world.

We have already touched upon the question of how far the education of a nation influences its political fate. The ideas that inform the culture and education of a country are always part of its total ideology and express the yearning and striving toward the future by that portion of the population to which the future belongs. But what relation have educational ideas to external political events? It is extraordinarily difficult to say whether false ideas are necessarily the cause of failures of foreign policy. Public opinion tends to ascribe some of the guilt of misfortune to the educational system, while those who happen to be in power distribute the blame to suit their own purposes. Before the war, William II used to point out that only a people with a Christian orientation could rise to the situation brought about by war—but all the belligerents of the time counted God on their side. Frederick the Great adhered to the well-known maxim that God was always on the side of the strongest battalions. After the defeat of 1806 the desire for reform led to the abandonment of serfdom, the introduction of conscription, and the reconstruction of the educational system. Nevertheless, the paradox remained that the national decline to which contemporaries attributed the defeat actually occurred at the time that Goethe, Schiller, the Romanticists, and Beethoven

lived, when the music of Haydn and Mozart was widely acclaimed, and when German philosophy had reached its unique zenith. It cannot be maintained that these energies could have come to fruition only after 1814; for the same men who experienced the defeat became the emancipators. Among the prisoners of the Napoleonic era was the later liberator, Field Marshal Blücher.

If the Prussian king could say on the occasion of the founding of the University of Berlin that the state should—indeed, must—regain in moral resources what it had lost in physical strength, the intention must surely have been to point beyond the despair of physical impotence and servitude to the hope that there was a realm of blessedness which did not belong entirely to this fleeting world. But, self-evidently, the words of the king also implied that wisdom was power and, therefore, that better days awaited the renewal of cultural ideals, the intensification of knowledge, and the development of character. If a generation in which music and poetry and philosophy flourished as never before in German history assumed that education and culture were greatly in need of reconstruction, this could mean only that the average citizen had not kept pace with those who had successfully attained greater cultural heights. The treasures which had been created by the geniuses of poetry, philosophy, and music had only to be made available to all the people through general education.

Nevertheless, the question arises as to whether the victory over Napoleon in 1815 was already the fruit of an altered and rejuvenated cultural and educational policy.⁵ Had it not been, after all, merely a victory of the stronger battalions? Had it not been simply that the strategists had finally learned enough from Napoleon? Or, to take another example, were not the economic mismanagement of Napoleon III and the superiority of Bismarck and Moltke much more decisive for what Germany experienced in 1870 than the administration of the schools and the German educational system?

The German people were told in 1918 that defeat could not have come except for an obsolete education. And when, by 1933, the democratic government of Germany had still not de-

livered the people from the most essential provisions of the Versailles Treaty and, in addition, the economic crisis had become increasingly desperate, Hitler appeared and proclaimed that things had come to such a pass precisely because of the spirit of 1918. The Nazis declared that the educational system of 1914 had been much better than that of the Republic. Indeed, the only mistake of imperial days had been the failure to administer with sufficient rigor the then existing educational system. Every trace of liberalism and all emphasis upon the rational capacities of man should have been avoided. Exclusive stress should have been laid upon the discipline of the will, military training, and practical affairs. Had this been done, Germany would never have been defeated. And if national socialism had succeeded, these ideas of culture and education would have been confirmed.

The point at issue here is one not of military triumph but of the effectiveness of education in the life of the civilized nations. The pacifist contends that victories are achieved solely by force and that it is exactly the world of culture which transcends earth's brutal struggles for power. But is there any nation reduced to impotence and chafing under defeat which would claim to have delivered its soul because it had defended spiritual values? Suppose, for instance, that a country like America should one day really be defeated, would any questions be raised about the adequacy of the educational system? Would there be any room for some such reasoning as this: "The enemy has succeeded solely by brute strength, numerical superiority, more complete technical preparation, more adequate material resources, and the greater competence of some of its individual generals and statesmen. We Americans are spiritually much more acute than our conquerors and continue despite our defeat to work in the realm of the spirit and are better off than we were before"? Conquered peoples have often been aroused to vastly more valuable achievements than have the victors, who are always in danger of resting on their laurels; and yet the philosophy of education continues to affirm that education is an essential factor in the external success as well as in the inner development of a nation.

But what is the relation between the external success of a nation and its spiritual inwardness? It could be said that philosophers of history who do not believe in progress and theologians who dialectically juxtapose the sinful world and the approaching Kingdom of God may ignore the contradiction between national prosperity and cultural improvement. But in this case the value of education is negligible. If the world is fundamentally beyond improvement, education has a very limited significance indeed. On the other hand, it may be noted that the natural and spontaneous attitude of philosophers of education is not pessimistic. The values of education are not dissociated from the external interest of a state or nation in which such education is carried on. The problem nevertheless remains of whether a philosophy of education could be developed on the foundation of a general pessimism about the world. An education based upon an other-worldly theology tends to lose sight of the immediate task of the development of character in this world, whereas an optimistic educational outlook tends to oversimplify the actual character of life in this world. Apparently most philosophers of education have avoided this dilemma because of a conscious or unconscious commitment either to an eighteenth-century liberalism or to a markedly secularized theology.

In Europe a tension exists between the religious or historico-philosophical pessimism which has developed under the impact of the events of the last twenty years and a constructive philosophy of education. It is perfectly understandable that America should not recognize such tensions, since America has not experienced them; but in Europe the critical question of the precise relation between ideas and power can no longer be evaded. Even the exponents of a materialistic world view do not deny the nexus between ideas and power, although they ascribe to ideas only a propagandistic or functional significance. Ideas alone have never yet determined any historical event. But the task of a philosophy of history is to determine in each instance the extent to which ideas have influenced actions; and a philosophy of education, while not ascribing decisive historical importance to educational aims and procedures, must nevertheless take account of their interrelation with actual occurrences.

Educational ideas are the fuel of historical advance. Thus an educational philosophy must continually strive to affect the course of things in the world. If events contradict the educational principles which had guided men previously, these principles are not thereby discredited, as a naïve sense of justice sometimes imagines. The truth is that the tension between current ideas and the actual course of history has become too acute; and that is why educational principles must always be accompanied by the will to fashion the future and by the almost intuitive capacity to anticipate the shape of things to come. Such a philosophy does not require a doctrine of natural rights or moralistic assumptions of natural human goodness. The question of whether the defeat of a nation is to be ascribed to a false education is a false question. The disintegration of a people after a defeat proves only that the prevailing educational ideas have shown themselves to be either unrealizable or obsolete. A new educational effort is called for; educational ideas must be related afresh to the events of the time so that, despite a temporary eclipse, a nation or a group of nations can once again find the way to the meaning of life.

CHAPTER TWO

FROM GENERALS TO DEMOCRATS

THE COLLAPSE OF GERMANY WAS NO LESS A SURPRISE FOR its enemies than for most Germans. The fact that Germany had held out for more than four years and then fallen suggested to many a German that something was not altogether right. The victory seemed to have been won so clearly by the superiority of American materials and the intervention of unexpended American military strength that the German people felt that the prominence of France and England in the imposition of peace was unjustified.

Within Germany itself a search for those who were guilty was undertaken immediately after the war. A nation, astonishingly well educated, whose youth had for decades been prepared for military life, whose General Staff had secured itself against every surprise, could not improvise adjustments to the unforeseen needs and fortunes of war. The organizational capacity of the German people was incontestable, and everything had been prepared with machine-like precision. But, in spite of the greatest will to sacrifice, the people were not sufficiently safeguarded against surprise. When disappointments had to be overcome and new remedies provided on the spur of the moment, they were too inflexible.

Still more decisive was the lack of political perspective and leadership. On this point Germany was unanimous after the war: the government was reproached for having permitted so powerful a coalition of the enemy. The question was raised as to whether Germany's will to power alone had been responsible for the combination of nations against her. William II, who was

as unfortunate in his choice of collaborators as his grandfather William I had been astute, lacked the capacity to keep the balance wheel between the various departments of his government and the stability to administer adequately. He was a gifted, susceptible spirit, equipped with an uncommon memory. He could be gentlemanly, but he did not possess much tact, and he was vain and impulsive. During the war there was never unanimity between the chancellor of the Reich and the General Staff. The military dominated the civil leadership and set great store by its achievements over the diplomats. The invasion of Belgium at the very beginning of the war indicated that the military was in the saddle, for Bethmann-Holweg was fundamentally opposed to this maneuver. The submarine menace of the first World War shows in retrospect a complete failure of the German naval leadership, which made inadequate preparations and vastly overestimated its powers. Von Tirpitz, then minister of the navy, was greatly overrated both at home and abroad.

The historical result of the war, however, seemed clearly to prove that monarchies could survive only as far as they possessed an unmistakably democratic character. The verdict had fallen in favor of the democracies. It did not seem of great importance for the future that these democracies were, as we should say today, more or less capitalistic and imperialistic. The relation between liberalism and capitalism had not yet become the object of penetrating analytical inquiry.

But who really lost the war? The course of history from 1918 to 1934 has renewed this question. Many contemporaries of 1918 felt that the French and the English had won a victory so complete as to make the outcome irrevocable. How differently this victory is to be judged today! For Germany, at any rate, the monarchy had definitely been defeated and with it the aristocratic and military ruling clique. The general conduct of the war—what with the rapid succession of inept chancellors, some of whom, like Bethmann-Hollweg and Michaelis, were not even of average competence—seemed toward the end to have become so hopeless that any other class in the nation, however inexperienced, aroused more promising hopes.

Some of the generals took the view that they had not been

defeated; hence they looked for an alibi and blamed the diplomats. An able military authority like Ludendorff, clinging to his own successes, tried until his death to trace the defeat to other than military causes. Those who knew the facts, of course, remembered that no one else in Germany had been so determined as Ludendorff to assume political leadership and that the Kaiser had proved himself impotent to protect the statesmen against military usurpation. Despite his achievements, Ludendorff retains the odium of having seen the approaching catastrophe of the summer of 1918 without facing the facts in time. Attempts were made again and again by his closest collaborators to point out the consequences of his irresponsibility. Finally, Ludendorff broke down completely and suddenly demanded of the diplomats, whom he had hitherto scorned, an armistice within twenty-four hours. It is indicative of the limits of his character that he never had the courage to admit his complete and final failure but continually tried to hide it in all that he wrote.

Those who knew Hindenburg personally will always be impressed by his monumental simplicity, his rigid poise and dignity, and his consciousness of tradition. His simple-mindedness together with his advanced age no longer really qualified him for the presidency of the new Republic. More important still was the fact that, as a result of his indifference to all human considerations, his feeling for personal commitments seemed to disappear. He managed to continue to enjoy the waning ideals of a Prussian nobleman and even to talk about them, firmly convinced that he would continue to live by them. But history cannot embellish his attitude during the hours which preceded the flight of William II to Holland, his subsequent position with respect to Ludendorff when the latter was about to be dismissed by the emperor, his attitude toward Brüning and Schleicher, his abandonment of all those who had stood with him as ministers of the Republic during the days when they were being persecuted in one way or another by the National Socialist government, and, finally, his indisputable multiform breach of the constitution.

Hindenburg suffered heavily from remorse because of his

conduct on the occasion of the Kaiser's flight. But a statesman and general who claimed the maxim "Faithfulness is the mark of honor" will not easily escape the contrast between word and deed. Hindenburg's commerce with the Socialist ministers was haunted by uncanny unreality. An old and fading world flickered at moments before Hindenburg's eyes in dazzling and almost weird apparitions; and it translluminated the world that was coming into being—a world which did not yet seem to be certain of its existence, a world which did not know whether it was awake or still in a dream.

It has been necessary to refer to the personalities of Ludendorff and Hindenburg because in them the transitional situation comes sharply into focus. People said at that time that German officialdom did not abandon its posts, that it had done its duty and thereby had safeguarded the nation against chaos. A closer examination of the situation in the light of the terrible experiences of the second revolution of 1933 may well pause over the question of whether so many reactionary officials remained in office after 1918 solely because of their fidelity. The German official has never lacked military courage; but Bismarck's famous remark that the German lacks "civil courage" expresses one of the most striking aspects of the national character.

The lack of the courage of one's convictions and the willingness to accommodate one's self to points of view of superiors because disagreement might hinder personal advancement stand in clear contrast to the physical fortitude. The English statesman, Lord Haldane, who was in Germany shortly before the last war and who had previously studied there, writes in his autobiography that he was immediately impressed by the lack of character among the foremost men of the nation. The Weimar Republic was compelled within a few years to offer the highest position in the state to a representative of the monarchy, Field Marshal Hindenburg. At first he discharged his duties with absolute precision. But the cleavage in the whole situation is plain.

For the first time in centuries, men took the helm of government without the approval of the crown, that is, the approval of an individual and his narrow circle of advisers. The leaders of the Republic were men of the people. The question of how far

individuals in responsible positions are creatures of circumstance and how far they impose their own stamp upon the times is problematic. The distinguished German historian, Ranke, with that sensitivity and refinement which characterize his treatment of cultural phenomena, has spoken of the "spiritual reality" of history, of those unseen forces which dwell in hidden depths. And, more recently, Friedrich Meinecke has elaborated upon what Ranke regarded as the polarity between the creative personality and the universal spirit.¹ The affinity between the general tendencies of a period and outstanding individuals must be accepted as a fact which defies complete rational explanation. The activity of the individual, in politics as well as in culture, occurs only in the living context created by the spirit of the time. Thus the leadership of the affairs of state ought to be significantly different in a democratic republic and in a monarchy.

The new leaders of the nation were involved at the start in a struggle with more radical forces. The example of Russia seemed to assure the possibility that in Germany, too, the leap could be made immediately from reaction to communism. It must never be forgotten that this prospect actually existed for months. The most radical leaders voluntarily left the stage as if by miracle; the reasons are not clear even today. They may have hoped that the Social Democrats would be crushed in the struggle over the terms of peace. A factor of considerable influence was the Catholic population of the border areas, the Rhineland, and upper Silesia, which were under enemy occupation. The support of Catholicism was essential if portions of the Reich were not to declare their independence and further weaken the nation.

The new social democracy had matured by demanding, by criticizing, and by opposing. Its leaders had become accustomed to the utopian character of their hopes, and now, after shattering and unalluring circumstances, they were in sight of the goal. Not a few of these men privately acknowledged that they had been taken by surprise and had never believed that the dream of a lifetime could be fulfilled.

The aims of the Social Democrats had been formulated after the war of 1870 under the ingenious influence of Marx and

others and had been proclaimed, despite many variations, with essential uniformity for almost two generations. Revolutions live by the novelty of their ideas and demands and by the unpredictability—indeed, improbability—of the events which follow. The demands of the Social Democrats were new for the average citizen, who was still rubbing the sand out of his eyes. However, those who had followed the official propaganda, which declared that the Social Democrats were the enemies of the state, had learned something from the fact that in the critical hour the Social Democrats had also supported the government. Very soon it came to be recognized that the new leaders “were not so bad after all.”

The discredited but obdurate groups hoped that the social democracy would gradually turn bourgeois and lose force. This reckoning was essentially false, although it was correct to this extent, that the old sections of the party had been infected without knowing it by the liberalism of the middle classes, who were much more liberal and bourgeois than they themselves realized; but they no longer expressed the principles of social democracy with complete purity.

Observers of the earliest manifestations of the revolution will not easily forget its eschatological, apocalyptic uniqueness. But when one recalls how things looked in Germany about a half-year later, one can only say that it was a mild revolution. Indeed, it almost seems to have been too mild. Just as a storm which does not bring the longed-for cool must be repeated, so the revolution of 1933 seemed to aspire to realize a part of that which the first revolution had failed to achieve.

The government of the Republic was anxious not to break completely with the past. To be sure, the conservative views of those who had previously held power were rejected. Liberal spirits were tolerated except by the latest group of Socialists, who regarded liberalism also as an enemy. Every ministry had at least one liberal official who retained the confidence of his superiors.

In the field of culture and education Carl Heinrich Becker is a case in point. He became a state secretary in the Prussian Ministry of Education. He belonged to the well-to-do southern

German middle class; had been a professor of oriental languages and culture in Heidelberg, Hamburg, and Bonn; and, as an authority on Islam, had traveled considerably abroad, so that he had acquired a comprehensive understanding of world affairs. For more than a decade this liberal, far-sighted, unprejudiced, and noble-minded man played a decisive role in the administration of the educational system.

A man of this sort could not believe that the cultural ideas of the past were wholly corrupt and unusable; yet, at the same time, he introduced a middle and southern German element into those Prussian circles which had had the leadership of German affairs. The south had always been more hospitable to democratic thought than had the rest of Germany. Becker had long been a convinced democrat though he belonged to no party. He was a humanist in the classical German sense of the word; as a scholar he had a sure grasp of the nature of scientific inquiry; and because of his familiarity with Islam he had come to an intimate understanding of the religious forces in history.

Upon one thing the Socialists who led the government and the liberals among the middle classes were firmly agreed from the first: in a decisive sense the defeat had been due to mistakes in the educational system. Accordingly, the first task was to identify these mistakes and then to work out something new and different for the future. Were there sufficient resources in the arsenal of the Marxian world view for this undertaking? It will always be a tragic circumstance that the Socialist leaders proclaimed that international reconciliation and pacifism alone could prepare the way for unity among the European states. Around this banner the workers of all the European countries would unite. Their voices would so completely drown the existing imperialistic attitudes and tendencies in the nations which had imposed the Versailles Treaty that its consequences would be eliminated.

When one considers that even the enemy powers at Versailles reminded Germany of her long tradition as a nation of poets and thinkers, one can understand why the new constitutional assembly met at Weimar. Culture and education were

now to be determined by the new politics. If the hopes which were enthusiastically expressed and disseminated among the people were not soon fulfilled, it could only mean that the educational aims of the new political system, which were democratic, were being hampered. A government that takes power after a severe defeat often finds itself accursed, because it has to survive the defeat and inaugurate wholly untried policies. The shortsightedness of the men who governed England and especially France after the war made them impervious to the extraordinary peril to which the German government was exposed. The most modest foreign political success was continually denied to the new leaders. Brüning still tried desperately to make clear to men like Macdonald, Briand, and Laval that a genuinely far-reaching achievement in foreign policy would disperse the threatening clouds; but all such appeals were ignored, and halfway measures continued to be the rule.

The previous course of education, however, was only gradually called into question. Dissatisfaction and anxiety in a people burdened to death, exhausted, and disappointed do not immediately give rise to cultural inquiry. There were more pressing practical matters to be attended to first. Subsequently, that part of the educational system most immediately open to attack was the elementary school, the so-called "Volksschule." Indeed, the chief critics of the ideas of the past and of the future were provided by the elementary-school teachers.

From about 1840 onward, the elementary-school teacher had been the *bête noire* of the Prussian state; and, since Prussia was by all odds the largest of the German states, his position there continually affected the situation in the smaller states as well. The government in conjunction with the churches assumed excessive supervisory powers. Constant coaxing and checking of the elementary-school teachers considerably reduced their joy in their work; nor was the government disposed to grant to the elementary-school teacher any opportunity for the unimpeded development of his own capacities. During the middle of the last century reactionary governments feared that the dissatisfaction of this group of teachers might spread more widely among the people, since by far the greatest number of teachers taught in

elementary schools and were thus in a position to exert considerable popular influence. Their training was regulated by the authorities on the assumption that a too well-educated elementary-school teacher would no longer be willing to carry out his unostentatious duty in remote villages.

Indeed, the bureaucratic outlook of the average government official made for considerable suspicion of the things of the mind. Intellectual acumen coupled with too much education made one critical and arrogant and fostered doubt as to the legitimacy of inherited privileges. The anticlerical and secular tendencies of the nineteenth century could also be nourished by good training. Consequently, the elementary-school teacher was to be discouraged from seeking a really fruitful academic preparation; hence his training had to be different from the rest of the teaching profession.

The institutes for the training of these teachers cultivated a kind of Spartan sobriety and discipline. The watchword was obedience. The result was that the unfortunate position of the elementary-school teacher between the academic and the lower classes of the population again and again created problems which governmental authorities were not able to resolve, since they wanted to increase the dependence of these teachers upon the state and the church. A whole succession of ministers of education has been baffled by the question of the elementary schools and their teachers. Competent and partly successful ministers of education readily admitted that their own tenure of office was largely dependent upon the issue of the elementary school, with its inevitable and insurmountable political consequences.

In other countries, and particularly in America, people talk about the militarism and the bureaucratic spirit of Germany. The Americans gather it all together into a Germanism when they say *Verboten*. Other countries do not lack their share of formalism and bureaucratism; but, in truth, subordinationist bureaucratism has been the greatest danger for Germany. The misfortune of German officialdom has always been the influence of the noncommissioned officer—the man who stood just high enough to exercise a limited command but was in turn dependent upon a host of higher-ups whose rank he could never

hope to achieve. He was foreordained to remain subservient, yet with something of a taste of the sweetness of ruling and commanding. He knew too much simply to vegetate, and not enough to come to terms with his lot. The elementary-school teacher, though apparently of somewhat higher station than the non-commissioned officer, nevertheless belonged to this group. The wish to attend the university remained unfulfilled, although, very tardily, only a few years before the outbreak of the war in 1914, elementary-school teachers here and there managed to break through into matriculation. Prussia was again in this respect notably inflexible, whereas Saxony was more progressively disposed.

Little wonder that the elementary-school teachers aspired to political power. If the ministers of education had formerly belonged to the ruling classes and had been trained in administration and in law, the cry now went up for the specialist who was also a politician. Such a man, moreover, was not sought for among the most highly educated. It was the exception when a former professor like Becker could hold office for long in the largest state in Germany. Large sections of the population preferred the elementary-school teacher as the administrator of culture.

In many German states these teachers now became ministers of instruction, and it is highly significant that they took an active part in the revolution of 1933. Hitler appointed an elementary-school teacher as minister of instruction in Munich and in Braunschweig. His friend Streicher was also a former elementary-school teacher. These teachers thought of the future of the German elementary school for the most part in trivial political terms of no pedagogical value. Nevertheless, the fact that the elementary-school teacher was more widely regarded as the representative of the educational system than the teacher in the secondary school or even the university professor shows how greatly scholarship had come to be discredited and how difficult it was to develop among the masses of the people an understanding of more varied and carefully analyzed ideas of education.

The secondary school was undoubtedly least susceptible to so

sudden and potent a reorientation. Some of the teachers in the Gymnasium were inclined toward liberalism, but an influential group wished to join the upper social classes by way of a reserve officer's commission. Even the liberal element among the secondary-school teachers was not revolutionary but desired the preservation of the past and orderly progress for the future.

The graduate schools, particularly the universities, were in a still more difficult situation. The German professor was only too well satisfied with himself; he looked with pride upon what had been achieved and believed himself superior to what was going on in foreign lands, especially in America. He imagined that every professor was an inspired extender of the work of Mommsen and Ranke in the field of history, or of Helmholtz or Bunsen in the natural sciences. Owing to the recognition given by state and national authorities and in particular by William II to famous scholars, almost every better-known German professor thought himself capable of expressing a competent opinion about anything and everything in the world. Not infrequently he ventured unbidden into the field of politics. If he happened to hold a chair which imposed upon him the task of building with fearless courage the highway of truth, he could regard himself, so to speak, as a secular saint.

The nation did not even find this supercilious wisdom burdensome. On the contrary, the leading statesmen listened to these professorial oracles with good-humored politeness and sometimes even appreciated the national-liberal opinions of the academics as a welcome influence upon public opinion. But many scholars were not sufficiently respected by their profession, and their achievements were not recognized by the universities as they should have been. As outsiders who could not be fitted into the prevailing scheme of instruction, these scholars stood politically far to the left. As far as their point of view toward higher learning departed markedly from that of the leading universities, so far were their careers threatened. On the other hand, there were perhaps in every university *alii minorum gentium*, those who had to conceal their rancor and anxiety over a lack of recognition. They now asserted themselves, since there were no natural avenues of critical self-expression. Thus various

forces came to the surface because it was plain that a decisive change was in order. Judgment was coming upon the official circles of monarchist governments because they had not taken account of such disaffection, or at least had done so too late.

It must be added that many a professor, secure in rank, title, and salary, had no cause for complaint against the government. The revolutionary spirit reached the German universities very late indeed; but when it arrived, it was thoroughgoing. The course of events was tragic for many a scholar who had grown fond of the past and content with his own privileged situation. At least those who were trained in the humanities and the social sciences had always been inclined to look toward the past with its fixed tradition. Suddenly, however, memories of the abortive bourgeois revolution of 1848, which apparently had gone beyond recall, came alive again and rudely shocked the older generation out of its contentment. Competent scholars were not always willing to recognize in time the deeper causes of what was now to come about—of what, indeed, had to happen.

Even the churches seemed to be on the threshold of a very severe crisis. When it became certain that the ghost of communism would remain outside the country, the Catholic church in Germany undertook to regularize its relations with the Social Democrats and with those liberal groups which soon came to power in the new state governments. Political Catholicism, which had been represented for more than a generation by its own party in the parliament, conducted itself watchfully and patiently, confident that its own seed would ripen. It was different among the evangelical churches. In Prussia and in Saxony the king was, in accordance with an old Lutheran tradition, also the highest bishop. In Saxony, where the Catholic monarch could not take upon himself the duties of the bishop, this fact was not so important. In Prussia, however, with the disappearance of the king, the evangelical churches which did not follow the presbyterian system were faced with immense problems. The episcopal dignity of the king had not always been a disadvantage to the church. But as things had finally developed, an identity between "throne and altar" seemed to have appeared during the last generation under William II, which secularized

the church and made for a nationalistic abuse which obscured traditional Christian teaching.

The "separation of church and state" had been an old political slogan of the Socialists, which later turned out to have been a rather negative slogan. Above all, it had obsessed the brains of anti-Christians, of atheists, and of monists who had been colored by the ideas of Haeckel. The more loosely the slogan was understood, the more effective were the examples which had been observed in other democratic countries since the French Revolution. One could not see, in 1918, how strangely and unexpectedly this so-called separation of church and state would later work out. The bureaucracy of the Prussian Evangelical church, the church of the so-called old Prussian Union, regarded itself as orphaned in matters of church administration.

To sum up briefly, then, it may be said of the general situation that a new world was being built under the bayonets of former enemies. Although the old world had crumbled, it had not been completely destroyed, and there were many people who had not noticed that they were surrounded by chaos. But what could a nation, exhausted and half-dead, whose mood expressed itself in the dictum *primum vivere, deinde navigari*, itself contribute to reconstruction?

CHAPTER THREE

STATE, COMMUNITY, AND EDUCATION

THE STATE IS NOT NECESSARILY THE MONSTER WHICH Nietzsche has described in his *Thus Spake Zarathustra*; and democracy does not inherently exclude the state from education and allow education to regulate itself. However, the whole relation between the state and education in Germany had to be changed if a democracy was to be born in the wake of the defeat. Sometimes the urgent desire to ignore the state and its agencies in the administration of education is prompted by the fear of political domination. In a democracy such a fear is groundless if that democracy is healthy and if the relations between the executive and the legislative branches of the government are balanced and harmonious. Certainly, the question of where the limits of the state should lie is of decisive significance. But the question of whether democracy and only democracy provides the best education is by no means of minor importance.

Democracy in Germany was introduced under the guns of the enemy. The majority of the people were unprepared for it, and the notion that the new form of government had been forced upon the country, that it had no real roots and, therefore, was not congenial to the German people, was never dislodged. Learned circles declared that a "Westernization" had been imposed upon the German soul, which was strange and unnatural to it. However, the real issue was whether the democratic spirit existed in Germany at all and, if so, what could be done to foster its growth.

It would be very shortsighted to lay the blame for the failure of the effort to make democracy at home in Germany upon the

leading statesmen and educators. A glance at the France of the French Revolution and at the frequent changes of regime during the nineteenth century in France suggests a more cautious judgment. The most recent events in France have demonstrated how swiftly a democracy can disappear in the face of military disaster. Even the democracies of antiquity, although they seemed unquestionably to represent an advance over despotism, finally surrendered to other forms of government. America had the good fortune to be founded as a democracy so that the initial confederation of the states bore the mark of an original achievement. Moreover, during the nineteenth century, England and America were not fundamentally shaken by social conflicts. But it was the fate of Germany after 1918 to have to overtake the democratic development of the nineteenth century and combine it with a solution of the socioeconomic problem, which was too heavy a burden. The German Republic was simultaneously beset by two tasks, each one of which was a problem in itself.

Uniform cultural policies were not feasible in the German federal system. In an established state, undivided by centuries-old ethnic loyalties, a federal administration of culture and education might be effective. The German situation cannot be compared with that in America because in America education is not decisively directed by the state. The longing for the autonomy of education is the American's banner of freedom; but the advantages and disadvantages of American decentralization are not to be discussed at this point. Switzerland intrusts the regulation and administration of education to the several states. If a comparative equilibrium has, nevertheless, been achieved, it is to be explained as due essentially to a small territorial area and meager population. An auto can traverse several Swiss states in an hour; under such conditions a common mind is easily and naturally attained.

After 1918 Germany had to renew its domestic structure. There was a widespread consciousness that the hard-won unity which had been maintained for almost fifty years must not be abandoned; but there was really no way of depriving single German states of the prerogative of autonomy in the hour of

defeat. Even in 1870, the empire had achieved its unity only by exercising the utmost caution toward individual member-states and their dynasties. Nevertheless, the new government attempted to work creatively at basic constitutional principles.

The German Reich had never had a bicameral national assembly. Experience has shown that it is the upper house which successfully embodies the resources of moderation in a genuine democracy when the ship of state is sorely tossed about; and the lack of such a body in the Reichstag proved to be a very great misfortune during the last days of the Republic. There was, to be sure, a council of the representatives of the separate state administrations. This council was called the "Bundesrat" during the Bismarckian era, the "Reichsrat" during the Republic, and was composed of a mixture of state representatives and provincial deputies. The Reichsrat had little influence upon the course of political affairs, merely occupying itself with formal and unfruitful recommendations. Toward the end of his administration, Brüning attempted to imbue this Reichsrat with something of the vitality of an upper house as an instrument against the threatening revolution, but his attempt failed.

Furthermore, the fact that each single state also had its own parliament which claimed the power to rule in its own way clearly shows that the national authority was questioned from the first. The critical issue was whether or not the national authority, which had been totally weakened by the defeat, would be able to establish a unified national and cultural will.

Democracy could be instituted during these days of collapse only by a national government; such a state alone could direct the stream of new ideas within the body politic. Unless the Reich were very much stronger than the separate states, political pluralism would be unavoidable. The general weakness of the central government was justified on the ground that it was essentially democratic to give as much independence as possible to incorporated communities, city councils as well as separate states. Under Bismarck, Prussia was so strong in comparison with all the other states that a special national administration of culture did not seem necessary. Indeed, Bismarck feared that such a cultural administration would bestow upon the southern

German states an influence which could be avoided as long as Prussia was quietly allowed to lead in cultural affairs without a cultural administration. Such leadership seemed to be secure, since the Prussian king was also the emperor; but after 1918, Prussia became the equal of the other states and had no more power than the rest. Thus the need arose for the establishment of a national bureau for cultural affairs which should serve the purpose of unification.¹ A bureau of education and culture was created under the national Ministry of the Interior. However, during almost the whole life of the Republic, those who headed this bureau were frightfully devoid both of experience in cultural affairs and of the qualities of spiritual leadership. Moreover, a centuries-old tradition of cultural leadership like Prussia's could not be so easily eradicated.

How difficult, then, to find a uniform educational policy for the nation! Americans tend to relegate philosophical questions to private consideration as far as they do not directly touch politics and economics. Germany, which had been accustomed for centuries to obeying and tended to look to the state for anything and everything, would under no circumstances have been equal to a change to the American way. During the days of defeat such a course would have meant the spiritual liquidation of the nation. Confessional antagonism between Protestants and Catholics was ominously reflected in the parliament and further aggravated the situation. During the early years of the Republic, the Social Democrats represented the anticonfessional tendencies. Thus the task of the state could only be to find a platform above and beyond these contradictory forces and these diverse cultural points of view. Could this platform be found in the democratic idea? Was democracy able to give German culture a living content, or at least cover the contradictions?

The way in which the national constitution came into being indicated at the start how many-sided the cultural positions were. There were days, even weeks, after 1918, during which the existence of a national constitution seemed to be endangered because the representatives of the various lawgiving bodies could not agree on cultural matters. And, under those conditions, the compromises which were finally arrived at were pos-

sible only at the price of a clearly defined policy. This or that was either ignored or reserved for later decision.

Indeed, the subtle variations of cultural life cannot be set down in the articles of a constitution in any country. The bulk of the population represented by the delegates has no taste and no interest for such things. But certain ideas, like the freedom of the press, the freedom of assembly and of worship, have been so intimately connected in general political theory since the rise of modern democracy that they came to be anchored in the constitution. Most of the articles of the new national constitution dealt with the secondary schools and particularly with the elementary-school system. Unfortunately, these articles reflect the confusion of the German situation after 1918.

In the judgment of the men who now held power, every unfulfilled longing, every unsatisfied aspiration of the past, was to be realized; and this consummation was to be attested by the national constitution. The three parties which exercised the determining influence—the Social Democrats, the Catholics, and the Liberals—compressed into the document as much as possible of what had hitherto been merely a dream. It was soon evident that the German people had dreamed only too diversely and that the Social Democrats looked more toward the past than they themselves suspected. Even opposition parties which desire new forms live within their own time and can predetermine the future only in a limited way. In Germany the opposition had to wait too long in order really to be clairvoyant about the future. What went on was more in the nature of a recovery of what men had struggled for for fifty years than a new construction. But the past did not permit itself to be embalmed. Some of the aspirations of those opposed to the imperial era also belonged to the past. The liberal dream of 1848 and the Socialist desires of the eighties and nineties had now been written into the constitution. Could the inclusion of these conflicting desires of the past really envisage the future? Was the new national constitution a symbol of age or of youth? A constructive “new deal” should show the signs of youth. Originally the cultural direction taken in the formulation of the constitution was that of a liberal social democracy. Since the days of Lassalle, the Social Demo-

crats had not had an outstanding cultural statesman; and the real opponents of democracy knew how to exploit this weakness. Meanwhile, the German people were encouraged to accept the national constitution as the only way to cultural peace.

But the new social democracy was compelled to grant to Catholicism an increasingly prominent part in shaping the cultural provisions of the constitution. An American, of course, might be inclined to ask why the contradictions in cultural outlook in America could persist and develop unhindered by religious tensions. There are many reasons. The great number of denominations and religious societies in America dissipates a focus of conflict, while these tensions are so strong in Europe because only two or three denominations are involved. Mutual watchfulness is more alert than where Christianity is pluralistic, as it is in America. For centuries the opposition between Catholicism and Protestantism and between Lutheranism and Calvinism had disturbed the German soul. And ever and again this disturbance has broken out as though the German soul had been convulsed by a feverish memory. The church in Germany has never had merely a social function. As a result, the church in Europe has often been guided by profounder metaphysical insights than has the church in America. But it has lacked, on the other hand, the facility for denominational co-operation.

The problem of the universities had not really been faced in drawing up the national constitution. The decisive fact in this connection was that the universities and technical schools had achieved a very considerable independence of the state, despite the monarchical system. The Socialists, of course, took the view that these universities were the fruit of a purely bourgeois spirit which had to be changed. But there was one constitutional provision which showed the complete triumph of traditional ideas over Socialist demands. The sentence to which I refer read: "The theological faculties shall be maintained."

The German universities had had theological faculties from the beginning. Some universities had only a Protestant, some only a Catholic faculty; still others had both a Protestant and a Catholic faculty. This was the case in Breslau, in Bonn, in Tübingen, and in Münster. Under the pressure of those forces

now making for the separation of church and state, it was possible to eliminate the theological faculties from the structure of the state universities. This would have meant that the churches would have had to assume responsibility for the training of pastors and theologians. But by constitutional provision theological education for the Protestant churches was to be provided solely by the state; whereas the Catholic church, following an established tradition, could educate its clergy either at the state universities or at its own seminaries. Why was it, then, that theological education continued thus to be intrusted to the state, despite the generally expected separation between church and state?

The Protestants, on their part, did not welcome the separation between church and state. The hope was that, by maintaining the Protestant faculties at the state universities, the Protestant spirit would be preserved among the educated sections of the population. Theological liberalism, moreover, fostered the view that the connection of theology with the humanities and social sciences in the universities was necessary for a sound theology. At the same time, the constitutional article to which we have referred guaranteed that no government, however secular or atheistic, could arbitrarily put an end to the training of Protestant pastors. So long as the theological faculties existed, one had, as it were, one foot in the door of the state.

In the Catholic camp the bishops and curia were not so much interested in the theological faculties. They emphatically preferred their own long-established seminaries for the priesthood. Nevertheless, the subepiscopal hierarchy valued the connection with the universities. A link with scholarship in general seemed to them to increase the respect for Catholic scholarship in particular. This more liberal attitude of a part of the clergy is rooted in the fact that Catholics in Germany were in the minority and believed they could more effectively resist the sweep of the secular spirit if they had a more exact knowledge of it. Moreover, experience had shown that contact between Catholics and the state brought with it many advantages and facilitated an understanding on many problems.

But the constitutional provision for the maintenance of the

theological faculties embodied also a strong conviction on the part of the new secular state that certain guaranties should be offered to the church. It may appear particularly astonishing to Americans that this provision was sponsored by the Catholics themselves who could have maintained their own academic establishments, whereas the Protestant churches possessed almost no scientific educational facilities outside the state universities. When the provision was debated in the Reichstag, it was widely supported by the public at large, and its adoption was in no small measure due to the brilliant apology of the well-known Protestant theologian, Adolf Harnack.

Particularly in the light of what happened after 1933 was the approval of this constitutional article an event. Christianity had been accorded an ultimate safeguard, a guaranty that the Christian spirit among the German people would not suffer under the fanaticism of those who were otherwise-minded. And this guaranty prevented the transformation of the theological faculties into scientific faculties of religion, such as the Swiss democracy had from time to time encouraged. A formula of prevention had been included in the constitution.

But could a common conception of education really be achieved by the co-operative effort of Liberals, Socialists, and Catholics? The constitution was scarcely the means toward that end. The spiritual heritage of the liberalism of the past overshadowed the ideas of the Socialists, although the representatives of liberalism in the earliest governments of the Republic were the weakest of the three majority parties. The national constitution concerned itself further with general ideas about the education of the people, about education beyond the elementary school, and about assistance for poorer pupils and students. And there was a general determination to dispel the shadows of the *Kulturkampf*² under which the Germany of Bismarck had so acutely suffered. Nobody sensed the approach of a new and greater cultural crisis, despite the fact that Oswald Spengler's book, *The Decline of the West*, appeared at this very time. Tolerance was the democratic watchword intended to inspire the legislative assembly, despite the fact that political passions were still rife in the streets.

The desire for reconciliation was much stronger in these days

than the capacity for reconstruction. Neither the will to culture nor the cultural insights of parliament reached down into the depths whence ultimate conflicts arise. The constitution of the Reich declared that "in the matter of the instruction in the public schools, care must always be taken that the feelings of those who think otherwise are not violated." Despite all efforts to the contrary, the cleavage in the mind of the German people with respect to cultural affairs permeated everything that was done.

The accusation was subsequently made that in the controversy over a school for general education as against a school preparing immediately for a vocation the constitution had favored the vocational school. The constitution did indeed contain the provision that the structure of the public school should be determined in accordance with the variety of available vocations; but statements of this sort only slightly affected the educational measures adopted.

The question might be raised as to how far a parliament needs to have a voice in cultural matters in a newly established democracy. In other words, why could this young democracy not follow the American pattern and make education independent of the central government? A nation like Germany or France, traditionally dependent upon governmental financial assistance, could not count upon private aid in the development of culture. But, even more, America had withdrawn from Europe immediately after the war. The model for a democratic state was much nearer at hand in France or in Switzerland. And, except for these two states, no European country other than England had intrusted its cultural interests to private agencies. To exclude the state would have meant to take up a back-breaking task. The tediously established outward order would have been endangered, and a cultural chaos would have followed necessarily, since the state and education had been intimately connected throughout the history of the German people. A government weakly conceived from the beginning and struggling to establish itself could not abandon education, the instrument of power and wisdom by which a previous government had attempted to perpetuate the principles on which it had been established. How

could the new democratic conception transform the educational system and through it the youth of the nation, if its propagation were intrusted to chance?

What is required of education in this respect needs no emphasis in America at a time when the demand is sweeping the country to keep the idea of freedom alive in and through the schools. It was not as though the democratic idea had spontaneously captivated Germany like a gospel of redemption. Ideas, by no means self-evident or inbred in all Germans, had to be discussed; and many had, first of all, to be converted to democracy. The controversy affected the whole nation and was broader than the usual tension between the older and the younger generation. There were men and women of the older generation who were open to new ideas, and there were many young people who passionately defended the old way of doing things for which they had fought and risked their lives. Others of the younger generation had returned quite bewildered and had no interest in any educational issues. Moreover, the virtual exclusion of the state from educational affairs would have been more readily accepted by the Liberals than by the Socialists, who were more strongly represented in the government.

According to the American educational philosopher, John Dewey, education is concerned with the life of society, indeed *it is the life of society* and includes, therefore, the community of the older and the younger generation. In Germany there were in those days many among the older generation who certainly were not prepared to teach anything but what had been handed down to them. These people had lived by the conviction that what had been tested and tried by the past must also prove itself effective for the oncoming generation. Such conservatism can be maintained, in educational matters above all, only in times of great stability. But the younger generation was inspired by a different vision of the future. It is not too difficult in turbulent times to be progressive if thereby one can appeal to the aspirations of youth. The oncoming generation had returned from the war disillusioned and worn out, and the prevailing hopelessness of the country offered them no reassurance.

Then, too, there was the problem of providing competent

teachers. For the revolution was not so radical as the Russian one, which eliminated all previously existing forces that had not unconditionally repudiated the past. The Russian revolution had also immediately intrusted higher education almost entirely to those groups which had hitherto been virtually excluded from it. In the case of Germany everything was settled by compromise as soon as the initial storms had subsided, and everybody proceeded to live together under the same roof. In spite of the intolerance among all political parties in political matters, the leaders very quickly sought to serve the nation as a whole. However, a considerable section of the younger generation belonged to those groups which refused to be persuaded that the new democratic government which seemed to have accompanied the defeat promised a better future.

Thus the application of a democratic conception of education required both unity and power. Indeed, such a conception was the only guaranty that education could be brought into conformity with what appeared to be unalterable reality. A nation like America did not have to worry about the basic harmony between education and the life of the country; yet, even here, more than a century of public education has not established an impregnable wall of defense. A glance at the economic development of America discloses the necessity for an extension of governmental participation in the cultural life of the future. Thus for America, too, the lessons to be drawn from Germany's past experience could be more than a remote and romantic fantasy.

But what is democratic education? We shall not attempt a systematic answer to this question. Perhaps the problems of the German situation can be better understood by drawing upon principles which Professor Dewey has set down in his book on *Democracy and Education*.³ The value of community life, he thinks, is decisively determined by two factors: the first is the extent to which the interests of a group are shared by all its members, and the second is the completeness and the freedom with which the life of the community can be related to that of other groups. A society is democratic, according to Dewey, which allows all members to participate equally in its advantages, or at least has the will to do so, and which insures

the possibility that its institutions can accommodate themselves when necessary to differently constituted social forms. "Such a society must have a type of education which gives individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control, and the habits of mind which secure social changes without introducing disorder."⁴ Accordingly, neither a social group which has exercised leadership through tradition nor a class exercising power by reason of its wealth can set the standard of life in a true democracy. On these principles, however, not even the older democracies can be said to have achieved the true democratic ideal.

The new German organization set itself the task of developing this true democracy; and for this it seemed particularly well equipped because socialistic principles had inspired the revolution. However, the transformation of a capitalistic world into a socialistic order did not succeed in Germany. After a short period of transition, the Social Democrats had to turn for help to those parties which represented the capitalistic system, since attempts at a thoroughgoing socialization could be carried out only in isolated instances and in accordance with the political alignments of the moment. The unity of the state required the kind of compromise which the established democracies did not need to make because in them the Socialist party seldom held power. Meanwhile in Germany, the various forces—capitalistic, socialistic, and liberal—contended for the balance of power, and this situation existed until 1933. The question still remains as to how far the capitalistic system can be combined with true democracy. The increasing industrialism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has created difficulties which could not be foreseen in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the democratic ideal was proclaimed.

Freedom and equality must be amplified by brotherhood in a genuine democracy. It would have been easier for the German people to regard democracy as desirable if the traditionally democratic countries had been better examples of their principles. It will not be misunderstood if we venture to declare that this was not generally the case. Brotherhood must surely also mean brotherhood among the democratic nations, just as

freedom and equality in the larger sense include more than one nation. Undoubtedly, however, the Versailles Treaty was in many respects not merely a precautionary measure but also a punitive one. Lloyd George had adopted an attitude of punitive and indulgent benevolence and was particularly fond of treating the German statesmen, who wholeheartedly attempted to inculcate the democratic ideal in their own land, as prisoners who had just been released from captivity. How this attitude wounded the self-respect of Germany does not need to be elaborated; what is more important is that it injured the reputation of the friends of democracy in Germany almost beyond recovery. Germany seemed to be the exception to the fundamental democratic principle that, in the words of Schiller, "all men should become brothers."

It could, of course, always be said that there was the question of war guilt and much bitterness toward Germany among other nations. But, since this is not intended as a political treatise, we are not concerned here with a value-judgment but with the facts. The ideal of a common humanity was fundamentally shattered by the war. The struggles of the German democrats for the restoration of this ideal were not lightened by other nations. Indeed, if even the proletarians of other lands seemed to take no steps toward improving the situation of the German proletariat, the persuasive power of the democratic and socialistic ideal was just that much weaker.

Socialism had been born on German soil and only later spread to the rest of the world. This fact should never be forgotten in any appraisal of the German situation. It is true that it took three-quarters of a century to implement socialism in Germany. The German soul has always been inspired by general and absolute principles, but when it comes to translating these principles into action, the obvious concreteness of practical affairs often is not appreciated. As the last decade has abundantly shown, this weakness afflicted patriotism and nationalism. If the idea of community was to be made convincing, conceptions like "the people" and "the state" apparently required the magical and transcendent glow of a utopian dream. Society, as such, does not come alive for the German in the daily round of duties

but in a metaphysical idea with the irrational intensity of an immediate experience. That is why the German people succumbed to the uncanny, semisacred mass movement of 1933.

The ideology of democracy is a product of the Enlightenment. There is in it much reasonableness and common sense, but the rationalism of the new leaders of Germany seemed commonplace compared to the pomp and circumstance of the Wilhelmian era. After 1918 the days of "shining armor" were to be forgotten even by youth, the plain, healthy common sense of men was to rule, and every external symbolism of the nation was dispensed with. This, of course, went too far. The rejection of the past was so strong that those who looked eternally backward—and they exist in every nation—were bitterly hurt. The beautiful mirage of public life on which their eyes were fixed had to be dispelled with might and main.

Yet there had, after all, been a great past with episodes that transfigured the memory of famous men: there were the ecstatic moods of earlier victorious wars; there was the whole glamour of the parades, beloved by the nationalism of the nineteenth century since the days of Napoleon I and the Congress of Vienna. That youngsters were highly sensitive to such things will astonish no educator. But the new government did not want to parade after the defeat of the nation; it desired, instead, that the German people should henceforth rule themselves, that they should become articulate, that they should take their political fortunes into their own hands, that they should give themselves the most liberal constitution the world had ever seen. The enemies of the state did not want to accept the gift of self-government, and they tried to persuade the younger generation that times had been vastly better when responsibility was vested in the crown. The government counted on the oncoming generation, which, properly educated, would be fully conscious of the new possibility of self-determination.

Now democracy was supported from the beginning by the workers and by the Catholic circles but by only a small proportion of the remaining population. The majority of the so-called educated classes did not favor the Republic; and neither the *petit bourgeoisie* nor the group of so-called minor officials, which

had been asserting itself under the monarchy, was kindly disposed toward the democratic way of life. These classes had nourished the hope that their children might acquire academic standing and so come into closer contact with the ruling groups, but now they were in competition with the masses of the people. The industrialists, however, were more realistic: they did not like the new form of government, since they had prospered under the monarchy by grace of the sovereign, but they found it expedient to co-operate with the new authority.

It is easier to understand in the light of these circumstances why the German Reichstag lacked a real center when the deadly effects of the economic crisis came to be felt in the days before the advent of Hitler. There were some members of the democratic party among the educated classes in the large cities of northern Germany. In the south the upper middle class had been more hospitable to democratic ideas from the first. The party of Stresemann, however, was dependent upon heavy industry. It swung hither and yon and never found the courage for an unmistakable decision in favor of democracy. Stresemann tried in vain to bring his party around to a more positive position, but he died in the midst of these efforts.

The Prussian educational administration was neither Socialist in the narrow sense nor liberal in the sense of the nineteenth century. It tried to make room for democracy and believed that democracy was broad enough to serve all those parties which assented to the republican form of government. Where the educational system was concerned, the administration wanted to stand above the parties. But it was an open question as to whether this policy could win popular support. In a formal sense this policy did express the educational will of the nation, since it had been enacted by the parliamentary majority and parliament had had every opportunity of criticism and pressure. But there is a public opinion over and above parliament, which, like a seismograph, indicates the easily unnoticed shifts in the attitude of the people. After the war public opinion in Germany was much more divided than the parliamentary line-up showed. However, the party majorities in the parliament supported the government. So long as things were being done constructively

and effectively, it did not want to complicate its work by falling back upon a policy of "divide and rule."

Every statesman had to overcome three obstacles in order to win freedom of action. For one thing, he had to struggle toward an equilibrium between his own tasks and aims and the more general principles of the cabinet as a whole. This is true, of course, in other countries too. But the peculiar attitude toward educational questions and the remarkably contradictory position of culture and education in a military state always made the Ministries of Education a stormy, wave-tossed island, even though such a military state was slowly advancing toward a kind of cultural liberalism.

The postwar period did not change this condition; it merely enlarged its proportions. Throughout a century of history, the principal Ministry of Education in Germany, i.e., the Prussian one, always had had to guard itself against political radicalism as well as against the rigorous impersonalism of the activities of the cabinet. During the first third of the nineteenth century—the time of Metternich—it was the Prussian ministry of culture which in the so-called "Karlsbad Resolutions"⁵ revolted tenaciously and effectively but almost singlehandedly against the stubbornness of the ultra-conservative and reactionary government. The ministry seldom carried the day, but it did check and even prevent much that threatened the careers of valuable men. Although the change of government after 1918 did not greatly alter this state of affairs, the defense of the principles of the Social Democratic party had been emotionally intensified by the revolution, with the result that revolutionaries who had been prevented from coming to power for a generation now mistrusted the government and misinterpreted and frustrated the best and most loyal purposes by their own suspicion.

The second obstacle had to do with parliament. The differentiation between executive and legislative functions was not sufficiently clear and definite. In Prussia there was as little evidence of an actual upper legislative house, as there was in the nation as a whole. There was, instead, the so-called "Prussian Advisory Council" (*Staatsrat*), whose membership consisted of party officials from the separate provinces. The competence of

this body was very insignificant indeed, and its conduct of affairs was tedious and only retarded the administrative machinery. There seemed to be no need for the expert knowledge which an upper house would have made available. Furthermore, the nascent parliamentary procedure was itself still insecure in Germany. Party leaders, blinded by their new power, misused it and tried to exert a disproportionately large, and unfortunately often very incompetent, influence upon appointments. Such practices are generally recognized as the price that every democracy is more or less compelled to pay for safeguarding its citizens against the more serious consequences of a dictatorial system. The German Republic, however, had to face these usual accompaniments of a democratic form of government to a degree which naturally made the difficult tasks of the first years all the more burdensome.

The German people understood only after it was too late that a nation must daily win its freedom anew and that this is possible only when those who benefit from this freedom limit their personal desires in the interest of larger goals. Germany did not realize even after fifteen years that the essence of freedom is incompatible with the toleration of parties which desire on principle to destroy the structure of democratic government. The German Republic did not know that parties are legitimate only in so far as their aims lie within the limits of the existing state, and the lack of this insight contributed to the Republic's dissolution.

And then, in the third place, there must be added the tension which existed between the central government and the state governments. The new popular government could master the problem of the relation of the nation and the states in a democratic way only as far as it could effect a great simplification and centralization. Culture and education seemed to the Germans to have such peculiarly manifold implications and variations as to defy every centralization. The establishment of a separate national department of culture in the Ministry of the Interior contradicted the previous cultural tradition of Germany.⁶ Nevertheless, this new department could have accomplished a great deal if it had been endowed with sufficient comprehension

of the problems and if it had really maintained a decisive policy. In 1919, Becker published his pamphlet on *The Administrative Educational Tasks of the Nation*,⁷ the ideas of which accurately reflect the underlying convictions of the responsible men of the time.

The goal of the national administration of culture was defined by Becker as "the establishment of intellectual and cultural values at the disposal of the people or the state for security within and for differentiation from others without."⁸ At the same time, German cultural policy was to be the spiritual medium of the unity of the state, and education was to complete the consolidation of the German states into a nation. The national government was to undertake that "the necessary cultural tasks of the member states would not be neglected."⁹ The previous lack of unity in the German educational system was obvious.

An American, who knows that in his own country higher education is for the most part left to private initiative and who believes that by conferences and agreements a sufficient mutual understanding upon essential educational problems can be achieved, may regard this urge toward centralization as unusual, perhaps even as superfluous. And later centuries may perhaps also describe the total effort toward political unity which Germany has undergone since 1815 as an ideal which brought advantages but also many disadvantages in its wake. What Germany and Italy gained in strength from the struggle for political unity seems simultaneously to have been denied them in the area of culture, since the richness and the variations of cultural life were circumscribed and weakened.

On the other hand, this problem may be viewed in quite a different way. When one thinks of the difference in the administration of the American high schools and compares the high schools in the large cities with those in rural areas, one cannot say that decentralization is wholly good. Decentralization can never make for an entirely satisfactory selection of a competent personnel for available positions, since the appointment of teachers in a decentralized system, especially in a country of great size, must involve many weaknesses which are avoided by centralization. Such requirements as that the best

available person should get the position for which he is fitted, that references and appointments should be left as little as possible to blind chance, and that superior abilities should not lie fallow but under all circumstances be most effectively used are likely to be critically neglected in a decentralized system. And, since the meaning of democratic demand for equality of opportunity unquestionably lies in the critical area of the selection of personnel, democracy must tend toward a kind of centralization by its own fundamental principles. But centralization means that the measures necessary to the unification of the educational system can be instituted more effectively than the method of free agreements allows, since the latter too often dissipates available resources. How far centralization can be carried in order to achieve these ends will, of course, always depend upon tact and judgment.

The limits set to the German attempts at centralization are very clearly shown by the fact that Germany was never very enthusiastic about legal regulations in education but tried to dispose of most matters by purely administrative means. Those who know the Germans and their unqualified fondness for the written law will find this very remarkable—but legal prescriptions do not work in the field of education. Here, at least, there was no great departure from Anglo-Saxon ways of thinking as they are expressed, for example, in the cautiousness of British boards of education. Becker recommended a gentle hand and patient procedure out of respect for the traditions of the separate German states. The traces of the *Kulturkampf*¹⁰ had not yet been eradicated, and many misunderstandings and suspicions still existed between the Protestants and the Catholics in Germany. A unified German culture should, therefore, not be built upon a uniform world view; in fact, Becker held that such a world view was not attainable under existing conditions, nor was it desirable. "There are, however," he wrote, "certain basic attitudes toward the nation and toward life which could grow into a wide-spread unity without being affected by the difference between a religious and a non-religious point of view. One should be deliberately constructive, not ignoring the ideals of the past, but attentive to those of the future." For this future,

German education should learn to understand that the "polarity which has now developed into conflicting points of view is a natural necessity of the German character, so that at least ethical judgments might be freed from this divisive German conflict."¹¹ The tragic antagonism between Social Democratic and nationalistic ideas should be dispelled; the natural tendencies toward constructive contrast inherent in the German soul should be nourished side by side in German education. These conflicts should be transcended, according to Becker, by genuine patriotism. Love, not hate, should mediate the cultural principles of the state. The heritage of the German cultural tradition should be blended with new developments, and what was valuable in this heritage should be retained and deepened.

But how was all this to be carried out? The national government was weak as compared with the separate German states. It had to give due regard to the Catholic elements of the population, which, though considerably in the minority, were represented in parliament by a special party and were politically stronger than the Protestant church. The long-standing demands of the Social Democratic party insisted upon the separation of church and state. Consequently, the problem of religious instruction in the schools became one of the most critical issues.

This can be understood only in the light of the fact that the teaching of religion in Germany had always been a part of general public instruction. It was the exception rather than the rule when someone forbade his children to accept the religious instruction which belonged to the curriculum of the schools. Because religion was taught by people who had studied theology in the university and thus were as well prepared for the teaching of religion as other teachers were for other branches of learning, religious instruction, unquestionably, was much more competent than it can be in a Sunday school. In view of the contemplated separation of church and state, what place was to be accorded to religious instruction in the public schools?

Later times will find it scarcely credible that so much acumen, bureaucratic hair-splitting, and pedantry were expended in the effort to find a formula by which the mutually hostile parties among Protestants, Catholics, and atheists, might, for the time

being at least, seem to be reconciled in their common work upon the constitution of the Reich. In the future there was to be a secular school in which there would be no religious instruction, in addition to schools with either Protestant or Catholic religious instruction or both.

This so-called "school compromise" underlines the momentous importance to democracy of the relation between the educational authorities in Germany. The traditional connection between church and state had given rise to a curious mixture of patriotism and Christianity. The Protestant church now faced a new political authority that mistrusted the church. Socialism had long been decried as atheistic; only during the second phase of the republican era did a minority of Socialists adhere to a religious socialism; hence leading Protestant circles greatly feared socialism. Then, too, socialism had not been sufficiently studied in earlier days so that most church leaders were not in a position to appreciate its real merits. The Protestant churches made the great mistake of regarding the German National party¹² as the substitute for the monarchy. The German National party was the party of conservative-reactionary opposition to the Republic so that this liaison suited the monarchist sentiments which colored many a sermon. The Protestant churches needed new leaders capable of independence; but the existing leaders of the church remained what they had been before—officials who wanted, fundamentally, to be led; and there was no longer a leader to issue orders. Since the Protestant officials wished to continue to obey, a conservative would have to give the command.

The Prussian Ministry of Education eventually tried to meet this situation. The discussions were conducted with an eye to the future of the Protestant church and were not prejudiced by the appearance of the church at the moment. The church was still financially dependent upon the state and could claim a long-standing historical right to continued financial assistance. Satisfactory agreements were finally made with the Protestants which affirmed loyalty to the government. And if the Republic had continued, the relations between the church and the state probably would have improved considerably. Discerning lead-

ers of the Protestant church recognized too late how much more secure the church would have been had the democratic state, which they had so mistrusted in the beginning, been able to survive.

Protestantism was, of course, in the transition period. Its theology was still nourished by the fruits of liberalism, which had so rewardingly applied the critical methods of historical investigation to the Christian tradition. Yet the belief in progress, according to which Christian thinkers harmonized the Christian doctrine of salvation with a this-worldly optimism, was gradually losing its hold. Moreover, attempts to import Christianity into the working-class world failed because there was no adequate grasp of what the situation required. The great transformation which dialectical theology was destined to effect had not yet made itself felt; while the older liberalism hoped from year to year that this new theology would be merely a passing phenomenon, a theological fashion which would soon be forgotten. Liberalism did not recognize that in this theology there were at work forces which surged upward from depths beyond rational comprehension.

One thing, however, could not be misjudged: the war had altered the religious attitude of the younger generation. In so far as the young people had not become nihilistic, they had returned from the war in a more believing frame of mind. Many a wave of religious enthusiasm spent itself in mystical undulation. Here is the soil from which the polytheism of national socialism subsequently sprang. How aptly these lines of Goethe apply:

From this derived the peoples' nobler praise,
That each defined the Best he knows
As God; indeed, it is his God he owns.

Nevertheless, an account of the republican regime and its relation to Christianity cannot overemphasize the decisive difference between what happened then and what came later. Precisely in the light of the comparison with the persecution of Christianity and its deliberate destruction by national socialism does the positive attitude of the democratic government become especially plain. Although the legal separation of the church and state was effected, a spiritual separation did not occur. The Re-

public continued to observe Christian festivals; for the leaders of the state never dreamed of denying the Christian heritage of German culture, and hence they maintained the provision for religious instruction in the public schools. Humanism had been united with Christianity since the days of Schleiermacher.

Catholicism was in the minority in Germany, but it had one advantage over Protestantism and, indeed, over Catholicism in other countries. Catholicism had the entree to the trade-unions and to the working classes, in so far as they were professing Catholics. The strong medieval element in Catholicism, which during the nineteenth century had deprived it of a full share in the idealistic-immanent culture of the classical German poets and philosophers, now stood it in good stead because it was not required to recast a bourgeois-liberal culture. The vast social wholeness of Catholicism, together with its grandiose impersonal aloofness, eased the way to the working classes. Catholicism always is more influential in weak states than in those in which there is a strong sense of national unity and power.

After 1918 the Prussian government signed a concordat with the Catholic church. The agreement was prepared by very painstaking and scholarly work on the part of the negotiators. Competent scholars in Protestant canon law praised the compact, in which Pope Pius XII, then papal nuncio to Berlin, collaborated. The state had not yielded any essential advantages, while the Catholic church looked back upon the agreement with satisfaction.

Experience proved, in fact, that the relations between the high contracting parties had been stabilized. Catholic policy during the Republic was wise and cautious; it set limits to the fanaticism of the revolution of 1918 and certainly checked the descent into nihilism. To the outsider, Catholicism seemed to have been consciously or unconsciously liberalized and to have mastered the problem of co-operation with the new powers in the state with an uncommon adaptability, which reactionary circles declared to be lack of character. A later age, however, will certainly interpret it quite differently. One has only to recall the groundless and frivolous arrangement which von Papen as

Hitler's agent subsequently made with the curia to see at once the tremendous difference. Papen's concordat, devoid of any fundamental knowledge of canon law, miscarried from the very first moment after it had been initialed. With certain notable exceptions, Catholic authorities in Germany likewise demonstrated an almost incredible strategic ineptitude from the very day of Hitler's accession to power.

Germany also had a Calvinist minority, but Lutheranism was strong even in the churches of the Prussian union in which Lutheran and Reformed Protestants had joined. Quite definitely, the Republic could have been strengthened if Protestantism had known how to distinguish more sharply between what was of Christian, and what was of national, importance. The Calvinistic tradition of other countries was lacking. Perhaps one can put it this way: If Calvinism and Catholicism had not been in the minority in Germany, if the Lutheran conception of the state had not been so predominant, the Republic would have been able to turn its relations with Christianity into a barrier against the forces of disintegration which later accomplished the temporary eclipse of both. The great problem which the German Republic left unsolved is the problem of the integration of Christianity into a working-class world.

At only one point did the governing parties find themselves without difficulties; this was in the so-called "common system" of the elementary schools. The idea expressed by the slogan "common system" was that the whole educational system from the lowest level—the elementary school—to the highest level—the university—was to operate according to an inner logic of its own. Formerly, the secondary schools, particularly the Gymnasias, had their own elementary schools which were attended only by those pupils who expected to study at a Gymnasium. This meant that the children of those classes which were by tradition and economic circumstances well-to-do were separated from other children at the very beginning of their education. They had no opportunity, therefore, to come into contact with the so-called common people. The first opportunity for graduates of the Gymnasium to learn to know the people of the nation came with military service, and here, too, the more high-

ly educated person was immediately accorded privileges which again set him above the others. Private preparatory schools were now to be eliminated and replaced by one "common system" for all, i.e., every German was required by law to send his children to the common elementary school. Thus the nation hoped that a unity would be provided at the beginning of the child's education which might bind the people together and eliminate the class consciousness from which Germany had suffered so much. With this regulation the Socialists had fulfilled a desire of their hearts. But its adoption also involved something more—it meant the elimination of private schools as such—and this was a demonstration that Germany was in deadly earnest about democracy in the modern sense of the term. A system of private schools was regarded as irreconcilable with true democracy because it separated the privileged from those whom fortune had not blessed with a larger pocketbook.

The possibility for gifted children of the poorer classes to advance was to be guaranteed under all circumstances. Before 1918, very little had been done in this direction. The Socialist leaders were deeply convinced that higher education had been denied to the poor because they had no money, and many Socialists therefore regarded themselves as martyrs. The new educational program aimed at a greater flexibility within and among the various kinds of schools. In all that was done, there was a particular concern to keep the elementary school free from what was called the "mentality of the corporal"—the militaristic class spirit.

The national constitution provided the external occasion for all these measures. Becker's proposals defined the task before the ministries of education in terms of the reorganization of the educational system, but that did not lead to the formation and execution of educational policies by the national government itself. It was left to the several states to carry out the suggestions provided by the constitution. Hence the program failed because of weakness and lack of imagination. The national administration acted only to offer mediation among the various educational policies of the states, when practical questions affecting the professional training of physicians, lawyers, or schoolteachers

demanded it. The separate states preferred to follow their own traditions and to collaborate without the mediation of the national administration. The nation had lost the possibility of establishing a real national administration of education, the germ of which had been contained in the constitution.

This paradoxical situation is not likely to impress Americans very strongly because they are not accustomed to the co-operation of the national government with the educational system. The persistence of educational autonomy among the German states proves that the legal structures of states are more strongly influenced by historical tradition than by logical considerations or organizational ingenuity. The course of events described in this chapter shows the complexity which burdened the administration of the educational system in Germany. There were advantages and disadvantages alike in this complexity: German education retained a certain many-sidedness congenial also to Americans; but, at the same time, the mechanics of administration were beset from the first by dangers which severely tried the zeal of the reformers of 1918. Meanwhile, educational reforms were undertaken by the separate states. Since Prussia, as the largest state, took the lead, it is with Prussian reforms that the next chapters have to do.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE REFORM OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION

AFTER THE WAR, REFORM WAS THE WATCHWORD OF THE day. The old and the new world convulsively collided in this demand. The victory of 1870 and the apparently progressive development to the year 1914 were on the side of the "eternally backward-looking"; but on the side of the reformers were the fact of the collapse, a new hope, a new faith, a "new will." Foremost was the conviction that regulations, the reconstruction of institutions, prescriptions, even laws, would not mean very much unless animated by new people. Educational reforms are always dependent upon personalities and require the power of an unshakable faith in the possibility of creating a new ideal for humanity. There will always be people who set about corroding such faith with the mildew of their own skepticism and defeatism. All periods of reform are attended by the call of the philistines that this has all happened before, that one is chasing will-o'-the-wisps, living in illusions, and ignoring the real situation. If the philistines had always won, the world would have been deprived of a host of creative ideas and efforts.

In Germany the beginning naturally had to be made with the elementary school. A new corps of elementary-school teachers was to be established which could inspire a new and vital educational theory. As already noted, the traditional training of elementary-school teachers stifled every feeling for the people and all genuineness and simplicity by the despotism of the garrison mind. The aim now was to reform this tradition so as to encourage freedom and inner security. Nevertheless, there were

still doubts as to whether a complete university education really would benefit the teachers in the elementary schools. After all, was the lack of university study the only shortcoming of the elementary-school teacher when compared with the teacher in the secondary schools? Prussia resolved to take an entirely new course. The previously existing normal school transmitted knowledge at second, even third, hand; moreover, it was dull and necessarily dependent upon the politics of the monarchy. On the other hand, the university was likely to turn the elementary-school teacher into a frustrated pedant. For the future a new kind of teachers' college, which took over certain things from the universities while retaining its own special character, was to be established.

The elementary-school teacher ought, first of all, to acquire culture, not scientific training, because he did not need the specialization to which the universities were devoted. The elementary school was not to become a school for scientific knowledge but for more general education and culture. It was not to train the intellect alone but to develop technical, artistic, and general human capacities—the emphasis was to be upon character. The children were to be more effectively prepared to serve the nation and the state as a community in which there was a real balance between education and the various economic classes. It was in this setting that the cry for “the new person” went up for the first time—a cry which, from then on, accompanied the German cultural crisis until finally the Nazis fulfilled the dream in a way which the leaders of 1918 in their wildest moments could not have imagined.

The ideal of the English university was much nearer to what was expected from the new teacher-training program than the inherited ideal of the German university, which in its devotion to high scientific standards had neglected the total task of education. Thus, in the newly established “pedagogical academies,” scientific work yielded to the task of developing human beings. The danger here was the rise of a sort of snobbish education in competition with the universities. At first a naïve, immature enthusiasm for new and revolutionary movements of thought permeated these institutions, a development quite foreign to the

expectations of those who had inaugurated them; there was no doubt, however, that intellectualism had been curbed. The joy of manual work, genuine simplicity, and a more open humanity came to the fore and set welcome limits to mere professionalism. The whole development took place with an abandon and a readiness to experiment which seemed most promising. With each succeeding year the German elementary school breathed more and more freely.

The future elementary-school teacher could now be a graduate of a secondary school. Having passed the standard examinations, he pursued advanced study in the pedagogical academy and learned also how to communicate what he knew to the children. Something of the spirit of the country home schools (*Landerziehungsheime*), with their progressive tendencies, and much of the vitality of the German Youth Movement had passed over into these new academies. The Youth Movement had been the first to realize that much of the culture of pre-war Europe and Germany had expired. It revolted against tradition, was spontaneous and instinctive, and pretended to be coarse rather than aesthetic and humanistic. It was vague about its aims, and romantic; and yet this harmless confusion and restlessness, this "return to nature," proved to be the lightning before the storm. The spirit of the Youth Movement was really the desire for a way of life which should test afresh every inherited convention of the nineteenth century. What a pity that the older generation recognized the meaning of this movement too late!

One of the strongest traditional forces in the German educational system was humanism. Undoubtedly, this humanism had stood in the way of a closer relation between the elementary and the secondary schools. The rift between the educated and the uneducated seemed to be deepened by the humanistic curriculum of the secondary schools. The German ideal of humanism fostered individualism. The great contributions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to German culture are well known. However, the question is whether during the course of a century this humanism had not overreached itself and turned German culture in a direction which necessarily alienated it from the cultural tradition and the educational pattern of other

peoples. It is not inherent in humanism that the sense of community lags behind the aspirations of the individual, but the German humanistic tradition had not sufficiently developed the sense of community; and its individualism gave rise to an exclusiveness and intolerance which injured social impulses in advance.

The question may well be asked, therefore, whether the proud heritage of the classical period of German culture had really permeated the people under humanistic influence. Had this heritage not remained the privilege of the more highly educated classes? As Humboldt and Schleiermacher and Schiller and Goethe envisaged humanism, they were persuaded that it must and could transform the whole people. Wilhelm von Humboldt saw that elementary education still faced the primary task of abolishing illiteracy. The educated class was so small that its conversion to classicism seemed to him wholly possible. But after the agricultural state became an industrial state and after the nineteenth century had brought an unprecedented increase in population, what kind of *rapprochement* could be expected between the social classes? The lower classes were gradually moving toward mass consciousness and had not been touched by humanism; for it could offer them nothing to live by.

Furthermore, the gulf between secondary and elementary education was allowed to widen. And before the humanistic ideal of the nineteenth century had really reached the so-called upper classes, the industrial era set in and either blocked further development or made it problematical. At the universities, research came to be more and more an end in itself; positivism either overshadowed humanism or absorbed it. Hence, when nationalism became a fixed point of view—indeed, a kind of religion, with a fanatical desire for finality and intolerant self-preoccupation—the enervation of humanistic culture was inevitable.

Who really had been won over to humanism? The educators who proclaimed the gospel of liberalism, the gospel of the nobility of the soul, of the humanistic and aesthetic spirit, belonged to the bourgeoisie. The humanistic ideal promised them and

their adherents more and more equality with the German ruling classes. The nobility looked upon the humanistically educated person as a type which by adaptation approximated to itself.

Humanistic culture remained, however, a comparatively thin veneer. Otherwise, the educated people in Germany would not have failed so completely in social relationships as they did in 1933. The old instincts of blunt rivalry, the modern robber baron's delight in adventure, motivated the nobility in unexpected ways and proved to be very much stronger than their humanism, which had only temporarily combined and modified obviously ineradicable impulses. Moreover, like the proletariat, the nobility had not been weakened by the bourgeois yearning for security. The humanistic education of the upper middle classes seemed rather strange to the military caste, even though it had to respect this education. If latent tensions existed between the military and the bourgeoisie from the second half of the nineteenth century until the first World War, they were at least partially due to the fact that the traditionally ruling groups instinctively sensed in humanistic education a newly forged weapon which could more and more deprive them of the monopoly of privilege. But this humanistic education could not possibly have proved so impotent after 1933 had not the whole humanistic tradition disintegrated into purely intellectual gymnastics and lifeless formalism.

In an increasingly technical society the question of whether German humanism had anything to offer to one whose life was to be devoted to a practical vocation could not be indefinitely evaded. The answer could be fairly simply given by tracing the not unfamiliar development of the humanistic ideal of the great classical period. But the critical point was how classical humanistic education prepared the individual for life in an industrial age. It must be admitted that this kind of education had run into increasing difficulties, which were not mitigated by the tendency of those who supported humanistic training to ignore them. The establishment of other types of schools during the nineteenth century—the Realgymnasium and the Oberrealschule—shows that doubts about humanistic education had arisen comparatively early. By the twentieth century only a

few university faculties held firmly to humanistic education as the only possible avenue to learning and to culture. Humanistic schools really did not seem to transmit a living understanding of antiquity.

It is, of course, not entirely fair to expect in every single Gymnasium the highest type of humanistic teachers. The education of the Gymnasia could not remain on the precipitous heights traversed by the ingenious founders and apostles of humanism a century before. The daily routine of the school seemed to be much more drab and monotonous than the classical educators of Goethe's day had imagined. Much of what had hopefully blossomed in the fresh air of the days of Goethe and Schiller, of Humboldt and Schleiermacher, had wilted. Nevertheless, the schools had perpetuated a thoroughgoing development of intellectual powers through the classical languages, which, according to Goethe, "are the scabbards of the swords of the spirit."

When the humanistic school was at its height, the number of academically trained persons was comparatively limited. The tremendous multiplication of academic professions which accompanied the increase of the population and the rise of the bourgeoisie had reduced the standards of humanistic education; hence, in order to recover for the humanistic school something of the serenity which had surrounded its cradle, reforms were essential. It seemed more important to win back the original purity of humanism than to destroy the perfection of the ideal by making as many concessions as possible for the sake of saving the dominant position of this type of school. Such compromises were not inspired by cultural pride. Those who wanted to revitalize the humanistic school aimed at an organic reconstruction of an original educational pattern, while recognizing that the humanistic tradition could no longer be the only way to acquire higher education.

The reform of the secondary schools tried to preserve the superb intellectual discipline of the German school system. But the purpose and the meaning of the structure of the secondary school were also to be adapted to the general needs of an era which had markedly changed when compared with the nineteenth century. A new type of secondary school was estab-

lished, the Deutsche Oberschule. It was based upon the belief in the autarchy of a specifically German foundation for education. It is worth noting that this type of school was established at a time when the Social Democrats were in power, since they were continually accused of sponsoring internationalism and not displaying sufficient patriotism. The demagogic possibilities of such accusations were subsequently to provide Hitler with whole chapters of propaganda.

On the whole, the school reforms were thoroughly "liberal." Students were accorded a much greater right of self-determination, since, for the first time, the opportunity to choose courses in line with individual interests was granted. People believed, moreover, in the possibility of opening the youthful mind to the cultural achievements of other nations. The exclusiveness of humanistic education was justified by the contention that only this kind of education could provide an understanding of the culture of the world as a whole. The men who undertook to reform the secondary schools repudiated this conception; they no longer believed in the possibility of a so-called "universal education," since the stuff of knowledge had increased beyond all bounds and the complexity of life had made specialization of interest and occupation indispensable. With the establishment of four different courses of study, Germany admitted for the first time that there were many methods of producing the educated man, that culture was pluralistic, that there was no single gospel, and that no one was able any longer to grasp the whole.

The various types of schools were defined in the following way: the "humanistic school," with its emphasis upon the classical spirit and its contribution to culture; the "Realgymnasium," devoted to the modern European spirit, especially in France and England; the "Oberrealschule," centered in mathematics and the natural sciences; and the "Deutsche Oberschule," dedicated to building its curriculum upon the German culture and the love of home and fatherland. Such a scheme seemed to dispose of the charge against humanistic education that it represented a cultural outlook remarkable for its monumental simplicity but nevertheless completely outdated. At the

same time it took account of the technical progress of the twentieth century. The Deutsche Oberschule could be especially recommended because it did not emphasize foreign languages, and thus students who came from the elementary school could belatedly acquire secondary education.¹

Today this type of school can be seen to have been the first sign of a national autarchy whose cultural self-satisfaction prevented the understanding of other cultural achievements. The appreciation of what is different, even totally different, is one of the essential conditions for the self-analysis of individuals and nations because both are thereby delivered from the burden of a too exclusive preoccupation with their own.

Americans may well ask why the separation of the various types of schools was necessary. The American "single-ladder system," which attempts to provide a combination of all fields of study in the same school is, of course, fundamentally different. These differences are not unrelated to the national character. It must be remembered that in a single German secondary school scarcely more than five hundred pupils were enrolled—indeed, more often the number was less. The enrolment of an American high school is very much larger. Consequently, the organization of a school in America can allow for a much greater flexibility.

But there is also much more experimentation in an American school, and relations are less personal. The social principles which distinguish the American school system assure a unity amid variety quite apart from pedagogical or philosophical considerations. (The German school system, with its separate types and its more circumscribed aims and methods, devotes more attention to the individual pupil, although its organization is more cumbersome. German thoroughness has at least this to be said for it, that it establishes a definite and invariable pattern for the education of the individual student.) But the question remains whether this pattern works to the advantage of the average student or whether it is more likely to suit the educators who tend to be concerned about the students with special gifts.

The opposition to reform was substantial. It was not marked among the rank and file of those who had themselves suffered

from the shortcomings of the previous school system, but it was very considerable among the teaching corps. Naturally, one factor had to do with what might be called the "arithmetic of teaching hours." Jealousy among the various fields of instruction was as great here as it obviously is in the rest of the world; for it was clear that the need for teachers in specific subjects had been altered by the reforms, and the employment statistics of previous years had been upset. Much more serious, however, was an unexpected opposition to the so-called *Kulturunterricht*, which had been introduced with the changes in the educational system. This new approach to culture was inspired particularly by the circumstance that instruction in both classical and modern languages had become almost an end in itself during the fifty years before the war. Linguistic, grammatical, and stylistic interests were so dominant as to obscure the ideas which the languages expressed. Of course, this was the consequence of the use of the languages for intellectual gymnastics and as a means of teaching the art of thinking. In the case of the modern languages, conversation was unfortunately neglected, and that which should have been communicated by these living languages died. In the case of the classical languages, content and culture were not completely ignored; nevertheless, the mastery of the linguistic skills required so much time that only a comparatively modest emphasis upon culture could be included in the instruction.

It could justifiably be charged against the humanistic education that it did not provide a well-rounded understanding of classical times and especially neglected architecture and sculpture. The so-called intensive method of exegetical instruction in languages was dedicated—in a totally un-American way!—to the tedious and minutely accurate interpretation of a given document, so that for almost a generation such well-known educators as Paulsen proposed to supplement this instruction by general cultural surveys, using good translations. Such a proposal seems so practical and so persuasive that one wonders at the opposition to it in professional philological and linguistic circles.

The teachers in the secondary schools were supported in

their dislike of the *Kulturunterricht* by a few of the professors in the universities, all of whom regarded it as a threat to systematic and fundamental work. They feared that a secondhand cultural knowledge was being substituted for a real education, which depended primarily on the independent acquisition of all knowledge. It cannot be denied that a slow and careful examination of material at first hand increases both accuracy and satisfaction in the work that is done. Of course, the American custom of sustaining the interest of students by changing materials as rapidly as possible has difficulties, too. But it must be admitted that in the German school many aspects of the culture of foreign lands remained for students a book with seven seals. Students themselves undoubtedly favored the new cultural instruction, and the educational administration made every effort to convince hostile teachers that both methods—the intensive and the extensive—could be harmoniously combined. But the German “thoroughness” which is strikingly evident in the German teacher did not wish to find this true.

Nevertheless, the creation of a *corpus magistrorum* equal to the new demands and cordially receptive to new plans was undertaken. But could this be achieved? The German elementary-school teachers were not kindly disposed toward the system under the monarchy; the teachers in the secondary schools, on the other hand, were not kindly disposed toward the Republic and influenced the younger generation against it. During the fourteen years of the Republic a considerable number of German secondary-school teachers opposed the state. Some opposed it openly and honestly and with the help of the parties of the Right, which were against the government. Others, however, opposed the state secretly and indirectly. Many a German schoolman appeared outwardly loyal to his governing board, but the influence of those who regarded the state with a jaundiced eye was considerable.

A reform of curriculums without a decisive reform of the teaching personnel was, therefore, a very questionable enterprise. The security of teachers by means of life-appointments and pensions had been among the earliest legal gains for officials and had been established for three generations. It is not possible

to weigh in detail the advantages and disadvantages of these arrangements. The Ministry of Education was bound by these provisions, unless it wanted to adopt revolutionary measures which would have violated sacred promises and injured its reputation. It will always be an unpardonable act of the Nazi government that with brutal faithlessness it broke the agreements which all previous governments had made with public officials and with complete arbitrariness left countless civil servants and teachers penniless. Since the law-abiding republican government did not wish to act in bad faith, the only course open was the revitalization of the teaching corps when positions became vacant and new appointments could be made. The extent to which this course now had to give way to wholly new procedures will be discussed in chapter x.

School reforms are always the expression of the aspirations of an epoch; they manifest a dissent from the past, from what seems to have outlived itself, and a confidence in a better future. The foregoing account of educational reforms has attempted to show how the elementary and secondary schools adjusted to the changed conditions of the twentieth century.

The understanding of the world which the new types of schools were to make vivid partially transcended the actual course of daily life. Men took pride in the fact that their ideals were written in the stars, and they set up an educational system upon an essentially aesthetic foundation of literature and learning. The younger generation, however, was excited by the course of political affairs and preoccupied with daily events. The new liberties of the schools which permitted students to compensate for lack of achievements in one field by achievements in another seemed unimportant. The democratic spirit of 1848, which inspired the persecutions in which many splendid men like Carl Schurz were sacrificed, no longer lived in the German youth of this time. Only a vague and romantic repudiation of the state in general remained.

Many a teacher encouraged his pupils in this repudiation. Again and again young people were told about the heroic past; they were reminded of the way in which Germany had been driven out of paradise by her enemies and of how the victorious

powers had sacrificed Germany's honor in the Versailles Treaty. And the legend of the "dagger's thrust," according to which Germany had never been defeated but had only capitulated because revolutionary Socialists had abandoned the front to the enemy, was believed because men like Ludendorff, "the warrior hero of the world war," had totally misrepresented the situation. In this way many teachers revived nationalistic impulses and promised "better days."

The school reforms of the German Republic were hampered by two decisive conditions. In the first place, scholastic conscientiousness was too entwined with the cultural heritage to meet the demand of an emerging democratic future. In the second place, the domestic and foreign political situation of the nation was too insecure. All plans for the improvement of elementary and secondary education were necessarily affected by these deficiencies. Neither the government nor the educational leadership in the new democratically minded Germany were responsible for the mistake and the mistrust abroad. But how did it happen that internal stability was not at the same time achieved? The answer is to be found in the unusual political frustration of the younger generation.

CHAPTER FIVE

POLITICS AND YOUTH

IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLICAN government the Social Democrats vigorously demanded the abolishment of the old flag. The new flag of the Republic had been the symbol of the democratic movement in the middle of the previous century; the old flag was the flag of Bismarck and had led the nation to its victories; but the new flag had been only the flag of a minority and had never become popular. Reactionary circles amused themselves by ridiculing it, and they displayed the old one. The young democracy did not want to take compulsory measures, and the result was the paradox that the democratic flag was displayed on official occasions, whereas the homes of the people were often decorated with the flag which embodied the previous ascent of the nation. The democratic flag was branded by the enemies of the new state as the flag of defeat.

These circumstances are important because the Republic was not successful in creating a new symbolism. It cannot be maintained that such symbolism is superfluous in a democracy still fighting for its life. On the contrary! It is a particularly priceless treasure for youth; for it reflects the joy in one's own people, one's own government, and one's own nation. The German Republic showed itself unusually devoid of imagination at this point. The government was ultra-rationalistic and lacked a sense of the value of prestige, of the effective significance of mythology and symbols in holding the loyalty of the younger generation. Consequently, the successors of the Republic had an easy time of it with the fictions which they used

as a means of political propaganda. Indeed, the younger generation took particular pleasure in attacking the symbols of republicanism, since they were told by the enemies of the Republic that the abandonment of the old flag was "wanton iconoclasm."

Could any state win over its youth by indifference toward the symbols of its own existence? Especially after the monarchy had taken exactly the opposite course, could such a victory be achieved? Reason alone has probably never inspired youth. And to quicken the imagination for poetry at a time when Germany seemed to be isolated in Europe was scarcely more promising. But there was a tremendous task ahead, and the government incredibly underestimated it; responsible authorities grasped the seriousness of the situation too late.

The struggle over the school reforms revealed the lamentable lack of an atmosphere in which youth could have regained confidence. The Republic had not been able to win the support of students in the secondary schools, and the school slipped from under state influence despite all the zeal of official educators. Military traditions refused to be extinguished in the hearts of the youth. This may have been a weakness, but it had to be reckoned with. Surely, it would have been possible without compromising the democratic idea to offset the prevailing indifference toward it by some adaptation of historical traditions. Socialism, however, had become so mistrustful of every nationalistic impulse that it threw the baby out with the bath.

As the years went by, Socialist circles experienced deep disappointment. International understanding through a *rapprochement* of the working classes failed. There was no gleam of light on the horizon, and nothing that had been expected came to pass. Had a success been evident anywhere, it would have made an impression on the youth. After the acceptance of the Versailles Treaty, pacifists and Socialists alike looked expectantly to the Western powers. Would the working classes of the victorious powers be strong enough to force the beginning of a European spiritual community in which Germany would again find the way to new possibilities of life? One need only recall the visit which Briand and Laval made to Berlin when Brüning faced the imminent collapse of his efforts to inject new courage

into the German people in the midst of economic crisis. At that time Laval was not in the least inclined to bring about any kind of political understanding between Germany and France. The German people seemed to have waited patiently during a long succession of years for some achievement in foreign policy. The era of Stresemann gave rise to the hope that a reasonable republican policy could be united with a respect for those historical values which were precious to the German people. Stresemann's politics seemed also to promise an improved situation in foreign relations. His too early and unexpected death was a misfortune not for Germany alone.

The politics of the Republic were particularly upset by the reaction of the students in the universities. The majority of the students stood politically to the Right, in line with the social position of their families. The majority of the German people, however, belonged to the parties of the Center and the Left. This state of affairs gave rise to an unusually difficult problem. In very similar circumstances Soviet Russia had adopted a very simple procedure: the middle classes were denied university study, whereas the lower classes were allowed to study without cost. German social democracy could not take this course, even if it had wished to do so, because it did not command a popular majority. Stipends were, of course, paid to poor students in order to influence the political complexion of the universities; and, while it cannot be claimed that nothing was accomplished in this way, much more could have been done. The fault lay with the bureaucratic attitude of the state financial administrations, which either were unaccustomed to regard such matters politically or were deliberately obstructive because the men in positions of authority were not kindly disposed toward the new way of doing things.

A thoroughly imaginative policy would have involved tremendous expense, so some excuse may be found in the poverty of the nation at the time. It is perhaps relevant also to recall that such support for needy students had until very recently not been provided by the traditional democracies. The student body differed in only one essential respect from the days of the monarchy. The lower middle class (i.e., the sons of minor officials

and appointees), which had suffered relatively less from the revolution of 1918 than the upper middle class, was now in a position to attend the universities in greater numbers. But these students from a rising social group looked rather to the upper middle class than to the social democracy for inspiration. Since vocational prospects were no longer limited by social standing, as had been the case under the monarchy, these students found university attendance unusually attractive. The goal was to become the first university graduate of the family. Furthermore, less than 5 per cent of all university students came from the working class, upon which the Republic was largely dependent for support. It would have been a miracle had the university students been automatically won over to the support of the new state.

The real power of the students was concentrated in the fraternities, and these societies were completely hostile, some of them having long since ceased to glorify democratic ideals. The fraternities could make things rather unpleasant for the Rector and his council, whereas the students who did not belong to these societies, although they were more gifted, bothered little about politics and were of no importance in the internal organization of the universities. Behind these fraternities were the alumni organizations with their conservative and reactionary pressure. Republican circles recognized these conditions and accused the educational administration of failing to deal with them with sufficient vigor. But how could this be done, since the government was composed of representatives of industry and of labor, and industry supported the reactionary tendencies of the fraternities?

Leftist groups also blamed the professors for the attitude of the students, and not without reason. The charge against the professors was that they had failed to interpret democracy to their students. The working-class members of the government found the attitude of the professors even more disappointing than that of the teachers in the secondary schools. Before coming to power many old-time Socialists had regarded the German professor as an aloof being—misled by the monarchy with its ranks and titles, to be sure, but, nonetheless, fundamentally re-

moved from the world. They believed that somehow there must be latent in him an original democratic feeling, and they expected that the spirit of 1848, when the professors dominated the parliament at Frankfort and were prepared to stand by their liberal convictions, would reveal itself anew. Many liberals and Social Democrats simply could not understand that the majority of professors in 1918 did not favor the Republic. When they finally recognized that this majority could not be won over, their early affection changed into hatred, as often happens with unrequited love.

Indeed, it was really remarkable that the university community—which regarded itself as an academic republic, defended the palladium of its independence against the democratic state, and proudly insisted upon the internal democratic constitution of the universities—clung so staunchly to the tradition of the monarchy. This was no merely sentimental attachment to the House of Hohenzollern; nor was the German professor, as many supposed, simply disgruntled over the loss of privilege and influence enjoyed under the monarchy. It would really be naïve to regard the German professor as an opportunist, for he had always been something of a dreamer, overcome by the poetic ecstasy of the historical past. A century of such living in the past had not strengthened his feeling for the urgency of the present.

The autonomy of the universities with their incorporated rights of self-government was a great obstacle to any regulation from above. Precisely because Germany was a democracy, the universities could not be deprived of rights guaranteed to them under the monarchy. Among Socialists the question was raised as to whether compulsion was a possibility. However, the freedom of research and teaching guaranteed by other democratic constitutions of Europe and rightly regarded as a mark of true democracy, prevented undue pressure upon any professor because of his views, so long as he did not neglect his duties as an official of the state. The Socialists increasingly took the position that the universities were the product of the one-sided bourgeois-capitalistic spirit of the nineteenth century, that they could be regarded only as relative and conditioned institutions,

and that their ideals of learning could not claim absolute and transcendent worth.

Only a minority of the professors were sympathetic toward the new state and able to direct the oncoming generation of students toward democracy. But was German youth thus easily influenced? Were German students more highly emotional than those of other countries? In England, where the universities are not state institutions, political forces are not decisive in academic affairs. Public opinion, therefore, did not need to take too seriously the open declaration of the British students some years ago that they would refuse to answer the call to the colors in the event of a war. In France and Switzerland, also, young students had obviously not been so influential in revolutionary periods as they had been in Germany.

For a century German students had been the vanguard of extreme nationalism as well as of aspirations toward democratic unification. Even Goethe, who as minister of state had to supervise the university of Jena, found the students difficult to control. And, before 1914, friction between the government and the student body frequently occurred. It cannot be denied that the economic situation after the war, the growing surplus of men in academic professions, the dissatisfaction of the younger generation with its forebears—all contributed to the general national ennui against which the Republic had to struggle. The government, however, was not idle; it tried to convince the students that it understood their needs and sympathized with their bitter disappointment during the first years after the war.

A long-standing dream of the fraternities had been the formation of a unified German student body which should be represented in all the universities and should include all student associations in a single organization. But the fraternities were themselves so divided that often not even students in the same university could be unified for special purposes like an anniversary. The war had renewed the desire of the fraternities for a unified student body recognized by the government. But why was recognition by the state necessary? One would suppose that students concerned about freedom would be inclined to hold themselves as aloof from the state as possible. Recognition

by the state and the protection of advisory boards were necessary, however, if the right to collect fees from every student was to be maintained—and the organization needed funds.

Becker was fascinated by the new prospect, and he undertook to explore the possibility of more direct, confidential relations between the state and a unified German student body, for he believed that the responsible elements among the students could thus be more clearly distinguished and direct consultations facilitated. No one seemed to sense the possibility that moderate and co-operative student leaders could be superseded by other forces. Becker hoped that the aspirations of the Youth Movement could be developed under the influence of a unified student organization in such a way as to assist the government in the reconstruction of the state. The various reservations voiced by some critics in the government were set aside; and the organization of the student body was undertaken under the aegis of the government, which failed to realize that it was organizing the bitterest political opposition of the future—an opposition which eventually derived its strength from reactionaries and National Socialists.

Meanwhile, the real campaigners for the new organization among the students were the flag-waving, right-wing fraternities. The great majority of the hard-working students had scarcely anything to do with such fraternities, but they were compelled to pay the dues which accrued to the advantage of the organized forces of the student body. Nonfraternity students were always outvoted and later terrorized by the fraternities.

Centuries of experience should have shown that too intimate a contact between students and the state was not to be desired by either party. Academic youth and the government could get along very well at a certain distance, even though the universities were state institutions. The unified student organization now recognized by the state had little appreciation of the fact that it had also taken on responsibilities. The rapid turnover of students prevented any continuity in the conduct of organizational affairs; hence, if there happened to be a student leadership which had a working relation with the government, the lapse of a year could change everything.

The situation was further complicated by an ominous ambiguity in the relations between the government, the professors, and the students. The professors as state officials were under certain obligations to the government. Students dealt with the state, so to speak, as independents. When political issues arose, the student body made it obvious to the professors that it was under no official obligation and was willing to exploit the advantages of its relations with the state without guaranteeing anything in return. An impossible situation had been created.

The war was followed by the inflation, which meant the financial collapse of a portion of the bourgeoisie. Between 1924 and 1928 there seemed to be an improvement; but the great international economic crisis came and reached Germany first among the European nations. The consequent overcrowding of the universities was undoubtedly a thoroughly unhealthy condition. Student days, which in Germany had once been the most carefree, seemed to anticipate life's every gloom. Military service which had formerly pre-empted a considerable number of students had been denied to the Germans by the Versailles Treaty.

By this time the organization of the German student union had created an unfortunate kind of occupation—that of the “student business manager.” For the student business manager, study was merely the cloak for political activity, and, in order to keep his position, he trained himself in the fine points of political agitation. These student managers really owed their existence and continuation solely to governmental approval of the student union. The importance of the manager's position in the university, where the administration needed his co-operation and influence, made every intellectual pursuit and discipline superfluous. Being a student no longer meant a temporary existence in preparation for one's life and work but a perpetual opportunity to indulge in the worst practices of the political agitator. Thus a new type of student came into being—a smooth-tongued, plausible, shrewd, arrogant, and often licentious busy-body and go-between—who was superior to many an impractical professor not only in power but also in adaptability and cunning.

Thus the political aspirations of the students were on the way to chauvinism and national socialism. During the last years of the Republic, officers of the student union could count upon the advice of political wire-pullers behind the scenes. Seemingly essential demands of the student body were turned to the service of political strategy, the purpose being not to satisfy the demands but to make trouble for the government. Finally, the struggle became entirely political, with ever more violent and radical aims.

What were these aims? Ultimately the prevailing political attitude was what is usually called "Pan-Germanism." This meant not merely the union of Austria with Germany but also union with all central European territories claimed as German. In short, the principal emphasis was racial, and it became very acute in view of the tense frontier-consciousness of the Austrian student associations. By the phrase "frontier-consciousness" we mean the remarkable fact that inhabitants of border areas with their centuries-old mixtures of population tend to be more vigorously nationalistic than the inhabitants of the principal territories, who take their nationality for granted. An exaggerated nationalism emanated from these peripheral areas; and the racial mixture of the leaders of the National Socialist movement may be noted as a particular proof of this observation.

Now the German student union demanded permission to unite with the Austrian student associations, which were not recognized by their government and which were violently anti-Semitic and excluded Jewish students from membership. The confused situation in Austria created a host of difficulties for the German government. The Austrian government was bound to oppose anti-Semitism by the treaty of St. Germain, but it lacked the power of enforcement in the universities and so pretended to be deaf and blind. The Austrian government denied *official* recognition to the student associations, yet tolerated them despite their anti-Semitism.

The fact that the German student union, which could not adopt a policy of racial discrimination because the government would never have permitted it, now wanted most emphatically to unite with the Austrian student associations was an ominous

portent. The racial principle was slowly to be introduced into Germany also; and there can no longer be any doubt as to who was behind these activities. Since the political program of the student union would not stop at the boundaries of the state, the government was threatened by an irredentist propaganda promoted by its academic youth. A powder keg had been set up, so that a lasting peace could have been achieved only by compromise and with the best of will on all sides.

Ultimately it had to be recognized that a persistent and calculated attack was being made upon the democratic foundations of the Republic, although, in spite of everything, ways and means of compromise might have been found. But the student organization was intransigent because it was committed to the service of the revolutionary forces of national socialism. The state could not rid itself of the demons it had reared; and even the conservatives lost control of the movement which they had cheerfully abetted for years. The majority of the students went over to the radical nationalists, the secrecy of the shift merely increasing its attractiveness.

Should the reader wonder why the aspirations and activities of the students were so important, he has only to look to Hitler for the answer. Hitler knew very well why he made use of the youth. There were well-meaning people who suggested to the government that it ought to "show more heart for youth" or that it ought to act with more "humor" and not take events so tragically. Becker, who had defended the students during the early days of the Republic and had firmly opposed those who were skeptical of his insistence upon a unified German student body, was now accused of failing to understand how to get on with academic youth. But the real problem was no longer how the educator or the teacher might best deal with students. At first, authoritative quarters had tried to shut their eyes to what was happening, because they did have a "heart for youth." But when it appeared that students were merely the front for quite other and more sinister powers, patience could be regarded only as weakness. The reputation of the state was at stake—a state which was not so secure that it could afford to play the role of a wise and generous grandfather. The government could not act

entirely on the basis of tempered educational principles after the gauntlet had been thrown down by the Fascists.

Shortly before the rise of Hitler, the politically minded leaders of the student union stooped to the most ruthless procedures; for they regarded the government as a political enemy against whom every disloyalty was permissible. The student representatives never reliably reported any conference that took place at the Ministry of Education. Even though a common resolution had been adopted, the substance of it would be misrepresented in the press by additional comments that were distorted or false. And then disturbances followed in the universities and occurred at the slightest provocation. The Rector, as the head of the autonomous administration of the university, usually stood in the middle, between the government and the student body. He was paralyzed with fright by his ambiguous position as an official of the state and as the head of a disunited faculty, part of which sympathized with the students behind the curtain of anonymous administrative autonomy.

The Ministry of Education, however, had to implement the political decisions of the government and to conform to the general political strategy. As in most other European countries, the government included only a minority from among the professions. The members of the government and parliament who came from the working classes were not inclined to regard politically influenced student rebelliousness as academic fun or as excessive youthful enthusiasm. It would, of course, have been simple to call the police in cases of disturbance in the university buildings, but police measures against students had long been in disrepute in Germany. After the Napoleonic wars, the Austrian prime minister, Metternich, had prevailed upon the German government to proceed with police measures against all nationalistic students who agitated for the granting of the constitutions promised the German people. The first agitators continued to live in the memory of the German people as democratic martyrs who were forcibly suppressed by the government. Not every one of these heroes of freedom, of course, was a Carl Schurz or a Hoffmann von Fallersleben, a Goerres or a Fritz Reuter. Many a vague enthusiast was involved in these

movements—but the fruitless revolutions of mid-nineteenth century were viewed as outbreaks of popular feeling which could have been avoided if the existing governments had not made martyrs of the pioneers in the struggle for national freedom. One who knows how strongly such historical memories affect the life of the German people will understand precisely why a democratic government hesitated to take police measures.

But the nationalistic fraternities did not yield. They enjoyed arranging national memorial celebrations in order to use them as hidden or open demonstrations against the Republic. The commemoration of the foundation of the monarchy and the Reich, January 18, 1701 and 1871, came gradually to be a particularly appropriate occasion of this kind. The speaker could glowingly extol the days of Bismarck as days of national pride and joy and then contrast them with the present; or he could merely hint at the comparison and allow his listeners to draw their own conclusions; and tactless and pompous *faux pas* of professors only served to heighten the tension. Finally, a celebration in protest against the Versailles Treaty which the students in Berlin wanted to hold in the university was forbidden. For the first time, students had to be restrained by the police from further demonstrations. Then the storm broke in the opposition press.

As the minister of education, Becker was called a second Metternich, although the whole cabinet had adopted the resolution forbidding the celebration. Becker was accused of having violated the national honor, and he was unblushingly reminded that vengeance would be taken upon him when the appointed hour arrived. Today there is no need to waste words over what lay behind all this. However, if the question should be raised as to whether the government should or could have employed sterner measures, the answer might well be that no other democratic government of the time had experienced the fascistic misuse of democratic liberties calculated to undermine those very liberties. Only with the accession of Hitler to power and with the plain disclosure of his tactics did the democratic governments of the world learn—and some among them very slowly indeed—where the lines of self-defense for a freedom-loving democracy are to be drawn.

But there is a final point to be made. The fraternities, during a century and a quarter of existence, had not been exclusively political; creative poetry and a romantic sense of life had also been connected with these societies, and they had been honored by poets and thinkers. The educational administration of the largest state in the first German Republic stands at the bar of history as an agency which did not regard force as the only means for carrying out its policies. The fraternities were later destroyed in Germany by their so-called friends, for the National Socialist government annihilated by decree the entire tradition of student societies. The conservative associations of alumni, which once had allied themselves with the National Socialists and had helped to lift them into the saddle, were not in a position to prevent the abolition of the fraternities by Hitler. What a pitiable fate! Today, not a stone remains of former glory. Unwept and unsung, the student organizations in Germany were eliminated by the man who owed his rise to power partially to them. Once again Hitler had shown himself to be faithful and thankful!

It is still an open question as to whether the republican government could have prevented the development of the nationalistic spirit and the conflict to which it led. Those Socialist statesmen who were in favor of dispensing with fraternities forgot that the cabinets were not exclusively Socialist but Socialist and bourgeois coalitions. It was not enough to hold a private conviction that the fraternities had outlived themselves. The alumni of these fraternities had also to be persuaded, and it is not only in Germany that alumni exert pressure. Nevertheless, the student movement could not be dissociated from the total political picture. Whether the rise of national socialism could have been prevented is a question which cannot be discussed here.

THE REFORM OF THE UNIVERSITY

THE TERRITORIAL HISTORY OF GERMANY BEQUEATHED more universities to Prussia, as the largest state, than to all the other states taken together. There were twelve universities in Prussia, whereas Bavaria, the second largest state, claimed only three. Baden had two, and the remaining German states, including Saxony, had one university each. What happened in the Prussian universities was of decisive significance for all German universities. The academic policies of Prussia during the Republic were dynamic, while the remaining states, with few exceptions, took a more cautious position. If a purely Socialist government came to power in those states, radical changes were suddenly introduced which left no permanent aftereffects because such measures were recalled again by the following government.

Liberal education in Prussia was conceived in comprehensive and aggressive terms. Toward the end of the war, Becker published a monograph with the title *Reflections on the Reform of the Universities*.¹ Considerable literature had appeared during the middle of the last century when these questions were widely discussed. The proposed reforms led, like the revolution itself, to no significant results, and they were buried and forgotten. Increasingly widespread complaints about the universities also confronted the Republic. Neither in 1848 nor in 1918 was it regarded as a blot upon the memory of the founders or reformers of the German university like Humboldt, Schleiermacher, Fichte, and Schelling to have one's own thoughts about structural changes.

In the decade before the war the monarchy had not been completely deaf to appeals for reform; but the monarchy loved to go its own gait and please all sides and contented itself with small concessions to instructors who had no rights within the autonomous administration of the universities. The freedom of the universities was tremendous. The special rights and privileges guaranteed to them since the beginning of the nineteenth century were the more remarkable in view of the fact that they were not granted by a democratic state. Indeed, it cannot be overemphasized that Germany was far ahead of other countries in this respect. France, and even America, have until this day not even remotely accorded their professors the rights and liberties which they enjoyed in imperial Germany. It is no accident that Germany was the land of thinkers. Autocracy and bureaucracy came, as it were, to a stop before the portals of the spirit. And the result was that the German professor and his research acquired public recognition beyond that of most other countries. The German Republic did not desire to limit academic freedom but attempted to codify it in such a way that customary rights were legalized and even extended.

There was, however, another problem with which the republican government had to deal: The intellectual and economic privileges of the professors were so great that there was a real question as to whether these traditional rights could continue in a socially minded state. An adjustment between the status of the universities and their professors and the rising democratic demand that every citizen should have the same educational opportunity proved to be absolutely unavoidable. Becker's book was favorably received by the general public and by the younger instructors. Older professors, many of them well-known scholars, however—and for the most part these were the ones who were politically reactionary—stubbornly resisted every thought of change. Only the fear that other statesmen, who, unlike Becker, would not be chosen from the ranks of the professors and could impose still more vigorous demands, prompted these scholars to look upon his proposals as the lesser evil. What did Becker propose?

The critical voices of the present generation had to be taken

into account, for times were changing. For the first time the humanistic ideals of teaching and of general learning were under fire, and they had to prove themselves afresh; for the trends of a machine age had cut across these ideals. The astonishing development of the medical faculties and the technical schools made such a strong case for specialized training that the humanistic demand for the development of personality through academic training seemed to exist on paper only.

The humanistic combination of the faculties was more of an ideal than a reality. Indeed, so far as the medical faculty was concerned, it was only a fiction. Was the monumental idea of Wilhelm von Humboldt—that academic study had to develop the personality and that it served this purpose best when it had no direct practical advantages in view—still applicable? Was it, indeed, still alive in the faculties? Had it not become simply vanity to believe that the universities really produced the classical humanist? The ablest German educators began to have doubts. The humanistic course of study had become, as it were, a matter for Sundays. It continued to be a topic in the inaugural addresses of Rectors and on academic occasions; on the other hand, many a professor, precisely because he valued the ideal of Humboldt, seemed to have lost the appreciation for the practical professional needs of the average student. Such academics cared little about what later awaited the students as clergy, judges, physicians, or high-school teachers. They worked and acted as though only future professors were to be educated, thereby causing the fate of students who lacked the means and abilities for university teaching to be very unfortunate indeed. During their student days they lived by the happy fiction that they were already embryonic professors and tried to do an accomplished piece of research. Then they had to take positions in which they had no immediate use for what they had learned, and disillusionment was the result. Many never found the time to continue research. Since it was necessary to pursue research in the grand style, not infrequently they became insignificant and neglected micrologists, who applied the method they once had learned to pedantic hair-splitting. How many, therefore, practiced their professions in a mood of complete resignation?

Here was an impossible situation in plain sight. It was sheer blindness to ignore it! But where was the possibility of improvement?

The university professor, often because he was an accomplished scholar in philology or history, had too little contact with the secondary school. Once at a meeting concerned with secondary-school reforms the professors of history were asked which of them had had practical teaching experience in a secondary school, and it turned out that not one of them had done such teaching but that all of them depended on hazy memories of their own school days. This condition was to be corrected by stressing the educational value of each discipline. The intention was certainly not to interfere with the old and honorable tradition of research which was the glory of the German university. One had only to introduce a pedagogical perspective into the university. But the very idea of "principles of university teaching" (*Hochschulpädagogik*) was ridiculed by the older professors and especially by the most distinguished scholars.

The German professor usually began his teaching career as a *Privatdozent* without previous training in educational principles and methods. In general, his maxim was, "I roar like a lion on his native heath." And since teachers tend to be born and not made, good teachers could adopt this maxim without risk; but this whole attitude left much to chance. There can be no doubt that the teaching methods at the universities could have been improved and that the work of many a professor would have been facilitated if more attention had been given to the art of teaching. Indeed, it took a very long time to establish professorships of education in all universities. Not until after the last war did every university have its own chair of education. If such distinguished scholars as Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, the famous classical philologist, condescended to recognize the principles of education as a fully established scientific discipline, it was because such principles were listed as a branch of philosophy.

The lecture method in the universities had likewise been the object of long-standing criticism. Personal relations between professors and students left much to be desired, because, at the

large universities, the professor did not come to know his students sufficiently. Students had no way of measuring their own progress, since they were not required to attend seminars in addition to lectures. And professors had no way of evaluating their teaching, since they met the average student too seldom in seminars and the lectures were largely professional discourses almost never open to questions from the students. Besides, the university had no place for tests. A community of students and teachers had been envisaged by the philosophical founders of the humanistic university as the sound presupposition for effective education; such a community no longer existed in the large universities. In the faculties of law the situation had already reached the unfortunate state in which the student attended the university but prepared for his examinations by paying a tutor, a drillmaster who guaranteed the rapid acquisition of enough practical information to pass.

Curricular reforms, discussed by authorized representatives of the university teachers, won the approval of a majority in the faculties; although it was not always easy to persuade the individual professor. Many a favorite custom had to be abandoned. In the future students were to be introduced to practical professional problems without thereby infringing upon the spirit or the requirements of an academic and scholarly education. The mass influx into higher education and the overcrowding of the academic profession urgently called for such an adaptation. But the purely practical point of view, interested only in immediate usefulness and gain, took the center of the stage, and with it came a decline of that lifelong respect for *Alma Mater* and her teachers which had been characteristic of previous generations. The humanistic point of view, however, was so deeply rooted in the German soul that contrary tendencies simultaneously developed to preserve at all costs the humanistic ideal. Many of these efforts flourished even in the advanced technical schools which existed independently of the universities.²

As men saw the approaching conflict of humanism and a crass realism, they began to think over what could be done to maintain the humanistic ideal. With youthful enthusiasm the proposal was made that, following the medieval example, a separate

faculty of liberal arts should be established in every university which every student would be required to attend as a prerequisite for his specialized training.³ The idea was that general humanistic training would be a kind of preface which would then be followed uninterruptedly by purely professional training. But strength was lacking for such thoroughgoing changes. In general, Nietzsche's prophecy that education loses genuine creativity by diversification and by the unlimited multiplication of those who receive it—that the elixir of education loses, so to speak, its aroma and recuperative power when it becomes mass education—seemed on the way to fulfilment.

Thus far we have been discussing the structural aspects of the reform of the universities. Their true significance, however, can be understood only in the light of the underlying conception of research. The development of German culture in the universities during the nineteenth century was dominated by the humanities and the social sciences. When the Romanticists with their speculations about nature declined, the general standards of scientific work came to be determined by the historical and philological disciplines. In the wake of the tremendous upsurge of the natural sciences during the last third of the century, the humanities and the social sciences were strongly influenced both in point of view and in method by naturalistic empiricism. French positivism was combined with scientific naturalism to produce what in Germany was called "historism" and "positivism." This positivism held sway in Germany until the end of the war and dominated academic method in particular.

The result was that the search for facts was thrust into the foreground, and the slogan was "the data of the senses." Whatever lay behind phenomena was beyond the possibility of inquiry. The speculative enthusiasm of German idealism as it had been manifested at the beginning of the nineteenth century fell into disrepute. The kind of systematic analysis which uses facts only as the foundation for a unifying structural interpretation of reality was belittled by the proud claim that there was no longer any need for metaphysics. History seemed to have taught that all systems pass and that philosophy was a series of attempted solutions which were of only relative worth; hence men took

comfort from the fact that all metaphysical constructions had proved themselves temporary. It was impossible to penetrate the whole of reality or to master it at any given time.

The epoch concluded by the first World War was essentially unphilosophical. Men turned eclectic; they became "historical"; they had no "prejudices"; and they found the great creative builders of the comprehensive philosophical systems extremely arbitrary. Epistemology and logic were now the rage, and men devoted themselves to fitting together item after item. Always the moment had not yet come for making the whole from the parts. Specialized research seemed to be an endless path, and with each day's progress the goal of putting everything together grew more remote.

In Becker's *Reflections on the Reform of the Universities* the conviction was clearly expressed that German positivism and historicism were in danger of disintegrating into a mere accumulation of facts. According to the new thesis, what was expected of German scholarship was not more tedious collecting, not refined specialization alone, but the attempt at wholeness, a synthesis of what had for decades been worked out in isolation. Becker demonstrated his views by citing the historical disciplines. He regarded the goal of historical inquiry no longer in terms of Ranke's widely influential maxim that one had merely to find out how things had really happened. As one of the foremost historical scholars, Becker doubted whether Ranke's conception of reality was adequate for the historical process. And he called into question the so-called "objectivity" (i.e., without presuppositions) of scholarship.

"Objectivity of inquiry"—this had been the proud dictum of Mommsen and his colleagues in the days of liberalism and the Kulturkampf. That slogan expressed the conviction that it was possible, indeed necessary, to arrive at scholarly conclusions which were completely free from metaphysical presuppositions. Liberalism, then engaged in a struggle with the Catholic church, imagined that, in contrast to Catholicism, it manifested no presupposition in its research and had already achieved objectivity. The new point of view maintained that all intellectual activity implied a conditioned frame of reference, whether the in-

vestigator was fully aware of it or not. Scientific inquiry without value judgments, such as liberal scholarship believed itself able to carry out, was regarded as an illusion which could have arisen only because the theory of natural law had, consciously or unconsciously, been transferred to the humanities and social sciences.

The so-called objectivity of inquiry which reproduced only the facts was denied by this new conception of scholarship chiefly for the reason that no scientific point of view can be held in complete independence of the spiritual climate of its time. The new point of view presupposed a much more rigorous analysis of the foundations of research than the more naturalistic conception of historicism with its naïve self-confidence had done. Increasingly the German conception of scientific work absorbed this new idea and made it the basis of analysis. Therefore, a severe struggle against inherited ways of thinking was unavoidable.

Gradually, however, the new perspective took root. The work of Troeltsch on *Historicism and Its Problems*;⁴ the philosophy of Max Scheler,⁵ which made room for a "knowledge for the sake of God"; and, finally, the rise of existential philosophy and a new ontology were milestones on the way toward establishing new purposes for scientific and scholarly work. These new purposes were no longer afraid of "subjectivism." The authority usurped by the natural sciences in the domain of the humanities and the social sciences seemed at last to have come to an end; but the natural sciences had themselves undergone a great change, as indicated by the work of distinguished physicists like Planck, Einstein, Heisenberg, and others. Confidence in natural law and in a merely empirical interpretation of the universe were on the decline in physics, also, in a way that an earlier generation would have regarded as impossible. The mathematical, physical, and chemical insights of an increasing company of scientists had demonstrated the relativity and limitation of all human inquiry and had opened the way to a transempirical conception of reality.

This did not mean that empirical historical investigation was abandoned. Nobody would have ventured to belittle the pre-

vious accomplishments in the collection of historical data. Ranke's oft repeated and admired declaration seemed rather to mark a halfway point in the evolution of a general methodology of research. Ranke had said: "I wished as it were to eradicate myself and to let events speak for themselves, to let the mightiest forces appear, forces which have developed simultaneously and with complex intensity and which have erupted in opposition and in conflict during the course of the centuries."⁶ But according to the conception with which men in Germany were pioneering, events can speak for themselves only in the language of the inquirer, and they undertook to explore the symbolic significance of all occurrence.

This newly formulated point of view could not be unanimously understood abroad; sometimes it encounters misunderstanding even today. The German development is alien especially to the empirical genius of English-speaking countries, which continues to be influenced by the naturalistic rationalism of the eighties and nineties. On the other hand, scholarship in Germany was peculiarly open to stimulation from America and England after the war. This can be said particularly of sociology, which had been neglected because it cuts across the separate disciplines. Men like Toennies or Vierkandt were more highly regarded abroad than in Germany. Positivism had greatly intensified the belief in the expert and in specialized training, and anyone who sat on the fence had to meet the charge of diletantism and was ostracized by professional arrogance. Sociology, however, was inconceivable apart from the combination of various disciplines. Again, the magic word of reform was "synthesis." The titans of scholarship did not like it. Moreover, the prevailing view under the monarchy had been that the government would satisfactorily look out for the administration of social problems. Parliament had largely supervisory and confirmatory powers. Life in imperial Germany was comparatively quiescent, and the course of social evolution, which later gave rise to such tremendous convulsions, was hidden. When, then, the Ministry of Education undertook to increase the chairs of sociology and to encourage sociological inquiry, a conflict ensued with the specialists. Nevertheless, the ministry refused to

be intimidated. And it was characteristic that German sociological inquiry did not, as scholars abroad were fond of doing, adopt the methods of natural science but went its own philosophic and systematic way.

The moment seemed to have come when two emphases, hitherto almost exclusively dominant over the field of scholarship, declined. The first was the exaggerated individualism, combined with hero worship, which aimed to transform historical inquiry into the history of great men. The study of the history of ideas which now came into prominence aspired to a constructive appraisal of the great totalities of human existence and consciously or unconsciously leaned toward Herder and Hegel without losing itself in Hegel's fascinating all-inclusiveness. The second was the rigorous delimitation by historicist-positivistic research of what could be investigated, so that everything irrational and mythical was considered ultimately beyond inquiry. The new conception of research proved in almost all fields of inquiry to be hospitable to imponderable and irrational possibilities not expressed by words alone.

The history of the humanities and the social sciences demonstrates that the period after the war was animated by a more genuine and original spirit than the immediately preceding era. Intellectual inquiry before the war had, on the whole, lived on inherited assets. The tendency toward the transcendental, the absolute, and the unconditioned, for which the Germans had been imitated or reproached since the rise of idealistic philosophy, was unmistakable in the new currents of thought. The creative forces of the period between 1918 and 1933 pointed toward a more promising future. In 1933 these forces were mightily attacked by demonic powers; but when the delirium is over they will continue to extend their influence in the world. Phenomenology and the existential philosophy came into prominence during the Republic; and the same is true of dialectical theology, which has been beset by many misinterpretations both in Germany and abroad and has aroused enthusiastic adherents and some bitter opponents. But so much has permeated theological thinking in general as a result of this movement that there is no way of denying its tremendous effect. There is an

evident abandonment of liberal attempts at harmonization in which the blind belief in human progress inspired the worship of a secularized God in a sacramentalized world. The Barthian emphasis in theology has helped to oppose a theocentric orientation to a capricious anthropology; it has secured anew the autonomy of faith by its attempt to provide a foundation independent of human cultural development; and it has once more worked out the limits of humanism and nationalism, obscure since the days of Schleiermacher. Thus this theology became a "theology of crisis," alike a warning and a turning-point which could not be ignored in a day of cultural disintegration.

The revised purposes of scholarly inquiry which have just been described affected nearly all branches of learning. Even political economy and jurisprudence broke through historicist confinement and found the way back to systematic thinking and to conceptions which were relevant to life and its development. And there were distinguished physicians who turned without prejudice from the mechanized apparatus-medicine, with its materialistic presuppositions, toward the living totality of human existence, toward the nonmeasurable but effectual connections between body and soul. It would be false to declare that developments of this sort could have been brought about by the organized efforts or stimulus of boards of education. Nevertheless, educational administrations were able to co-operate with the course of events by nourishing the spirit that had come to birth.

A very fundamental way of doing this was provided by the appointment system, the method of selecting professors. The faculties had the right to appoint young instructors quite independently of any assistance from the government. Before the war the independence of the faculties in the selection of young instructors had encountered sharp criticism both in parliament and among the general public—criticism which was directed not so much against the appointments as against the rejections which aroused suspicion concerning the objectivity of the decisions. The number of famous Germans who, like Schopenhauer, Gustav Freytag, Dühring, and others, were not treated by the faculties in accordance with their achievements did not

speak well for the reputation of the German universities. Moreover, the unjust rejections, the consequences sometimes of a one-sided or too rigorous ideal of scholarship and sometimes of a complete disregard of competence, were so numerous that it seemed probable that a society of scholars would be formed outside the universities whose members would aspire to public influence by a more prophetic and less academic attitude. This was a real threat to the central position of the universities. Professionalism, narrow-mindedness toward other points of view, fear of competition, were sources of friction which bedeviled the faculties. Potential tensions could be controlled, however, because the faculties were very sensitive to public criticism and because the healthy co-operation between faculties and state administrations prevented many an abuse and mistake.

The freedom of the faculties was very great. The right of appointing young instructors without governmental interference when compared with the rights of teaching bodies in the universities of most other nations proves how far the freedom of German universities went. After the war the criticism of this appointment procedure and of the position of the young instructors in the universities was sharply renewed. The delegation of responsibility for appointments to the faculties themselves involved an extraordinary trust. The government genuinely desired to uphold the freedom of the faculties, but it was plain that objectivity of decision in individual cases had to be guaranteed if public confidence was not to be seriously impaired. Nothing could be more ominous than the appointment by the faculties of men without academic distinction and the repudiation of the really gifted. An additional irritant stemmed from the disinclination of the faculties to recognize "outsiders" from the public schools or from the practice of law or medicine as qualified for university appointment. After 1918 the Ministry of Education became convinced that practical experience would benefit the universities, and men were called from actual practice if they had given evidence of scholarship. Meanwhile, the government for the most part elevated professors from the ranks of young instructors.

But the severest reproach of the appointment system of the

universities was inspired by the inflation. It was customary for salaries not to be paid to anyone below the rank of associate professor; and the young instructor earned the right to teach upon the completion of his doctorate and after publishing a major scholarly work in addition. But, since lecture fees were negligible, he was dependent upon his own financial resources, and at the large universities an instructor could barely manage to live on fees even if he taught required courses. Only in exceptional instances were young instructors subsidized by stipends from the state. After the war it was rightly charged that under these conditions only capitalists could take up university teaching. In order to meet this difficulty the state guaranteed young instructors at least a minimum livelihood by means of special stipends, but the right of the faculties to make the appointments was not abridged. Consequently, an anomalous situation was created in which the state had scarcely any influence over the number of instructors appointed, no influence over their competence, and yet supplied the funds.

In the long run, this state of affairs was very difficult to manage. Some complained that instructors were becoming state officials; others declared that the stipends were too low. Meanwhile, the allegiance to tradition in the universities was so strong that the faculties were prepared to barricade themselves behind their prerogatives. Government proposals for the readjustments which were commendable from the standpoint of the furthering of scholarship could not count upon sufficient general support to risk carrying them out. That he who pays the piper calls the tune was in this instance, at any rate, flatly disregarded.

There can be no doubt that the prevailing practice of appointing young instructors could scarcely have been maintained once the question of the reconstruction of the universities became an issue. Nevertheless, it may be pointed out that the determination of the status of instructors by the whole faculty possessed an undeniable advantage over the departmental system of other countries; for the relation between the younger instructors and their immediate superiors is subject to much more careful regulation when an autonomous faculty is in control. If the instruc-

tor works under an ambitious professor who tries to suppress him, the possibility of intervention by the faculty is much more likely than in the case of departments which function quite independently of one another; for in the faculties, neighboring fields see to it that human dignity is everywhere sustained and a skilful leadership of the faculty always has the possibility of illuminating the darker corners of the house. That presidents or deans in English-speaking countries possess equally effective powers seems to be not wholly a foregone conclusion.

The health of scholarship, however, is decisively dependent on the selective procedure by which professorships are filled. That is why it is so important that academic replacements be freely made with the highest standards in view. What is imperative for other vocations is decisive in the highest sense for academic life, namely, that the way be open to the most gifted and that the best man obtain the post for which he is suited. That means also that cliquishness, political influence from without, nepotism, considerations of friendship or relationship, are more harmful to academic professions than to other callings. They signify, indeed, an acute danger to scholarship. It is not too much to say that the standard of scholarship of a nation is dependent upon the development by that nation of the best possible system of selection for its professorships. Can this be done if things are left to chance or to the more or less uncontrollable influence of individual institutions or persons?

The methods of academic appointment vary greatly in different countries. In Germany the procedure was as follows: a call to a professorship was extended by the faculties which had the right of selection from the total number of available candidates. Three recommendations, accompanied by very full statements of qualifications, were sent to the government. The government accepted one of the recommendations or returned them all if it regarded them as ill-suited or insufficiently supported. The government appointed without recommendation only when no agreement could be reached with the faculty. In my judgment, this arrangement had very many advantages. It offered comparatively high security against personal or political influence. Since democracy proclaims the glad tidings of free and

equal rights and opportunities for all, it would fail to be true to itself if safeguards were not introduced against the inevitable pressures and temptations common to all human striving and rooted in political and economic power.

The history of the universities shows that governments very infrequently made use of the right of sole power, and when they did so they were quite often very fortunate in the choice that was made. A glance at the history of the University of Berlin, for instance, will disclose very famous names among those appointed to the faculties by the government. This should not be taken to mean that the faculties on their part had failed. They did very responsible work, but their point of view necessarily differed from that of the Ministry of Education. In a state the size of Prussia the faculties had to evaluate the achievements and character of candidates as well as the local needs in a given field. The Ministry of Education had the responsibility for appraising the present and the future situation of the field in which an appointment was to be made. Often the Ministry was in a better position to give a neutral and objective judgment about teaching prospects at a given university than local representatives were. But the Ministry also had a negative function: it could correct a judgment of the faculties which failed to take account of competence, and it could arouse the consciences of the faculties against injustices.

These really tremendous responsibilities could be adequately discharged, however, only by a government which was free of similar errors. And it would be giving too roseate a view of the situation to neglect to add that the state governments were also exposed to extraneous influences: under the monarchy, uncontrollable pressures from the crown, the court, and the ruling classes were possible; under the Republic, there were unreasonable individual members of parliaments who tried to exert pressure on the decisions of the ministries. In such instances the faculties were in a position to protest and without reservation to engage in public criticism. Even under the monarchy, for that matter, university professors had the right of direct and immediate access to the Ministry of Education.⁷ Thus it may be said that for half a century in Germany the administration of

the universities was so unbureaucratically conducted that the Republic had to change but little.

The co-operation between faculties and governments in making university appointments was the fruit of an intelligently planned administrative strategy, in which nothing was left to mere chance or to the economic law of supply and demand. Nobody in Germany regarded the filling of university positions as something analogous to the procedures of business enterprises. One could not apply for positions. It was impossible that financial considerations should be decisive where important appointments were concerned. There were no coincidences and no windfalls. The co-operation of the autonomous administrative body of the faculties meant that a distinction was made between the calling of a professor and the appointment of other government officials. Furthermore, no German professor could be transferred from one university to another without his consent; every German professor was appointed for life and retained his full salary upon retirement. Only the student fees were cut off. Professors could even continue to lecture as emeriti.

The presupposition of this extension of the possibility of teaching and of the substantial financial arrangements after retirement was the recognition of the importance of research alongside that of teaching. The whole scheme was based on the assumption that no teacher should have a post in the universities who was not at the same time a scholar. One may think, perhaps, that these provisions for the German professor separated him too sharply from the working population, that he belonged, so to speak, to the leisure class, or that this system of appointments was too aristocratic. However, the actual achievements in research would tend to prove that his special position was one of the factors making for the high intellectual productivity which guaranteed the advancement of learning.

But how did the ministries of education determine the competence of prospective professors? Before the war the Prussian educational ministry too often availed itself of the advice of individual scholars and of the leaders of differing schools of thought who were tempted to exert partisan influence and to promote their own point of view. The democratic administra-

tion in Prussia tried to prevent this by securing the greatest possible number of recommendations from among the various schools of thought in a given field; by consulting foreign scholars as well in all doubtful cases; and, finally, by according to younger, promising scholars the opportunity to express confidentially their judgments about older colleagues. There were disciplines with respect to which it was comparatively easy to arrive at a sure judgment about the qualities of a candidate. There were other disciplines, like pediatrics or geology or theology, where judgments would be diametrically opposed. But the administration knew personally almost all those who wrote the references, and it attempted to become acquainted with the candidate before making any kind of decision. If those who had to discharge these duties were themselves possessed of clear and discerning judgment, a sense of scholarly competence, and personal integrity, then, on the basis of so comprehensive a canvass of faculty opinion, it must have been possible to arrive at a competent selection. Ultimately, of course, there is in all human decisions an element of imperfection. And those who have no sense of what is involved in appraising the worth of human accomplishments and human character will find every appointment somehow arbitrary.

Not infrequently it was believed abroad that the German universities, because they centered their attention upon graduate work, neglected to consider the teaching ability of instructors and took the question of the character of the teacher as well as of the students too lightly. But those who carried the responsibility for appointments were never concerned only with competence in research. During the Republic bad teachers were on the whole excluded, and exceptions were made only when appointees were such incomparable scholars that this distinction overshadowed everything else. In such instances the attempt was made to name an associate whose teaching ability was especially marked.

Whether German education ever achieved the optimum in the matter of character-training cannot, of course, be precisely determined. One of the reasons why von Humboldt, Fichte, and Schleiermacher would not consent to a separation between re-

search and teaching was their belief that only in this way could education serve the development of character. This belief presupposed that the teacher must also set an example. Did the Republic meet these conditions? The answer to this question will be affected by one's general outlook, yet who would hazard the assertion that character development in a nation can really be judged? An epoch like that which followed the Republic revealed character to a degree seldom seen in history. Revolutions tend to lay bare the instincts of men. The "righteous and the unrighteous" can be distinguished without mind-reading. How many German professors did not withstand the test of fire is well known. But it is just as well known that many a man preferred to abandon all that was dear to him rather than to lose his soul. And who could declare with certainty that other nations in the same situation would show stronger characters among their scholars?

The German system of university appointments wanted to see things great and see them whole and was permeated by the determination never to let ephemeral questions outweigh concern for the continuing reputation of scholarship. Important posts, therefore, could not possibly be filled temporarily; and, precisely because the appointment was irrevocable, it was a solemn decision of far-reaching significance. In the case of a university like Berlin, the question which preceded every appointment was "Will the reputation of the scholar under consideration be such as to justify his appointment a generation hence?" And though this question could not in all cases be definitely answered, nevertheless such an approach to the matter expressed the desire that "the highest thought should hover, living, over time and space."⁸

Such an evaluation of scholarship was the reflected brilliance of a classical age in which philosophy, poetry, and music nobly flourished. Early in the nineteenth century, faith in learning almost replaced faith in revelation. Today, such a transformation would be called a "secularization" or perhaps even "culture-mysticism." A kind of mythology surrounded Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, Schleiermacher, and the "Göttingen Seven."⁹ The absolute and universal validity of learning seemed to have been

established by them. And no one found it strange that the idealistic world view had slowly taken the place of Christianity. The scholar was himself a spiritual leader; and he seemed entitled to live as a prophet of his nation and a priest of the world.

From this standpoint it was of the greatest significance that the humanists' conception of learning included the indivisible unity of teaching and research. The basic conception of Humboldt and others portrayed the scholar as a man who moves among his disciples with his eye upon eternal truth. If the sole concern had been for teaching, the picture would certainly not have acquired this metaphysical splendor. But the fiction that all universities were of the same quality blurred the great differences among professors. Some scholars had really achieved distinction; others were only passing shadows. It remained an unwritten law, of course, that nobody could reach the highest position in the university without having demonstrated his ability as a scholar. But, lest too high a premium be placed upon research and thus endanger the duty to teach, it became necessary to provide professors whose sole gift was the ability to teach. This meant that a type of teacher came into prominence which had previously played no part at all. As the number of students grew from decade to decade, an expanding and ever more mechanical organization was required. Indeed, in the years after the war it became evident that only a very great enlargement of the teaching personnel, a specialization of the curriculum, and an orderly and systematic integration of the course of study would adequately meet the new demands upon the universities. The mass influx of students made the teacher even more necessary than the scholar. There were times when astute people regarded the separation of teaching and research as the only salvation of higher learning. This was resisted with might and main, however, because of the fear that the universities would lose something of the almost magical power which had been infused into them at their rebirth at the beginning of the nineteenth century. But the multiplication of positions inevitably threatened the quality of the German professor. If the average professor did not transcend the anonymity which is the fate of elementary- and secondary-school teachers, then cer-

tainly the high public esteem which had hitherto been accorded to professors could no longer be justified.

Actually the reputation of the German professor was changing. The war had already shaken faith in him; and during the Republic many scholars had transgressed the limits of their respective fields and had expressed themselves politically, even on matters about which they had no adequate knowledge. Often their analyses were arbitrary and irresponsible. Although there were also scholars like Harnack who engaged in public activity with great dignity and humanity, the earlier, perhaps exaggerated, confidence in the competence of learning had been undermined. The working classes, the parliaments, the bureaucracies which were unfavorably disposed toward academic privileges, saw so much of the human, all too human, in the activities of professors that they were no longer prepared to ascribe unusual significance to them, still less any metaphysical powers. A veritably prophetic inspiration would have been necessary to restore the old confidence. But many scholars did not even recognize the problem, regarding their authority as self-evident or complaining about the stupidity of those who failed to recognize their masters.

Meanwhile, the disintegration proceeded. Much of what Ortega y Gasset has excellently described in *The Revolt of the Masses* belongs in this context too. The world-wide crisis between the two world wars has completely shaken confidence in the impeccability of higher learning. Fundamentally, reason is an indispensable element of scholarship; but in an era of delirium, of mass suggestion, of unholy demonry, reason has lost so much of its radiance that the mass appeal of learning can occur only where its practicability and immediate applicability are obvious. When the German university had to surrender its autonomy to totalitarianism, delirium had reached its culmination. The German university under national socialism has become heteronomous, i.e., it is no longer a university in the sense in which its character has been defined for centuries.

Nobody, however, could have foreseen such a development when German democracy undertook the task of cultural reconstruction. Between 1924 and 1929, after the inflation and before

the world-wide economic crisis, all the energies of those who believed in the future of the Republic were directed toward preserving the tried and the true while incorporating the new. The external organization of the universities was also guided by this double intention: existing arrangements were left untouched, but an attempt was made to revitalize certain hierarchical aspects of university life. The differences in rank between professors and instructors which had been especially emphasized during the monarchy were greatly modified. The transition from one level to another was facilitated, and instructors below the rank of full professor were given a considerably increased part in the autonomous administration of the university. Hitherto this administration had been exclusively in the hands of the full professors. One of the new regulations was that persons of established practical experience who had a scholarly interest could become loosely affiliated with the university, thereby establishing a connection between life and learning which had hitherto been lacking. The faculties of law and of business administration benefited particularly from these changes.

As already indicated, there had always been a notable freedom of instruction and research in the German universities. The freedom of teaching was limited only by the duties of the teacher as a public official, which did not essentially differ from those of any patriotic citizen. The government was obliged on occasion to reprimand professors, but this was, for the most part, not a violation of academic freedom. It was rather a rebuke of social, educational, or general human tactlessness. If an instructor openly scorned the symbols of the state, if he disparaged the heads of the government in public addresses, or if he encouraged the representation of destructive political forces, like the National Socialist party, at official functions of the university—such indiscretions could scarcely pass without remonstrance from the educational administration. The attempt was often made to turn such occasions to political ends, and the opposition press found the slogan “violation of academic freedom” peculiarly adapted to fomenting unrest.

The juridical literature on the conception of academic freedom has been unusually extensive in Europe since the sentence

"Science and its teaching are free" was coined in the middle of the last century. This sentence, which appeared for the first time probably in the Belgian constitution, was also included in the German constitution. Academic freedom includes the method as well as the content of teaching, and in both cases the German professor enjoyed an almost unlimited liberty.

A word must be added about the academic freedom of students because at one point German and American procedures divide. This has to do with the use of tests. It has been noted that in Germany tests were regarded as superfluous, since the students were entirely postgraduates in the American sense of the term. There are advantages and disadvantages in this arrangement. The advantage is that the student must give an account of everything he has gained from his study at the end of his course. Thus no importance is attached to the specialized accomplishments of the student during his previous years of study. The credentials upon which admission to the comprehensive examination was based included only attendance at certain major courses of lectures and a certain number of semesters in residence. The examination, therefore, was prepared with reference to the total knowledge and ability of the candidate. Failures could not be canceled by summer or supplementary courses; hence it was much more difficult than in America to compensate for inadequate work by extended study, and thus the unfit were denied diplomas.

But the disadvantage of this procedure is considerable. The student had no effective measure of his growth during his course of study—he was put entirely on his own resources. And, since personal contact with the professor was confined to advice and academic discussions and seldom led to a progressive evaluation of the student's achievements and capacities, too much emphasis fell upon the comprehensive examination, the result of which could not be predicted with certainty. The student, indeed, submitted at the end of his course a written scholarly essay requiring at least several months' work, which, together with the examination, determined the final judgment about his course of study. But the decision was too long deferred.

It seems to me characteristic that the German mind would very probably have been inhospitable to the introduction of a system like that in effect in America. The German student, although he also entered the university quite young, would have looked upon such a system as a sort of coddling, of which he would have disapproved. And the German professor would undoubtedly have regarded the practice as too pedantic. Confidence in oral examinations was very great. It never would have occurred to anyone to see any need for so-called "objective" tests. Nobody feared the subjectivity or arbitrariness of the examiner. Occasional complaints were readily disposed of because the public reputation of the professor was above reproach.

Thus the freedom of the universities both as to teacher and as to learner, both in internal administration and in public life, was secure. But the fruits of this freedom would have been greatly diminished had not the ministries of education energetically circumvented those in financial control. The activities of governmental financial administrations were among the weakest points in the scheme of university reform. For generations there had been considerable penuriousness in handling the finances of the German universities. Compared to the general financial outlay of the state, designations for educational purposes were too few.

The financial administrations did not neglect the absolutely indispensable requirements for teaching, which were not excessive when compared to the funds required for research and for libraries. In relation to what America, for example, spends for research, the results accomplished in Germany with very modest means must be set down as an achievement of the very first rank. America could take the lead in the natural sciences and in medicine, whereas German scholarship was considerably hampered simply because of inadequate means. The blame is solely that of the Ministries of Finance. At every point one encountered penury and sometimes even subterfuge. Everything was done according to rule "F." The controlling idea was that culture and scholarship were a kind of *donum superadditum* when anything beyond the general apportionment for teaching was desired.

The duty of the Ministry of Finance is to keep hold of the purse strings. But what really could be charged against them was their very meager grasp of the peculiar nature of research, with the result that the withholding of funds retarded progress. Financial agreements involved the most tedious struggles, and often diplomatic detours had to be made which needlessly consumed abilities and strength.

The question might well be raised as to whether the American system of private endowment is not far more effective and far-sighted. In Germany, as in most other European countries, such private endowment would always have been very limited because there never was such tremendous wealth as in America. Besides, tradition assigned to the state the responsibilities for education. Nevertheless, Germany was for a very short time on the way toward the enlistment of private aid for research. In the years immediately before the first World War, even the emperor, vexed by the narrow and apparently intransigent bureaucratic attitude of the Ministry of Finance, tried to enlist heavy industry, bankers, and well-to-do landowners in support of science.

At the time wealthy men subscribed more than ten million dollars for the establishment of the Kaiser Wilhelm Society, which was a scholarly organization essentially devoted to research projects in the natural sciences undertaken by newly founded institutes. The funds of the state were only slightly involved in these enterprises. As supplements to the provisions of the state, these grants were to mark a beginning toward a new system of soliciting funds.

The war and the inflation defeated the attempt. After the defeat, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society became increasingly a burden upon the governments of the Republic and Prussia. It became a government-financed organization even though the far-sightedness of officials permitted the society to retain its hitherto independent administration. The hope was that the society later would again become independent of public support. This hope failed. And the decline of capitalism throughout the world seems, even in countries like America, to herald the public financing of educational and research projects.

Such a development confronts those countries in which culture is left to private initiative with one of the most difficult decisions of cultural administration. The dangers of state administration of education are evident in financial matters, if anywhere. However, if this trend of events is unavoidable and if industry, as in Germany during the Republic, supports institutes of research only in so far as they serve its own special purposes, then it is clear that no government can so ill afford to permit the penurious financing of scientific investigation as a democracy.

Just as democracy depends upon the creative powers of the spirit for its existence, so it has the responsibility of establishing harmony between spirit and power. Democracy can do this only if, on the one hand, the spirit is allowed to blow where it will and, on the other, the extension of creative research is fostered as widely and thoroughly as possible. For the most part, the German institutes looked rather unattractive from the outside, because little money was available for the appearance of scientific buildings. But the resources for research purposes and for libraries were never greater than under the Republic—a circumstance the more remarkable since the economic prosperity of the monarchy had been overtaken by times of financial stress and strain.

The Ministry of Education in Prussia earned unlimited praise for its financial supervision. Here even political opponents had to put up their weapons, for everyone knew that the funds allotted had been secured by bitter struggle with the Ministry of Finance. It would be ungrateful, however, not to mention in this connection that German scholarship received very considerable assistance from America. Marburg received a fully equipped institute of pediatrics; a magnificent university building was given to Heidelberg on the occasion of its anniversary; and Göttingen, thanks to the tireless efforts of Abraham Flexner, was favored by the Rockefeller Foundation with institutes for physics and mathematics—so great was the confidence of Americans in German learning, of which, in truth, the list of German scholars whose researches in the natural sciences attracted the attention of the world is clear evidence.

Take only the list of the Nobel Prize winners between 1918 and 1935: it contains the names of Planck, Einstein, James Franck, Hertz, Schroedinger, Haber, Nernst, Zsigmondy, Windaus, Hans Fischer, Carl Bosch, Bergius, H. Wieland, Heisenberg, Meyerhof, O. Warburg, Spemann—all German scientists and professors.

Such a list carries one beyond national boundaries; for research as such belongs to the world and its epoch-making consequences are never solely the expression of a particular national character. The achievements of scholarship are second only to music in uniting the nations; and thus, in the highest sense, a spiritual universe can be established only within a community of nations. The childish fantasy that a spiritual and cultural autarchy of one nation is possible remained for later political powers to cherish. It is plain, too, whither such a fantasy leads.

After the first World War much was done in Germany to further the knowledge of things abroad. It had been demonstrated that even the educated German knew too little about the political, economic, and cultural patterns of other lands. Indeed, the animosity toward the Germans during the war was partly traceable to their own meager comprehension of foreign impressions of the nation. After all, it was a deficient sense for life abroad that prompted the German to commit foreign affairs solely to his government and its diplomats. He was completely astonished to discover the reaction in other countries to the outbreak of the last war. Thus, even during the war, the idea took root of intensifying the study of international relations. Notably enough, this occurred in the universities. The aim was a theoretical enlargement of the knowledge of foreign countries—not the cynical and chaotic training of people who should seek to bring about political disintegration beyond the German borders. In the light of the subsequent skilfully planned instruction of spies and *agents provocateurs*, this activity of the German universities after the war was like chamber music compared to a brass band.

The spiritual comprehension of life abroad was a very important obligation so long as politics aimed at mutuality among the

nations and did not rest upon brute force or upon a propagandistic appeal to a dull mass-consciousness. Every university was under a special responsibility according to its tradition and its geographical location. The study of foreign countries was pursued as a kind of "university extension course" well designed to enlarge the influence of the universities upon the national life. The co-operation of the various disciplines concerned with the comprehensive study of a foreign country also counteracted the inclination of the scholar toward isolation. The ultimate goal was not merely to provide a certain knowledge of other lands for a limited number of students but rather to reach precisely those who would never have occasion to travel abroad; for the conviction of those who, like Becker, put their whole heart into the program of foreign studies was that in a democratic state the knowledge of other lands belongs to the constant equipment of every educated person—indeed, that the political maturity of a nation depends upon the extent to which its educated citizens have understood the spirit of other nations.

At this point we have come to the end of this phase of our inquiry. Looking back, the critical question raised by the educational policies of democratic Germany might be put thus: What was the basic conception of those who were called to administer the educational system in one of the darkest hours of German history? When the military state was discredited by the collapse of 1918, the idea of a reconstruction of the nation as a "cultural state" arose almost of itself. This certainly did not mean the *Kulturstaat* of the eighteenth century; the purpose was rather to enrich the German consciousness through the great cultural traditions which even the enemy had not opposed. But responsible people saw quite clearly that exclusive stress upon one's own cultural past would necessarily be stifling. Germany had now become a democracy, and the Social Democratic party held the governmental majority. It seemed as though the nation would not have to go through the bourgeois-capitalist stage of development but could immediately be transformed into a social democracy such as the Western powers had not yet achieved. The resources of education had to be devoted to overcoming the isolation of the war and the humiliation imposed by the Ver-

sailles Treaty. The objectives were formed by current necessity. Was it not a tragedy that Germany made it so difficult for the world to understand her? Cultural rehabilitation seemed impossible without restoring connections with western Europe.

When the Social Democratic party came to power, its educational ideals were at variance with its political hopes because there had been no opportunity to replace the inherited bourgeois cultural tradition by a socialistic one. A vigorous Socialist conception of culture which transcended Marx and was relevant to the time simply did not exist; indeed, it could scarcely develop at all under the dominance of the materialist conception of history. Those Socialists who began by condemning humanism as outmoded had nothing to proclaim in its stead. The battle against bourgeois education was carried on with tenacious enthusiasm; but Paul Tillich, a prominent Socialist long concerned about the cultural problem, confessed in 1926: "What is missing is a tangible, wholly obligatory, basic and holy meaning of the educational idea and method. As long as this is missing and to the extent to which it is missing, anti-capitalist pedagogy will be in a difficult position and will remain more a signpost toward the future than a creative force in the present."¹⁰ The Socialists were agreed, according to Tillich, that they did not desire to educate anybody in "the bourgeois emphasis upon the form of culture." But for "the question, . . . what was to be substituted for this culture," the Socialists had no answer. Tillich admits the failure of the attempt "to make a philosophy of the world and life the basis of education and to develop this philosophy in the co-operative thinking of teachers and pupils." The idea of the educational value of manual work could certainly not of itself give rise to a new world of culture, as many a Socialist theorist proclaimed.¹¹ Moreover, the German cultural heritage was too rich simply to disappear, and it continued to influence the German people even though repudiated by certain sections of the population. Thus the creative forces of a new education could not be developed entirely from the tragic experiences of the nation or by political reconstruction, since organic life cannot be replaced simply by organizational will.

The younger generation, in particular, lacked the easy cer-

tainties of life in Anglo-Saxon society. Leading German educators after 1918 were burdened by the desire to find a way for the creative energies of youth to unfold so that the new generation might be voluntarily incorporated into a well-ordered society. But it was not enough to reform the barren intellectualism of the educational past. The firm opposition of the Republic to the spirit of the schoolmaster was weakened by its own rationalistic propensities. The fundamental problem was the transformation of German individualism by a sense of the transcendent origin of the universal human community. This community is not the superficial society envisaged by the German enthusiasm for "organized get-togethers"; it is rather the consummation of that eternal hunger for social wholeness rooted in all human existence because it proceeds from God and leads to God. This community was the final goal of education. To achieve it is one of the greatest responsibilities of the future.

There was much in the German Youth Movement, with its desire for eternal values, its return to natural ways of living, its irrationalism, that offered points of contact to educational leaders and that might have been appropriated if the aspirations of the movement had not in the last analysis been anarchic. A bit of Anglo-Saxon moderation, impersonality, and conventionality would have been healthy for the German soul with its dynamism, its volcanic eruptiveness, its unpredictability, its need for boundless form-destroying expression. The German educational tradition seemed solid enough to achieve such a coalescence of temperaments without losing its identity. The conversion was intended to be pursued by slow and measured steps. For the first time, facilities for social life were set up in the universities; for the first time contacts between students and workers were encouraged in factories and in camps. The Dresden Student Aid Society¹² did commendable work along this line, as well as by providing grants-in-aid to students, even though it was too firmly linked with capitalism to retain the complete confidence of democratic and Socialist quarters. But all these efforts were only beginning when the end of the epoch drew near.

Since Nietzsche's *Untimely Reflections*, skepticism about the value of education had penetrated the soul of the cultured

European. Faith in the whole cultural system had been attacked, and this faith was further undermined by the great mass movements with their demand for a new conformity. After 1918, everyone struggling with educational questions sensed something of the mood of decline—it was the prelude to the cultural nihilism which swept over Germany in the thirties. But for the moment there was still time; the dark clouds whose heavy shadows overcast the nation might pass over. Yet the tremendous cultural tensions subsequent to the last war could not be resolved on the level of the immanent and the finite.

In an appraisal of contemporary German poetry during the decade 1920–30 are these words: “In opposition to the idealistic tradition, forms have a decisive strain of critical unrest in common, an unrest which prevents any style from maturing as the incontestable expression of the time and makes many artists homeless amidst the rapidly declining styles.”¹³ In truth, however rich the German poetry of this period may have been, it was, nevertheless, without inner unity. A final and solemn attempt was made to call the idealistic or romantic past to the aid of bourgeois art. Mystical introspection either sought out the hidden God or tried to penetrate the current façade of actuality. Expressionistic ecstasy flickered demoniacally over the abyss of existence.

Despite the variation in feeling for form and in attitude toward art, one thing remains common to the poetry of the time—the shudder of creation before the advent of catastrophe. But its meaning was hidden from contemporaries because older styles, like naturalism and impressionism, still blurred the outlook.

It would be nice if the discerning educator were at the same time a kind of seismograph which recorded the spiritual earthquakes ahead of time. The leading spirits of Germany had not failed to recognize that the “forms of life of the time had grown old”; the extent of the imminent dangers, however, could not be foreseen by any mortal. The reform of education could not have been undertaken if the future had been anticipated; for one cannot build a house over an abyss.

But the will to construct was stronger than the doubt of suc-

cess. This should be remembered by all who shudder at the contemporary disintegration in Germany and at the same time are cool toward the efforts of the German Republic. Its responsible educational leaders wanted to build a bridge which might lead from an outmoded past into a slowly self-revealing future. The great problem with which past epochs in Germany had wrestled in vain was the problem of power and spirit. This seemed to be the task which the times had imposed upon the men who were to administer German education. It could be discharged only as far as education and life could be set in an entirely new relation. The goal was the harmonious penetration of a freedom-loving people by a unified and active educational will. To keep this goal in mind, if one wholeheartedly put the hand to the plow, required an unconquerable faith in order to avoid the terrific rupture of generations.

Nevertheless, the cultural disintegration of Germany has come, and nobody knows the extent to which the culture of the rest of the world has been engulfed by it. On the one hand, the educational reforms of the democratic German Republic might have been all in vain; on the other hand, some of the ideas and concerns which we have been tracing could permeate another time in another form. Such a prospect could heal and restore the historical continuity interrupted by war and revolution.

CHAPTER SEVEN

AMERICAN AND GERMAN EDUCATION

THE ADHERENTS OF DEMOCRACY IN OTHER COUNTRIES tend now to look askance at the efforts of German educators during the Republic. Although the educational program between 1918 and 1933 was sympathetically observed and studied outside Germany, events since then have led many a warm friend of German education to doubt whether a program which achieved such horrifying results could have had any value whatever. Even very penetrating educators who visited Germany during those years have now succumbed to the legend deliberately fostered by the Nazis that the situation was already "chaotic" when the Nazis took over. But those who saw the country—not from a hotel but *really*—know that until the spring of 1932 there was order in the nation not fundamentally different from that of other democracies.

During the years immediately before the present war, distinguished American educators recognized that what was happening in Germany presaged an agony into which the whole world would be drawn. "The revolt against intellectualism and reason and the general sport of 'debunking' the tradition of values and ideals opened an easy road for the Nazi doctrine of 'thinking with one's blood.'"¹ These are the words of John Dewey, who remarked in another connection that "the world is moving at a tremendous rate, no one knows where. . . . We must prepare our children not for the world of the past, not for our world, but for their world, the world of the future."² A bulletin of Teacher's College at Columbia University puts it this way: "The gravity of the present situation is not due solely

to the accelerated triumphs and accumulating prestige of the totalitarian regimes. Our nation is endangered."³

In the light of these observations, many aspects of the American educational system have undergone an unusually penetrating criticism from American educators. In 1937, Dewey declared that "at least one great trouble is that we have taken democracy for granted; we have thought and acted as if our forefathers had founded it once for all. We have forgotten that it has to be enacted anew in every generation."⁴ And again in another passage Dewey notes that "conservatives as well as radicals in education are profoundly discontented with the present educational situation as a whole."⁵ Even in 1935, in an article entitled "From a National System of Education," Dewey expressed the opinion that "from the standpoint of any European country, except Great Britain, the American public school system is a chaos rather than a system."⁶ A year later he declared: "Present education [in America] is disordered and confused."⁷

Kandel carries the same general line of thinking further. "Democracies on the whole," he says, "have not devoted the same care to the selection and preparation of teachers as have either authoritarian or totalitarian states. The minimum standard of qualifications of teachers in democratic countries has on the whole been lower than in authoritarian or totalitarian states."⁸ About the high schools the same educator writes that "the development of the high school curriculum until recently has been somewhat haphazard, unguided by any definite philosophy and representing a blend of traditional and new subjects."⁹ He speaks further about the "oversimplification both of experience and instrumentalism."¹⁰ "Neither in England nor in the United States, he remarks, "can it yet be claimed that the professional preparation of teachers has been adapted to the new task of education which is today one of the urgent needs of the democracies."¹¹ Ten years ago Abraham Flexner had already written in his book about the universities:

"America places a naïve trust in education, but its lack of comprehension is indicated by the miscellaneous character of curricula, by its aversion to discipline, by its over-emphasis on social activities as against intellectual effort. To be sure, cur-

ricula were long too barren and monotonous; to be sure, the school is a social agency; to be sure, social attitudes are profoundly significant. But important and indispensable as all these are, education has at its heart a tough and indispensable intellectual core. Losing sight of this factor, we have in America heedlessly and recklessly jumbled together in secondary schools, colleges, or universities all sorts of purposes, all sorts of subjects."¹²

The number of critical voices from the widest variety of quarters has increased, indicating the open-mindedness of American educators. Every farsighted observer must recognize that the convulsion of the will to democracy was no isolated phenomenon but a world-shaking event which must, therefore, be treated and appraised as a whole. Comparative educational theory acquires full significance only as far as its conclusions establish a new, systematic perspective which transcends the educational interests of single nations.

We shall not attempt to add one more definition of what education is to the host of those which already exist. But we venture to correlate the democratic educational developments in America and Germany in a number of significant ways. American and German educational philosophy in the recent past has been determined by pragmatism, instrumentalism, and idealism. American instrumentalism undoubtedly shares with German idealism the belief in the original goodness of man and the optimistic evaluation of education which results. In a recent volume,¹³ Professor Robert Ulich of Harvard, with a certain inclination of his own toward the idea of progress and the original goodness of man, has rightly emphasized the unwitting coalescence of pragmatism and idealism in the common acceptance of immanent laws and rules which give significance and direction to the dynamic process of life. Moreover, in Germany, Darwinism, materialism, and positivism, as well as the more recent existential philosophy, were unable to replace the educational philosophy of the idealistic educational tradition. Similarly in America, despite many attempts at a reorientation of pedagogical aims, the last generation has been so strongly influenced by

Dewey and his school as to make his doctrines the specific expression of the American conception of education.

A theory like Dewey's never could have arisen in Germany. The idealistic tradition was dedicated to no merely academic humanistic dream, but rather to a particular type of man as the goal of education. Here was a definite and shining prospect for all mankind. It was always both a distant inspiration and an immediate approximation. Education was like a pilgrimage on which the traveler pursued his fascinating destiny, confident that the brilliant horizon marked the blend of his own way with the transfigured classical ideal. The individualism which prevailed in Germany in the wake of Leibniz, Fichte, and Schleiermacher and the poetry of immediate experience was not uncongenial to the romantic rapture surrounding such a conception of community. The individual man and the ideal man were met in glorious identity, which was not less persuasive because it could be realized only in brief moments of ecstatic experience. But the alternative has proved to be a convulsive expression of the idea of community under bitterest pressure from the state.

The social ideal which underlies Anglo-American community life was never completely understood in Germany. The comparatively smooth surface of life in American society is perhaps due chiefly to the fact that emotions which deeply disturb the individual are not reflected there. Consequently, the need for spiritual energies which transcend ordinary experience is less acute. Germans publicly bare the soul more readily than other people; indeed, there is not even a complete equivalent in the German language for what Americans call "social life." The German must use the word "community" (*Gemeinschaft*), which, according to the sociologist, Toennies, has associations reaching backward to the primitive. "Community" implies "patriotism," "the love of the fatherland," emotions to which almost every German is oversensitive and which he controls with difficulty.

There are, accordingly, striking differences in the school life of the two countries. The American pupil spends most of the day in school. He not only sits in the classroom for instruction,

but he has the opportunity to dispose of most of his preparation during school hours; when he is not being taught, he spends his time in social rooms. In short, the American pupil lives at school. The German pupil, on the other hand, knows that school hours are identical with being instructed, with strain and tension and discipline; that recess is only a very brief interruption during which one collects and prepares one's self for the next task. Unfortunately, the German learned how to relax at school only a few years before Hitler came to power; and this recognition of the creative pause was soon lost again amid the diseased overstimulation by Hitler of the fanaticism for work.

It is well known that the Anglo-American interest in sports first really penetrated German education after the Versailles Treaty limited military possibilities. There was, on the whole, too little appreciation of play. The more intellectual ideal of education was not that of the "gentleman," which in England is inseparable from the inclination toward sports. There were, moreover, no dormitories at the universities, so that there were no real facilities for social life in addition to academic work. Youths lived together only during military service. But until the last war the economically more privileged could obtain permission to live outside the barracks. The first sign of change appeared during the twenties when opportunity for common meals was provided at the universities; but even then the economic factor—the reduction of living costs—overshadowed the aim of providing social life.

How different in comparison are perspective and practice in American education. To begin with, education on a pragmatic-instrumentalist basis does not presuppose any ideal of humanity spun, as it were, out of the air. It is regarded almost as other-worldly in America to believe that such an ideal could facilitate the mastery of the contemporary life of man. In Dewey's educational philosophy everything is brought into immediate proximity; the school is the most important and effective medium of social progress; education is not preparation for life but life itself; all education proceeds from the participation by the individual in the social consciousness of the nation and must develop the inner capacities by taking account of the social situa-

tion. Consequently, the true center of the school is the social activity of the child, for education is a social process.

American pedagogy seems to believe that the fluid and ever changing character of life with its demands provides the measure of all educational requirements—the ends of education are relative. The German determination of ends must appear by contrast too rigid and too absolute. Knowledge itself, the transmission of the cultural heritage of the past, and, above all, the training of the mind must seem to be overvalued. More recently there were demands in Germany also for an “education from the standpoint of the child.” But the fact that the so-called progressive ideas of American education could be pursued only in special schools shows that the German view of the natural capacities of human nature is more pessimistic. German education has its eye continually on the *ought*; American education pursues the discoveries of experience and seeks to elicit, preserve, and promote what is there given. To the German, American educational philosophy is too relativistic, too vacillating, too completely subordinate to the immediate, so that the process as a whole cannot be envisaged. The German finds that in such a system the power of the will is not sufficiently quickened and the lower impulses not sufficiently limited. To the American, the German outlook is too severe, too forceful, too fixed upon a static and immovable goal, arbitrarily established and incommensurate with the multiple change of life. All in all, American education is milder, more politic, and develops the reproductive rather than the creative powers. Such a system is, of course, designed for the education of the average person. In Germany the stress upon intellectual training presupposed that all students should and could be intellectually creative. The average person was left fundamentally alone, since no appropriate and adequate standard was provided for him.

The inadequacy of the education of the average became evident in Germany when large numbers of the academically trained, after many years of laborious study, could not earn their living in the profession which they desired. Education seemed to them to have been aimed at building air castles. The humanistic ideal was too patently in contradiction to the more

sober demands of the day. Cherished as it was by the lofty-mindedness of a few born or cultivated aristocrats, this ideal had not thoroughly penetrated the rising bourgeoisie, where the daily routine of life had not kept pace with educational dreams. The German secondary-school teacher, in particular, was not equal to such high aspirations and often fell into a rut of specialization. He seldom saw things in the large, nor would it have occurred to him to inspire his pupils with the true spirit of antiquity.

The stern Prussian sense of duty, moreover, increasingly dampened confidence in the natural goodness of human nature. Even at the turn of the century the question had already begun to be raised as to whether an emancipation from the classical spirit would not be more valuable for general cultural training than the antiquated emphasis of the humanistic secondary schools. After all, if the classical ideal had to be forcibly transmitted to the average man, it was already on the wane. As a matter of fact, for the middle classes and particularly for the German nobility, a century of humanistic culture proved to be a thin veneer when Hitler and his companions took power.

American education, on the other hand, undoubtedly understood how to provide a satisfactory and equitable preparation for the average man and thus by a more limited aim prevented the rise of an exaggerated individualism. This course was easier, since education was decisively valued in relation to social life. Education of this kind can avoid many an extreme, but there is also a price to be paid. Whether or not the price is too high will naturally be a matter of very diverse judgment. Has education in America been able to produce as many superior persons as the people might expect in the light of their original capacities and energies? A curious cleavage seems to a European observer to characterize the intellectual product of American educational institutions. In the practical disciplines like engineering and the natural sciences, the contrast between average and superior people does not seem to be so pronounced as in the field of the liberal arts where there is a greater emphasis upon theoretical intellectual activity. The practical sense of the American may partially account for this situation. But if there is this gap in

the humanities, the languages, the more philosophical disciplines, history, and even some branches of political science, there would seem to be more varied grounds for it.

One real ground for the gulf between the average and the superior person trained in the liberal arts may be found in the repudiation of humanism. It will be useful in this connection to consider an argument of Dewey, because it is as characteristic of his way of thinking as it is foreign and incompatible with European thinking. Dewey defends the vocational school, which had always been somewhat depreciated by the humanists in Germany and had occupied a relatively minor place in the school system, by remarking that many an educator ascribes importance to the mental training of classical philology but often condemns the school of commerce or technology on the ground that these schools are too vocational. Then he observes that "some mysterious difference between general training and special training" is claimed by the opponents of the vocational school, "as if the training that the man got in the study of Latin and Greek were somehow distinctively the training appropriate to man as man, while the training which he gets in the application of, say mathematics and physics to engineering, or of history, geography and political economy to commerce, only touches some narrow segment or fraction of the man." And Dewey asks: "Whence the justification of such an assumption? Is not the whole man required in the calling of an engineer or captain of industry? Doubtless, the current implication is that general culture and professional utility are quite independent of each other." Dewey holds that this last opinion is false, and he finds in it the error of supposing that professors were necessarily open to higher intellectual ideals, whereas the doctor, the lawyer, the businessman, were engaged in the mercenary pursuit of vulgar utilities. So Dewey concludes: "Our conception of culture is still tainted with the inheritance from the period of the aristocratic seclusion of a leisure class. We are living in a period of applied science. Therefore the practical occupations, like the professions, are becoming less and less empirical routine. They are more infused with reason. They are dependent upon science."¹⁴

What would German educators have replied to this contention? In the German view, the problem would not be one of opposition between the professor, on the one hand, and the physician, lawyer, or businessman, on the other. The point at issue is not between aristocratic enjoyment of culture, on the one side, and rationally grounded applied science, on the other. The conflict is between two essentially different ways of appropriating the goals of education. Humanistic education was inseparably bound up with the conviction that theoretical, even abstract, knowledge, though widely removed from immediate uses, was itself the correct preparation for a subsequent professional practice. This contention collapsed with the extension of academic training to the masses. A "bread-bent" student body which had rashly aspired to the rewards of laborious study, eagerly welcomed the substitution of the national for the humanistic ideal as promised them by Hitler. It is not accidental that America excelled Europe in a totally unheard of way in true-false and multiple-choice tests and in statistical and mechanical evaluation of intellectual achievements. Examinations which require a "Yes" or a "No" or the choice between various possibilities do not, in the European view, sufficiently stimulate the independent, critical judgment of the student. This defect is especially evident in the teaching of languages, when a so-called "understanding," a "reading knowledge," is set up as a goal almost to the exclusion of speaking facility. The result is that receptivity dominates the student, while the kind of spontaneity which in Europe is a presupposition of the learning process is hindered.

Nowadays it is usually stressed that experimental psychologists contest the value of language study for intellectual training. But it is precisely this kind of experimental psychology that the European distrusts as inadequate for the evaluation of such complex processes as are involved in the mastery of highly developed cultural languages. German education regards it as a fact that where language instruction is creatively conceived it contributes essentially to the discipline of the mind. Therefore, instruction in languages is begun in early youth. To begin with such instruction in childhood transforms the passive receptivity

of the pupil into co-operative activity and comprehension. It may be that German education regarded intellectual discipline too much as an end in itself. Nevertheless, the spirit which inspired the teaching of languages between 1918 and 1933 achieved highly desirable results. One of these certainly has to do with the relation between language study and international understanding. American culture, in which the endless wealth of European memories lives on, would also suffer if the doors which open immediate access to European cultures should be closed. It is folly to suppose that this end can be achieved by translations, quite apart from the fact that an unusually small number of foreign works has actually been translated into English. Even though the average American has not had the opportunity to travel abroad—and this may be greatly changed after a victorious war—he needs an immediate access to the world of his forebears; for American culture, the more forcefully and uniquely it develops, will always be influenced by associations with its inherited past.

Naturally the evaluation of language instruction stands in intimate relation to the whole division and distribution of the curriculum. The number and election of courses is very different in America and in Germany. The German secondary school had a greater number of courses than the American high school. Against objections to the large number of courses offered by the German secondary schools, it must be remembered that thereby the flexibility of the youthful mind is stimulated. Perhaps the problem is not so much one of the number of curricular offerings as it is of the fact that the increase occurs during the transitional years of adolescence. In this way the nature of adolescence is not sufficiently taken into account. German educational literature is too largely interested in the beginning and the end of the school period, somewhat to the neglect of the intervening years, which doubtless present greater problems for the psychology of youth. The German student is more heavily burdened than the American student; he spends five or six hours in the classroom and must still study at home. There is something severe and joyless in this course of study. Formal schooling at its best required three languages; mathematics,

natural science, history, religion, and German were equally distributed over the course of study during the final six years. This procedure was possible only because with few exceptions vocational training was deliberately excluded from the secondary schools. It would have been unthinkable that "commercial business" or "bookkeeping" or "home economics" or "journalism" could be introduced.

The American may quite rightly observe that the German school with its abundance of theoretical disciplines was too completely "bookish." But the German procedure was based on the conviction that the later life of the student would not be exclusively occupied by a vocation and that the creative power of a human being could not be developed by vocational training. Perhaps the American way should also have been tried in Germany; but the German view that practical matters have no cultural content comparable to theoretical studies and offer insufficient intellectual training made this impossible. Flexner in his well-known book about the universities approximates this conclusion when he writes that "universities need not and should not concern themselves with miscellaneous training at or near the vocational level."¹⁵

There seems to be so much of merit in both American and German education that a *rapprochement* ought to be found. This is the more urgent since we have seen that Germany is not alone in being overtaken by a hurricane; America, too, is involved in an educational crisis. Current attempts at a regeneration of the educational system through humanism with a corresponding critique of the educational philosophy of John Dewey are symptomatic. There was a time when Dewey himself said a good word for humanistic education. In 1916 he wrote: "I do not know how we are to effect in this country a combination of a scientific and a humanistic education. I doubt if anyone knows. But that there lies our problem, I thoroughly believe. . . . When we learn how to interpret this human sense of one another with thorough training in scientific method and knowledge, we shall have found ourselves educationally."¹⁶ This trend of thought has been displaced in Dewey's mind by others. And further efforts to introduce the humanistic spirit into American

culture and American education have not been too cordially received. About twelve years ago Norman Foerster published his widely discussed symposium¹⁷ on humanism, in which he defended humanism against the charges that it was academically tedious, pedantic, and without venturesomeness; that it was un-American, a reactionary retrospection to a lost past; that it was too rigidly regulated and laid too much stress upon discipline. Irving Babbitt saw in the pragmatists the chief opponents of humanism. However, valuable and stimulating as the symposium was in itself, its appeal for a "new integration of values" was not effective; and humanism remained the concern of a select but small circle in America.

At the University of Chicago a more specific attempt to vitalize humanism in education has been made under the aegis of President Robert Maynard Hutchins' far-reaching proposal for a humanistic revival.¹⁸ Hutchins complains that the colleges in America have been called upon to take up the battle against professionalism; that vocational training in the colleges has been more popular among the students than the raising of the general cultural level; and that there has been a lack of interest in genuine research. "Our erroneous notion of progress," he declares, "has thrown the classics and the liberal arts out of the curriculum, overemphasized the empirical sciences, and made education the servant of any contemporary movements in society, no matter how superficial."¹⁹ Does this not sound exactly as though Hutchins were defending the ideal of the German humanistic university? To be sure, he never refers to the German situation, but there are certainly overtones in these contentions.

Hutchins' proposals, moreover, are reminiscent of the medieval humanistic university. It is not possible here to review the details of his argument. For those who are conversant with the Middle Ages, it must have an almost elegiac appeal. It is desirable, however, to consider whether or not Hutchins' view would, if adopted, stress philosophy to such an extent as, for example, to educate philosophers of medicine and of law whose professional preparation might be problematical. Hutchins' idea means an extension of the *studium artium liberalium* over the whole period of university study, at the expense even of such

vocational training as German humanism wanted to incorporate in the university. But this idea might have the unintended effect of separating research and teaching so that purely professional schools for physicians and lawyers would really begin to flourish. Nevertheless, a grand conception has been set forth in this attempt to overhaul the prevailing American tradition with its utilitarian overemphasis upon vocationalism.

A renewal of the humanistic bases for education cannot yet be expected in America because Dewey's educational philosophy is still strong enough to resist such efforts. But the outlook for humanism in Germany is equally dubious. Humanism has been increasingly enervated by developing social forces, and the attempts to adjust to these developments by means of a realistic education did not ultimately succeed. It will be worth while to explore these circumstances somewhat more closely because only so can a perspective upon future possibilities be acquired.

Realistic education in Germany must be understood as the attempt to overcome the growing doubt about the humanistic educational ideal. Everywhere the education of the realistic school was accepted as the cure for the remoteness of humanism from the world. It is the more strange, therefore, that the realistic school did not come into its own until 1900, after a struggle of more than two generations. Although the realistic school gave first place to mathematics, natural science, and modern languages, even professors of natural science and medicine preferred the preparatory education of the humanistic Gymnasium. Why was this? For one thing, the intellectual training in the classical languages was believed to provide a foundation for the study of the natural sciences. A further reason could be found in the fact that the majority of students in the realistic institutions came from the lower middle classes. The cultural tradition was higher in the families of the students in the humanistic schools. It was, so to speak, more "refined" to attend a Gymnasium. Then, too, practical competence in modern languages was not very highly regarded in Germany until the last war, for the average German had not seen much of foreign countries. And the Realgymnasium was partly based upon the training provided in modern languages.

The instruction in the natural sciences and in mathematics could not overcome these difficulties. Why did these studies not possess a greater educational appeal? Naturalist scientists assure us that the reasons are to be found in the comparatively recent development of these disciplines and the lack of teachers who could make maximum use of them for the training of the mind. It is easy to forget that modern natural science is not yet a century old. But there is a deeper explanation. Empiricism is, of course, more remote from the German than from the Anglo-American habit of mind; yet there are doubts as to whether even in America the natural sciences could ever become the center of the curriculum. Professor Ulich has put the matter in this way: "There is a remarkable discrepancy between the role of the sciences in our practical and intellectual life and the part they play now in the education of our youth. The reason lies in the immaturity of popular teaching of the natural sciences. Most of the great leaders in science, even in the positivistic and materialistic era of the nineteenth century, were, and are today, philosophically profoundly interested in the implications of their work. But the second rank scholars who form the main body of our college and secondary-school teachers and the most successful of the popular writers in the field of the natural sciences have indulged in a form of scientific self-sufficiency which can but be harmful to true culture."²⁰ Furthermore, Ulich thinks that there has been a certain reluctance among teachers of the natural sciences toward a philosophical treatment of these disciplines which it will take time to overcome.

This brings us to the question of whether an ideal for life can be established on the basis of this so-called "realism." We have seen how the humanistic educational ideal was more and more narrowly circumscribed in Germany. The bourgeois dream of undisturbed harmony which glorified a kind of aesthetic humanity was compelled, as the nineteenth century wore on, to make room for the expanding effects of industry and the growth of the working population. The bourgeoisie sensed how the world was changing and welcomed a more realistic type of education. The critical problem, however, is whether or not the realistic ideal actually corresponded with the demands of a mechanical era

created by engineering and by natural science. Those who established and developed this type of education did not succeed in harmonizing it with the trend of life and culture. The realistic conception of education was the fruit of the work of Herbart, whose educational philosophy had won considerable influence outside Germany and who was one of the few German opponents of idealism. Herbart's writings, important as they were for teaching method and procedure, prepared the ground for positivism but were unable to present a unified interpretation of the world and education. It was this totality of perspective which marked the superiority of idealism.

The lack of unity, the strongly empirical and psychological character of Herbart's philosophy, led to a multiplication of the aims of education. Herbart set limits, to be sure, to the idealistic flight into the clouds, but he found no synthesis and no new realistic ideal of life which could be placed by the side of the humanistic ideal. This kind of realism gave too much attention to the *how* and not enough to the *what* of education. So long as positivism dominated Germany the defect of the realistic way of thinking did not become apparent. Herbart's insistence upon the "multiplicity of interests" continued to guide the development of the realistic educational system, but a thoroughgoing realistic school did not result. Herbart's own words seemed to justify a compromise. "It would be a great mistake," he said, "to oppose an historical to a scientific interest or even a philological to a mathematical one." Herbart feared that a vocational one-sidedness could dominate the schoolroom; for vocational interests, he explained, limited the human being soon enough. With such eclectic maxims, one could certainly not work out a realistic ideal of education. Neither Herbart nor his followers knew how to present the realistic conception of education with that productive consistency which alone could have been applied with suggestive power. Their ideas, more closely related to contemporary life than those of the idealists, were, nevertheless, partly idealistic. Consequently, they could not repair the cleavage which had developed when the aestheticism of the classical era declined and the civilization of an industrial era made its au-

thoritative demands. The realistic ideal itself remained an ideal of the pen.

The power of historical tradition and the compelling force of humanistic metaphysics proved to be stronger than the bifurcated realistic ideal. The ambiguities in German education were particularly pressing because Germany, like other European countries, possessed no single-ladder system. America has the great advantage of safeguarding the unity of its educational system, at least externally; and, since the educational relevance of the humanistic problem has been denied, the American educational system achieves at least a surface harmony more easily than most European systems.

But are differences in educational perspective and practice no problem in America? To be sure, the fateful division between the educated and the uneducated which permeates Europe is not so sharply defined; the contrast between the manual and the intellectual worker is not so evident. The considerable opportunities for economic advancement (until recently at least), the tradition of education for social life, the fact that the intellectual has usually done some manual work in his youth—all these circumstances seem to be immeasurable advantages over the European situation. They are like guaranties that the social tasks of the future in the field of education will be mastered more easily here than abroad. Moreover, whatever may be said against Professor Dewey's philosophy of education, this one thing must be conceded to it: it was most energetically concerned to correlate democratic educational theory with social principles. Everywhere in America the effort is being made to fill the old wine-skins of democratic education with new wine. It cannot be denied that a system of education grows only out of the spirit of the people themselves and that its survival depends on renewed support by the people themselves. And yet there is also something universal in education which should express the total spirit of the time, which should live not in one nation alone but in the whole world. The upheavals of the second World War make plain that the cultural crisis in which humanity stands must be borne in common by all the peoples of the world

and to a certain extent must also be brought to a common solution.

Educational questions compose one part of the great plan of reorganization which must be developed in Europe after the war and in which the future of America is partially bound up. The world crisis has been essentially occasioned by the German situation, so that one can rightly hold Germany responsible for it. But, surely, behind the obvious course of events there lie irrational processes which are independent both of the will to power of individual rulers and of the spiritual sickness of a single nation.

How must the education of the future be undertaken if the world is to find rest and inner stability? The answer is that the educational problem must be approached not as a German problem but as a problem of Europe.

CHAPTER EIGHT

WHAT TO DO WITH GERMANY

AFTER THE WAR THE PROBLEM OF GERMAN EDUCATION will be a European problem. The development of a European sense of community in which Germany will also participate is the presupposition for cultural reconstruction, and that is why the educational problems of the future can be discussed only in connection with the reordering of Europe. Until we know what will happen to Germany, we can scarcely appraise the possibilities afforded by educational policies for the peace of Germany, of Europe, and of the world. The critical issue is whether an independent will for education in democracy can be restored to Germany. Democratic education means education in the love of freedom and justice, in the high valuation of the dignity of human personality. One cannot simultaneously enslave a people and educate it for freedom.

Anyone who sketches the global future of Europe is following a precarious course; he must necessarily anticipate historical events and tends involuntarily to be affected by his own view of the world and his own desires and dreams. The daily fluctuating interpretations of the press and the tumults occasioned by unexpected military events darken the vision. Every informed person will admit the possibility that everything could turn out otherwise than the responsible leaders of government have thought and desired. Even the framers of the peace have power only over the nearer future and not over succeeding decades, and, besides, they belong more to the past than to the future. The younger generation which returns from the war, rather

than the older statesmen of the present, will determine the structure of the years ahead.

The last war certainly did not actualize the democratic ideas of the victorious powers. The task of the coming peace should be the recovery of what the period following the last war destroyed, that is, the epoch between 1914 and the present war must find its true meaning in the peace which is to be. The destruction of Europe by the condemnation of the soul to passive lethargy would scarcely be an achievement worthy of the war. Is the European continent to sink exhausted into a shadowy existence, or will the reconstruction of Europe be recognized as a precondition for the ordering of a chastened and stable world?

I take the ideological pronouncements of the responsible leaders of America and Britain seriously and assume that they are not, as partisan shortsightedness suggests, simply a screen for power imperialism. The ideas of the victorious powers will be of particular importance for the education of coming generations in Europe. Improvised political utterances must, of course, be differentiated from great and fundamental ideas. Political dilettantism tends to view the pronouncements of governments much too pragmatically and fails to recognize how strongly every government pursues its course in the face of unexpected and incalculable events which deflect it from its considered policy. Thus it may appear that the original principles of the government have been abandoned, whereas only the tactical necessities of the moment becloud the picture. Consequently, a distinction must be drawn between the plans for the transition following the war and the principles which will be decisive for the future reconstruction of Europe. Measures which are intended as temporary should not be interpreted as though they were establishing the foundations of a new order. The United Nations—or, at least, America and Britain—seem to fear that Europe, shaken by the tremendous havoc of the war and in feverish revolt against the yoke of the oppressor, may fall into chaos and enter upon a world revolution, the consequence and course of which would be unforeseeable and would contradict the principles for which the democratic powers fought the war. It may be doubted whether the democratic governments have always

adopted policies consistent with their desire to avoid such catastrophes. They have at least counted more heavily and more readily upon the operation of conservative forces than progressive spirits think wise. A final and permanent support of reactionary forces in the world and in Europe would undoubtedly lead to a countermovement through which the world would *really* slide into the abyss.

This analysis is not concerned with the problems of transition from the war to the peace; for nobody knows how long the period of the occupation of Germany will last. The Allies undoubtedly expect to guarantee by military supervision not only the implementation of the terms of the armistice but a more organic development of the political situation as well. There are, of course, statesmen who feel that only by a revolutionary catharsis within Germany can the health of the nation be restored. On the one hand, a brief period of occupation is proposed, partly because it is feared that a long occupation would inhibit revolutionary impulses and strengthen the rivalries among the great powers. On the other hand, a long period of transition is proposed, including an extended armistice and many years of occupation. It is important, however, to be clear about the fact that this is not an exclusively German problem. There are at the moment many foreign workers in Germany, and the vengeance of the subjugated countries would very understandably aggravate the revolutionary fever of Europe if the barriers of occupation were to be prematurely lifted.

It can scarcely still be disputed that capitalism as we have known it will have come to an end with the close of the war, at least so far as Europe is concerned. One may regret this development or one may welcome it; but no informed person in Europe believes any longer that the decline of capitalism, though it may perhaps be arrested, can be prevented. Of course, one must not regard capitalism as a kind of international confederation of conspirators which extends around the globe and makes a practice of hindering every social advance. Such a view commits the same mistake that Hitler, Mussolini, and their gangsters made when in their zeal for persecution they proclaimed that the world was dominated by an international

league of Freemasons and Jews. If the advance of socialism is inevitable, one must face the question of whether the victory is desirable whatever the cost or only if thereby fundamental democratic principles can be preserved. This is the decisive question before the world after the war; and it has momentous significance for the aims of education. If the democratic idea cannot be revitalized in the nations of Europe, then America, at least, has entered the war in vain.

After the war the world will be organized by America, England, and Russia. And, since China cannot at the moment be regarded as influential in the same sense, the world will actually be faced by only two foci of power: on the one side there will be the Anglo-American coalition and on the other side Russia. The future of Europe under such a balance need not be pessimistically regarded. Historically, Europe has always stood under a definite hegemony. To assume that the Continent will now be merely a pawn in the negotiations between various power groups is to misappraise the world political aims of England. After the last war, completely discredited political circles in Germany put forward the doctrine that England as the leading power of the British Commonwealth would have only a secondary interest in Europe. That was as false then as it is now—England was drawn into the war for the sake of Europe.

The forthcoming European confederation will be dominated either by England or by Russia. If Russian influence should extend not only over eastern Europe but over central Europe as well, it would reach the Rhine and move southward to include Italy. With broad foresight, American statesmen have pointed out how much the coming peace depends upon the continuance of confidential exchange between the Anglo-Saxon powers and Russia. England and America need Russia, and, where Europe is concerned, Russia cannot make decisions independently of these two powers. With the best of will, an understanding between the Western powers and Russia will be much more complicated after the war than during it. The eastern European problem, however, can be much more adequately settled than after 1918. For the last half-century eastern Europe has been a virtual powder keg. The Versailles Treaty did not achieve a satisfac-

tory solution of the eastern European problem. The exclusion of Russia from the councils of the world powers after the last war bequeathed the responsibility for guaranteeing the stability of eastern Europe to France, and France did not prove equal to this task. She was no longer at the height of her expansionist policy and at the same time was prevented by her geographical position from protecting the status quo. Russia has every prospect of maintaining leadership in eastern Europe now.

But what about the remaining global-political problems? A peace which rests upon compromises among the victorious powers nourishes in advance the seeds of new tensions. The puzzling early successes of Hitler's foreign policy were due to his ability to put his finger exactly on the cleavage which the jealousy and the disunity of the powers at Versailles had created and which only necessity had covered. At Versailles there was a bitter struggle over the Rhine; the demilitarized zone was the compromise. Hitler's first step was the march into this zone. There were the problem of the Czecho-German boundary and the German-Polish question which led to the neutralization of Danzig. In the critical moment who defended these commitments of the treaty? As long as the armies of the victorious powers were still mobilized and still co-operative, the situation seemed to be secure. But, actually, the disintegration arose very soon after the war, despite the League of Nations. This disintegration had reached such a point when Hitler came to power as to strengthen his conviction that the peacemakers at Versailles would no longer go to war over matters which the conference itself could settle only by compromise.¹

Will the settlement this time be devoid of such compromises? There is China, and there is Japan; there is the Russian interest in France and French weakness, which could scarcely undertake the single-handed suppression of Germany. What would the powers do if France should move toward a new dictatorship? There is, moreover, still the Polish question. The problems are so numerous and difficult that a lasting understanding between the Western powers and Russia is not so certain as the statesmen must wish. But one matter is perhaps primary because it is urgent. If Russia should claim to be regarded as a European

power in the strict sense, how would the German problem be viewed? A complete annihilation of Germany would, as we have said, bring Russia to the Rhine. We do not interpret this possibility in any sense in terms of the prevailing fear of communism, for nobody knows how far communism could spread after the war. World events might already be set in the direction of the further extension of Communist ideas. The real question concerns the extent to which these ideas can be combined with the democratic ideas for the defense of which America entered the war. The new world, as this discussion sees it, is defined by the aims and desires of America. Consequently, we believe that a Carthaginian disposition of Germany would aggravate rather than minimize the understanding between the Western powers and Russia. If Russia were to join hands with the West over the corpse of Germany, the joy in this achievement would be certain to cool with each succeeding month; for the vacuum created thereby could only increase the possibilities of friction.

The objection will, of course, be raised that the restoration of Germany, however limited, would also be fraught with peril; that for a time Germany would knock vainly at the door of the major powers, only later to risk again the attempt to play one power against the other in order thereby to break the circle in which she found herself. One cannot deny such a possibility; but that only proves that a completely satisfactory peace settlement is impossible anyway. The rhythm of history has always moved in political constellations which defied the foresight and the reckoning of the human spirit. He who hopes for the creation of paradise on earth has not understood the character of historical processes. The problem set for this generation in determining the peace can be resolved only to a limited degree. The forthcoming treaty will also be concerned with a *more* or a *less*. Therefore, it is important to discover those procedures which offer a better guaranty for the longest possible peace of Europe and the world.

We do not argue with those who believe it is possible to eliminate Germany from the map of the world and to scatter Germans abroad. Neither do we deny that after the official peace settlement it would be possible to bomb Germany occa-

sionally if she should prove herself unamenable to its terms. Under such circumstances the problem of this book would no longer be a problem. It would be pointless to speak about the re-education of Germany, since, let it be repeated, one cannot simultaneously enslave and educate for freedom.

It is an optical illusion to believe that the solution of the world crisis which did not come about before the war can be achieved by the war itself. Wars are often the fruit of economic, political, and cultural crises; but they do not heal them. Wars simply shift the balance, alter the pattern, and perhaps relieve by stormy explosions the murkiness and oppressiveness of the atmosphere.² It is, nevertheless, proper to view the peace as an instrument of reconciliation and reconstruction.

For a considerable time, now, two schools of thought on the question of what to do about Germany have opposed each other. Harold Callendar sees the negative school represented by the writings of Professor Bernadotte E. Schmitt, a Germanophobe of long standing; and the positive school led by E. H. Carr, professor of international politics in the University College of Wales and now on the editorial staff of the *London Times*. Bernadotte Schmitt underscores the militarism, the responsibility for the last war, the delusions of grandeur, the brutality of Germany. He thinks that a more temperate peace after the last war would not have beguiled Germany away from a new one; that each concession would have led to further demands. The Germans would have looked upon Versailles as a sign of the weakness of the Allies. The sadism and fanaticism of the German character make complete disarmament and complete reparations insufficient guaranties of a lasting peace. Professor Schmitt believes that a Carthaginian peace is necessary because the Germans are incapable of learning by experience, as, for example, the French did after the Napoleonic period. According to him, they understand only the show of force. On this view, Germany is the personification of evil, and every sign of new life is the expression of a thoroughly planned and calculated Machiavellianism. It is understandable that such views as these, which are identical with those of Sir Robert Vansittart and his circle, should impress all those who are overcome by emotional

revulsion at the unspeakable brutalities of the Nazis and the German military leaders. But the question may be raised as to whether the arguments of the representatives of this school really emanate from objective reflection upon the more than one thousand years of German history or from the mood of the moment. In such a connection, the judgment of Professor Carr takes on added significance. According to him, Germany ought, after a transition period, to collaborate in the co-operative life of Europe. Carr rests his case especially upon economic considerations which must be excluded from this analysis of the German problem. He believes that no permanent peace can be established simply by the destruction of the Nazis, saying: "Negative war aims are futile and deceptive."

Professor Carr's analysis seems to me extraordinarily convincing. It might be possible to add to them a somewhat more cultural perspective. Culturally speaking, it is a paradoxical historical circumstance that, despite all terms and limitations of peace, vanquished states almost always succeed in imposing something of their will upon the victors. The Congress of Vienna put an end to Napoleonic despotism; but the era of political liberalism and democracy, which had originally been nourished in the theoretical context of French ideas and was feared as much by the victors as by Napoleon, began for the first time really to flourish after the peace. France, physically overcome, gradually imposed its spiritual energies upon the conquering powers. Woodrow Wilson and the exponents of liberal democracy proclaimed the right of self-determination of peoples. And what happened thereafter? Hitler attempted to apply this conception to Germany and by recourse to that right laid claim to a portion of Czechoslovakia and to Danzig,³ thereby compelling France and England to take up arms. Again, the victors at Versailles compelled Germany to accept democracy. Germany was confronted by a newly emerging historical problem, namely, the correlation of democratic and Socialist principles. Meanwhile, the same problem has overtaken the other democracies. After the peace they were confronted by it with the same intensity which burdened Germany before Hitler. What was originally a German problem has thus become a world problem.

Nobody knows how far the vanquished will be able once again to draw the victors into their own cultural sphere. Suppose America should swing to the right after the war, and racial antagonism become a serious public problem. Surely, then, unless government and people are on the alert, very dark clouds could overshadow the future of the nation. And surely in the light of such fears, constantly expressed by serious persons, those who hold the Germans to be incapable of democratic ways of thinking might at least temper their judgment about the achievements of democratic education in American public life. One ought to proceed cautiously with the charge that Germany is incapable of improvement.

The conquest of the enemy and the removal of the Nazi menace can only partly point the way for the victorious powers. Fascism has been one of the most terrible symptoms of a disease which has infected the world; it has been an epidemic, feeding and spawning upon an already sick organism. Everyone knows that epidemics recognize no boundaries. Should fascism die in Europe, the affliction of the world would not yet be healed.

The solution of the economic crisis, the social problem, the prevention of unemployment, are responsibilities almost more overwhelming than the making of the terms of the peace.

The complete destruction of fascism is a self-evident objective; but a further goal must be the binding of the great wounds in the world out of which the war arose. "The sterility of the peace settlement of 1919," says Carr, "was due to the failure of those who made it to understand the contemporary revolution."⁴ When one views the forthcoming peace in this light, great and serious dangers emerge. National politics attempt to actualize certain ideas. When these ideas cannot be consistently carried out, short circuits occur which can be incendiary. Statesmen, engrossed in daily decisions, often overlook the fact that their original conceptions have been falsified by the course of events. And history seems to be so sensitive that even the slightest falsifications of ideas have seismographic consequences. These observations can be amplified by examples. As long as Hitler proclaimed the self-determination of the German people and seemed to act accordingly, he made amazingly secure prog-

ress. But this idea of national self-determination subsequently cut across the demand for military security, and the march on Prague falsified Hitler's apologetic. His generals needed Prague for "military reasons." Military necessities and national boundaries have intermingled in Europe for centuries. Thus it was not surprising that Hitler's will to power did not coincide with his abstract political conceptions.

The Allies, in turn, are about to be exposed to a situation which threatens to falsify the original purity of their political pronouncements. They declared war in the name of democracy, in the name of freedom and the dignity of man. But they were obliged to join with Poland, Greece, China, and Russia, whose ruling groups were certainly not exponents of democratic ideas. The Allies temporarily supported Darlan and the Italian king with his general, Badoglio; and Mr. Churchill even went so far as to pay eternal vows of love and gratitude to Franco for his services in connection with Gibraltar. He found it possible to distinguish between those Fascist governments which were involved in war with England and those which had abstained. How events do compel those in power to betray the very ideas which they themselves defend! The United Nations must be on guard lest such aberrations give rise to circumstances which could react like a boomerang. Churchill's ominous word that during the year 1944 the war had become less ideological marks a transition from the conceptual basis of the war to one of pure power politics. This utterance might survive as one of the most fatal aphorisms of the postwar period; for it conceals the cleavage between the political gospel of the victorious powers and the opportunisms born of the moment. There can be no doubt that the peace negotiations will aggravate the incongruities, and the lesson of history is that such incongruities give rise only to new crises. If the United Nations should betray their own political ideals in the making of the peace, new problems will necessarily emerge which can only hamper the duration and the blessing of a new order.

American writers like Walter Lippmann have taken the view that the fate of Italy after her defeat could be quite different

from that of Germany after the overthrow of national socialism. Italy has threatened the world only under Fascist domination. Germany, on the other hand, has always been inspired by the desire for world hegemony, with or without fascism. National socialism was but the final expression of tendencies which are deeply rooted and could very possibly survive Hitler. This war is not the first to have been provoked by Germany; consequently, long-time preventive measures must be undertaken. I doubt that Lippmann, distinguished author though he is, could possibly substantiate these observations before the bar of history. The Italian Renaissance surely demonstrates, along with unsurpassed cultural achievements, a kind of politics which is scarcely more moral than that of contemporary Germany. Italian fascism, moreover, was prior to nazism, and the Germans have taken over very much from it. Lippmann's observations seem like rationalizations of emotional biases which are not any more correct because they are believed by the broad masses of the population. After the war such observations would rapidly prove themselves to be very poor foundations for the peace; they would stand the test exactly like the doctrine of the sole guilt of Germany for the last war, which no serious historian any longer accepts. How much more honest it would be to justify a severe peace on the ground that Germany was by all odds the more dangerous foe!

We do not suggest that Lippmann's reasoning has already been adopted by the leaders of the United Nations. We are convinced, however, that the logic of his position would incur immediate resistance on the part of those on whom the peace will be imposed. Other men—indeed, no less a person than the English secretary for foreign affairs, Mr. Anthony Eden—have noted that Germany has picked a quarrel five times during the last eighty years. But can it be forgotten that in 1870 Germany waged war against one of the tyrants of history and delivered the world from his domination as it is now being delivered from the domination of Hitler and Mussolini? And what about Germany's traditional repudiation of democracy? Was Poland really a democracy? And did France, which had nourished the demo-

cratic idea in modern Europe, so faithfully safeguard her democratic zeal? Has she not fallen back five times upon autocratic forms of government within the last century and a quarter?

Plainly, the terms which the German people will have to assume can lead to a lasting peace only if they can be defended before the bar of history. Germany can be rightly and severely charged with having deserted the course of law (which is most readily guaranteed under a democratic form of government) and with having violated it in every conceivable way. If, then, after being reduced to impotence, Germany is to achieve a democratic reconstruction, the democracy of the victorious powers must be an irreproachable example. This can be the case only if the established democracies are themselves willing to reform. "Liberty," says Carr, "will no longer seem of paramount importance to the masses unless it raises the banner of liberation from the economic, as well as from the political domination of the more fortunate."⁵ Commenting upon the search for a new way to overcome unemployment and inequality—the two major enemies of modern democracy—Carr further declares that "the new faith must address itself first of all to the solution of the economic problem." This economic problem must also be solved for Germany if she is to be democratically re-educated. The economic level of the German people may even be lower than that among other peoples; but the minima of existence must be guaranteed to them if democracy is to become congenial. We agree with Professor Carr not only that this condition is an economic question but that it is a moral question as well.

There can be no doubt that the moral factor occupies a large and justifiable place in all discussions of the conditions of the peace and that among the victorious nations these moral issues receive unusual publicity. But those who know the German people recognize that moral arguments arouse them to particular opposition. It is not necessary to assume that, once the majority of the German people are fully informed about the crimes of its leaders, these crimes will be denied. On the contrary, it is important to remember that a majority in Germany has always felt that moral failures occurred among the victorious powers too. The compromise of Wilson's famous Fourteen Points, for

example, seems to the German with his lack of a sense of proportion only a little less weighty than many mistakes of his own leaders.

On this account, whatever punishment is to be meted out to Germany must be administered with great psychological caution. The idea of a righteous war which permits the victor to administer punitive justice is age-old. Quincy Wright⁶ points out that the Crusades were based upon the idea of a just war. And since Augustine the idea of a just war has ever and again attracted jurists and theologians alike. The righteous war is undertaken in order to re-establish and to aid in the victory of righteousness. If so, a discussion of punitive justice raises two questions of utmost importance for the success of any re-education. For one thing, there is the question of whether the justice proposed applies only to the leaders of the people concerned or to the people as a whole. Is the contention valid that for this war not only the Nazi authorities but the whole German people are responsible? After the last war the victorious powers declared the German emperor and the German military to be the stone of offense, but the whole nation was punished by the terms of the Versailles Treaty. Is all of Germany to blame for what the Nazis have done?

It is well known that there are differences of opinion on this issue. Vansittart and his group regard the whole German nation as "evil from its youth," as so depraved that it is self-evidently guilty of everything that has occurred. Vansittartism has, of course, unconsciously succumbed to the Nazi ideology; for national socialism can think only in generalizations, in collective categories. The National Socialist definite article is only plural; its whole way of thinking is universal and total, never particular and individual. Now, if all Germans are held responsible, all possibility of differentiation has been abandoned. And in such a case a surrender has been made to the pressure of Fascist thinking, which stifles the feeling for the nuances of spiritual life. It seems to us important to remind Vansittart and his followers of several events of the past which they completely ignore. When Hitler occupied the demilitarized zone of the Rhine, many Germans were animated by the single wish that

England and France would march at once. Hitler himself trembled before this probability; he knew that in such an event his power would collapse. Many intellectual leaders of the German middle classes, knowing that the war could be prevented, ardently looked toward England during those days. They hoped hour by hour that England would deliver Germany from those who had usurped authority within. Vansittart⁷ was then permanent undersecretary of state for foreign affairs. It must be ascribed to the hesitation of men like Vansittart that things have turned out as they have.

How ill, then, it becomes such men, even those more farsighted than Vansittart himself, to make the whole German nation responsible for what the Nazis have perpetrated! Harold Callendar has given an eyewitness account of the situation of that time. He writes: "It seems incredible today that the first great strategic move towards world war, Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhine in 1936, should actually have been applauded by the majority of the British people. The explanation is to be found in the sympathy towards Germany, the remorse over the peace treaty which had colored British views of Europe for fifteen years."⁸ The worst of all this was that what had been denied in orderly and legal consultations to every democratic German government was readily conceded to Hitler in Munich after the occupation of the demilitarized zone and the march into Austria.

But, even apart from these facts, the question of the total guilt of the German people cannot be disposed of without a psychological appraisal of the character of the Fascist rulers. Again and again outside Germany people have asked why the Germans did not revolt. Paul Hagen has answered this query by the terse remark that "there is no chance of revolt, as long as to revolt means certain death to every participant."⁹ The twelve million foreign workers who have lived in Germany during the war will have been able to convince themselves that no rebellion was possible. To have expected it after Hitler was approved by Hindenburg is to betray a lamentable lack of political imagination. Such an expectation does not understand what dictatorship means. It seems to me as fair to reproach the German people for

failing to revolt as it would be to reproach a prisoner for failing to escape from a heavily and alertly guarded prison. As Reinhold Niebuhr has correctly put it: "We cannot understand Germany by counting Nazi and Anti-Nazi noses and by debating the question whether there are more Nazis than Anti-Nazis in Germany."¹⁰ Such an approach to the matter completely forgets that countless Germans have regarded the Nazis as foreign rulers and have had to suffer severely, both mentally and physically, under their domination. An indictment of the morality of Germans as such ignores the fact that many of them voluntarily left the country because of Hitler.

And, finally, these fanatical haters of the German people close their eyes to the fact that the events of the last few years are symptomatic of a mass psychosis, a serious spiritual sickness with which psychiatry is unfortunately not yet competent to deal. Psychiatrists admit that they know very little about the nature of this psychic infection, about its duration, and about the possibility of therapy. Such mass psychoses have appeared from time to time in history before and have overtaken many other peoples. It is worth recalling that the German people have all along been quite uninformed about decisive events both inside Germany and abroad. Reinhold Niebuhr again seems to me to touch the heart of the problem when he writes: "Any theory which assumes that we can solve the world's problems merely by fathoming the depth of evil in the German soul and seeking to suppress it betrays us into evils into which self-righteousness is always betrayed."¹¹ He recommends, therefore, that a sharp distinction be made between the heavy responsibility of the German leaders and the responsibility of the people. Religiously speaking, the latter is also very heavy, but it cannot be lightened by human punishment.

Among the sins of the German people, the first place belongs to nationalism. Nobody will deny that Hitler has tempered this nationalism to white heat. But was it really so much more intense before Hitler than the nationalism of other European peoples? In 1933, James C. King tried to evaluate statistically the degree of nationalism in various countries.¹² He analyzed the judgment of one hundred experts and came to the conclusion

that, measured in terms of national aggressiveness, Italy was in the lead, followed in order by Japan, Hungary, Germany, and France. From many quarters the opinion is expressed that there could be an upsurge of nationalism after the present war. Former President Hoover, for example, has taken this position. Among those peoples which for years have lain under the German heel, vengeful resentments which inflame national instincts are certain to break out immediately after their liberation. In general, nationalistic excitement tends to subside more quickly among the victors than among the vanquished. Germany will be overcome after the war by weariness and disillusionment; hence a new enthusiasm cannot be expected immediately. Nationalistic passions could at best be rekindled only if the German people were convinced that they were to be permanently enslaved.

However, this war would in very truth have been in vain if the nationalism which has torn and shaken the foundations of the last two centuries should continue. The end of that pseudo-religion must be hastened by the peace. There are, indeed, many signs that nationalistic polytheism is dying. It is to be hoped that the nationalistic imperialism of Hitler and Mussolini will have been the last haunting flicker of a movement which has brought incalculable misfortune upon the peoples of the earth.

In view of the foregoing, the question of whether the whole German people is to be held responsible for the war can scarcely be answered in the affirmative. It seems to me to be essentially false because it ignores the sociological fact that a whole nation is never merely the sum of its individual members but an organic unity manifesting a different character from that which would be given by the sum of its parts. Vansittart's whole conception, therefore, can be regarded only as an abortive attempt to comprehend the irrational and imponderable forces of history by rational oversimplification.

The fact remains, of course, that many peace treaties have fixed responsibility not only upon the governments of the conquered but upon the total population as well. This moral implication was very pronounced also in the Versailles Treaty. It may be questioned whether or not it is better to establish conditions of peace without such moral implications. But the Anglo-

Saxon spirit inclines, as we have said, to such a moral emphasis for the satisfaction of its own conscience. The belief at Versailles was that a terrifying example could be set for the future in accordance with a legal principle which in individual cases had often been deceptive. But the belief proved at the very least to be a two-edged sword because it involved the prolonged visitation of the sins of the fathers upon the children who were ostensibly to be educated in the way of freedom and democracy.

But this discussion of punitive justice raises a second question, equally important for the re-education of a nation. Which among the peoples of the earth is entitled to distribute justice? In Germany the Versailles settlement was charged with having one-sidedly established punitive conditions without affording the conquered an opportunity to defend themselves. This is, for the most part, the way with treaties of peace. But it does not guarantee the wisdom of applying punitive measures to a people which is to be guided toward an understanding of freedom. Such measures would at least have to be temporary and avoid the unfortunate language adopted at Versailles. The forthcoming peace terms will provide for the exercise of justice by the *civilized nations* because the German leaders have been guilty of an attack upon civilization. But the commission charged with the task of fixing punitive measures ought to be composed also of representatives of neutral countries. It is clear that neutral countries will not be anxious to assume responsibility for such measures. In any case, unless neutral countries participate, punishment will be regarded by the German people as the one-sided demand of victorious vested interests, and thus some of the expected gains will be lost in advance. If retributive terms are to serve an educational purpose, much will depend upon the wisdom of their application. This has nothing to do with the severity or the moderation of what is prescribed; it is rather a matter of the basis, form, and duration of the terms. Nothing could be more injurious to educational policies than the failure to convince the majority of the German people that the conditions of punishment were designed to re-establish justice among all peoples. Should those who are not responsible for the misfortune of Germany and the deeds of the Nazis fail to be justly treated,

how shall they learn to believe in justice again? The idea of justice is as indivisible as the idea of democracy. The sense of law knows no national boundaries. International law presupposes the existence of a community which is able to transcend the interests of individual states.

Now precisely in the case of Nazi Germany the complex question of justice ought not to be disposed of without reference to Christian thought. Some measure of the difficulty of inculcating the idea of justice among the nations is succinctly given in the recent utterances of one of the most distinguished British theologians, the late Archbishop of Canterbury. The Archbishop acknowledges, in his little volume on *The Hope of the New World*, that England is partly responsible for the rise of so evil a spirit in Germany, because she wanted to retain her own peace and quiet and consequently failed to resist at the right moment. Nevertheless, he thinks that if justice is to be achieved by the forthcoming peace, the victors cannot be denied the right of acting in their own interest; for war inevitably involves the breakdown of legal procedures. Immediately following the armistice an interim must be established during which the punishment of Germany is to be determined. Just penalties are the necessary precondition for the re-education of the people and should be directed toward the total life of the nation and not so much toward the personal and economic life of individuals. The Archbishop rejects the view that his recommendations are not compatible with the Christian doctrine of forgiveness. He writes: "Here, two considerations must be borne in mind: first, Christianity recognizes that forgiveness to be real, must be costly. The Redeemer of the world took the cost upon Himself upon the cross. But secondly, no nation has ever been Christian in a degree that makes that possible, and where it is not possible, infliction of a just penalty is nearer to Christian righteousness than such action as seems to condone the wrong."¹³

It may be questioned whether this view of the matter accords with Christian doctrine. It transmutes the forgiveness of sins which proceeds from the mercy and love of God into a function of the intercourse between man and man and between nation and nation. Can, as the Archbishop seems to think, one group

of nations really claim the right and take up the responsibility for deciding whether and how the sins of another nation are to be forgiven? The dogmatic problem is not, in my opinion, disposed of by the fact that the Archbishop wants to administer punishment for a limited time. "Indeed," he says, "when we consider how the generations pass, it is evident that no penal element in a peace treaty can be both permanent and just. As the years pass, it will become increasingly an oppression and an injustice, for it presses upon citizens not guilty of the crime. The permanent settlement must aim at Distributive Justice, all nations, including Germany, taking part on equal terms in the negotiations, and all having equal claim to consideration and their fair share in organizing the common life for the common good."¹⁴ At least ultimately, the common sense of justice which includes Germany is acknowledged; and the Archbishop admits an obligation toward justice on the part of the victors, however much it may be doubted whether the assumption of their right to punish Germany can be derived from Christian doctrine. The recognition of the general sinfulness of all humanity and of all nations and the imperfection of all human arrangements will not make injustices imposed by the power of other states more endurable to the German people. The right of the forgiveness of sins is in God's hands and cannot be transferred to a tribunal of men. It cannot, therefore, correspond with any international right to administer the punishment of Germany in the name of God.

We have undertaken a somewhat fuller analysis of the conception of punitive justice because we believe that for the future education of the German people very much depends upon creating an understanding of such punishment among them. The severest penalties upon all guilty Germans, the restoration of all damage in countries whose neutrality has been scornfully violated, and the decisive disarmament of Germany are indispensable. So much at least must be done for the protection of those nations which have been ravaged by the German rulers. But much can be undone for all time if the German people cannot gradually be imbued with confidence in the sense of justice of their conquerors. No people can be democratically educated

apart from the conviction that international justice is real. Spiritual considerations of this sort will not of themselves enlighten those who are committed to an absolute power politics. However, the actual dialectic of the situation is this: education is a spiritual process and not the expression of a pure will to power. Thus the choice has to be made between two ways. If the peace should deal with Germany entirely in terms of power politics, there would be no way by which the German people could be influenced by educational measures.

It is necessary to explore in this connection the proposal for a partition of Germany. The first German Republic collapsed under the plurality of parliamentary and administrative agencies. To those who believe that the health of Europe depends upon a division of Germany into the smallest possible areas—who believe, according to a false historical analogy, that Germany can be restrained only if her unity is lost—it may be remarked that such a procedure will gravely endanger the development of a democratic form of government. Hitler came to power by playing the national government against the states and one state against another with unscrupulous virtuosity and by the constant sabotage of the democratic idea which one state maintained and another state abandoned. The statesmen of the United Nations tend to include Prussianism in almost every declaration concerning the spiritual powers that must be destroyed. In so far as “Prussianism” and “militarism” are identical, no word need be lost over the necessity of extermination. But in the thinking of many an American this Prussian spirit has been transformed into a purely geographical problem. However, it has been a very long time since this “Prussian spirit” contained itself within the boundaries of the Prussian state. It emigrated to Bavaria after 1918 and continued on its way until finally it intoxicated an Austrian painter and corporal. The day of the airplane will not be able to roll back this spirit within the Prussian frontiers.

By separating Prussia geographically from the rest of the German Reich, one would strike at the Prussian spirit least of all. It was in Munich that Prussian generals like Ludendorff made themselves at home and Prussian officers composed the

secret cells of incipient naziism. Paul Hagen correctly notes that it was Social Democratic Prussia which tried to resist the reactionary forces within Germany (until the last) and stubbornly fought against the rearmament of the Reich;¹⁵ and it was the Prussia of the Social Democrats which inaugurated far-reaching educational reforms. Under these circumstances the separation of Prussia from the rest of the Reich would accomplish nothing. The elimination of Prussianism today is no longer a geographical problem. Those who propose the partition and rearrangement of German territories overlook the fact that we do not live in the eighteenth century.¹⁶ The problem of Prussianism is a matter of spirit and not of space.

The dismemberment of Germany would undoubtedly afford reactionary forces in Germany the opportunity to play their game once more. They will know how to protect themselves in one state in order to foment unrest in another; they will know how to sow dissension and to gain power behind the mantle of confusion. They would accomplish these designs much more readily than the proponents of partition suspect; for partition would establish irredentism in Germany and provide a new national goal, a dream with which to satisfy the longings of the people. But, most of all, partition would obstruct the creation of a new and democratic educational will. Modern history has proved nothing so much as that such enforced divisions cannot be forcefully maintained. Nations have an ineradicable memory when their organic unity is torn apart. The case of Poland ought to be sufficient warning. In my opinion the establishment of a democratic Germany is very problematical if Germany is to be dismembered.

But who will be responsible for the new democratic spirit? The armies of occupation may remain for a longer or a shorter time and may do much or little for the prevention of chaos. In any case they cannot restore to Germany the understanding for democracy. Hitler, moreover, has done everything possible to destroy the potential forces of a democratic future: military circles and heavy industry will have been eliminated; the upper middle class has been completely compromised by naziism and has proved to be degenerate, inert, and devoid of moral courage.

Hitler himself was mainly supported by the lower middle classes, to which he belonged. It has been rightly observed that "totalitarianism has in fact created a vacuum such as has never been seen before."¹⁷ Who, then, shall fill this vacuum? Most writers on the subject agree that the *émigrés* are a negligible factor. They have lived abroad and have not shared with the German people the suffering of the war. Jacob Burckhardt has systematically described the feverish pace of revolution and thereby also touched upon the problem of the *émigré*. "It would be desirable," he writes, "for *émigrés* never to return, or at least not to claim restitution. They ought to bear what they have suffered as their share of earth's agony and recognize the law of limitation according to which both the years and the breach have decided against them."¹⁸

But history shows that *émigrés* have continued to return to their homelands in considerable numbers. After the fall of Napoleon I, France reabsorbed a considerable stream of exiles. After the fall of the second Napoleon it had to open its doors once again. Bolshevism is the creation of Russian *émigrés*. And recent events in Italy have been influenced by returning nationals. Wherever the status of *émigrés* has lately been discussed, a distinction tends to be made between Germany and other European countries. It is regarded as possible, indeed desirable, that exiles from other Axis nations and from occupied countries should return and fruitfully participate in public life. But there is no confidence in the German *émigrés*, and it is not believed that they have a political task to discharge in Germany. The idea is that a new and younger generation will seize the helm of affairs. It is, of course, difficult to make a judgment about *émigrés* as a group; as such they will scarcely be able to affect political life, for the problem is much an individual one. Nevertheless, it can be said with certainty that the German educational system after the war will manifest such a lack of adequately trained persons that every experienced educator would be of great value. The *émigré* would bring with him, in addition, an understanding of foreign countries which would enrich the education of the nation. Whether the postwar situation in

Germany will be such as to attract the return of *émigrés* is open to question.

But who should fill the vacuum? Paul Hagen declares that the German workers, farmers, and a section of the intelligentsia could comprise the nucleus of a new government. He believes that, of all the groups in the population, the workers have been the least sympathetic with the Nazis, that the number of disaffected farmers has considerably increased, and that many an intellectual has co-operated with the Nazis against his will and out of fear for his life. Anti-Fascist elements would grow rapidly if only the victorious powers helped to liberate these latent forces and equip them for action. Nevertheless, one cannot be too positive even about the German workers. It is correct that among the workers there were far fewer Nazi fellow-travelers than among the middle classes and the military caste. But the workers lost their leaders very soon after Hitler's seizure of power, some of the leaders of the Social Democrats fleeing abroad, having failed in the critical moment, and others retiring, ruined by National Socialist terrorism. A few suffered martyrdom for their cause. The workers, deprived of leadership and organization, no longer openly participated in the struggle against Hitler but were driven underground. Despite all risk and sacrifice the underground must not be overestimated; nor can it be forgotten that among the German workers there were those who were willing to observe their comrades from within National Socialist organizations.

Under these circumstances, an appraisal of the future must take full account of all the various social groups and classes. Even the middle class, which in general we have judged severely, contained a number of heroes—after all, the pastors, whose opposition has been so notable belonged to the middle class. In the last analysis it is individuals and not groups which have stood their ground; and when the veil of secrecy is lifted, we shall yet be amazed by the quiet heroism of such individuals in all sections of the population. Hence the answer to the question of who should fill the vacuum cannot be given solely in class terms. It seems to me much more probable that after Hitler's

fall a slow but extensive process of transformation will occur within the German body politic, a process which will modify the previously existing social classes. What is implied by this prophecy can perhaps best be understood with reference to America, where social differentiation in the European, and especially German, sense is not so pronounced. A similar situation could emerge in Germany if victors and vanquished are to avoid serious psychological mistakes. But it will no longer be possible to view political and cultural life solely in terms of traditional social categories. This is of paramount importance for the future of education, for educational policies can no longer be based on the antithesis between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. A purely proletarian education would mean a communistically tinged world view; a purely middle-class education would mean the continuation of an outmoded and dead tradition which could have no relevance for the present crisis.

Obviously, the beginning of political and cultural reconstruction will be accompanied by quite extraordinary difficulties. Revolutionary pressures will threaten to engulf the German body politic. It will, as a matter of fact, require the help and protection of the United Nations in order to avert a chaos that could be worse than the spiritual chaos of the German people under Hitler. But after a collapse the law of mass psychology can also be counted upon to turn the resentment and sardonic hatred of the masses against the Nazis like a whirlwind. What happens next will depend decisively upon the way in which the makers of the peace deal with the new political authorities in Germany. No German government will be able to maintain itself unless it can demonstrate to the people that it enjoys the respect of the victors. The course of events after the last war should be a warning to the United Nations, because the humiliation which was repeatedly the lot of the new leaders of that time undermined the confidence of the German people in a new state of things. No people will support new leaders into an unknown future if they are seen to be more despised than the old leaders were. Perhaps it will not be possible to avoid an initial upsurge of bitterness, contempt, and revenge among the victorious powers and their representatives; but such a spirit dare

not rule so as to complicate the transformation of the German people.

The new German government will unquestionably be faced with a responsibility which will demand uncommon gifts. The elimination of the Nazi rascals will involve prohibitive and not constructive measures. Let no one suppose, however, that everything will be disposed of solely by the execution of the ringleaders. This task will affect the party, the military, and other governmental functionaries, but it will bring with it many other difficulties. American generals have discovered in Italy how complicated postwar administration is; they have compromised again and again and thereby imperiled reconstruction. Even the question of the number of the guilty to be disposed of is an extremely delicate one. Should one stop at one thousand, or at ten thousand, or at one hundred thousand? It can scarcely be doubted that more than one hundred thousand have incurred heavy responsibility.

There is widespread anxiety—not without foundation—that immediately after the collapse the Nazis will organize their own underground. What would that mean, for instance, for American relations with Argentina? Those Nazis who succeed in escaping to foreign countries will try with all possible means to keep their ideology alive. Temporarily they will go into hiding or disguise themselves, but they will continually seek new ways to arouse foreign countries and to disturb the peace of the world. So much the more, therefore, must the new German government possess the necessary strength, confidence, and wisdom to effect preventive measures. All those who have held office under the Nazis must be dismissed. This is in itself a difficult task when one thinks of the many lukewarm and indifferent who hold such offices. Nevertheless, the whole body of administrative officials must be reconstituted. But what is to be done with those who have been dismissed? Shall they consume in comfort the pensions accumulated under the Nazis and undermine the government, as many retired generals did after the last war? Shall they starve inside Germany only to create hidden cells of economic and political discontent?

It is a foregone conclusion that there will be no German army

after the war. It may even be that for a long time police authority in Germany will not be autonomous. Moreover, what is to happen to the deposed officers? Shall they infiltrate into industry only to constitute a focus of opposition to the government within the national economy? After the dismissal of petty officials and the destruction of the military caste, the course of things that followed the last war must be prevented. It must be impossible for the dissatisfied and uprooted to assemble and slowly but systematically to sabotage the government. So long as there is no solution of this problem, all measures for the punishment of the guilty will be inadequate. What, then, shall be done?

A distinction will have to be made between those who have made themselves useless once and for all and those who could perhaps be reoriented and reconditioned. As for the first group, it numbers so many as to defy extermination; it will be possible to seize those who are flagrantly guilty, but the rest would be no less dangerous to the new government. The government, therefore, must have the right temporarily or permanently to exile them. Clearly they could be sentenced only by due process of law. But exile is possible only if there is a haven outside Germany for those who are condemned. Who is to receive them? Shall they go to South America? Will other countries open their doors to former Nazis? Or will it be possible for a new League of Nations to establish penal settlements? All such questions must be answered, and no answer can be given apart from the co-operative effort of the United Nations. The second group might be dealt with somewhat more leniently. It seems to me of great importance to try to win them over by probation. Those who could be reconditioned might be deprived for a time of the privileges of citizenship, especially of the right to vote, as was done in America after the Civil War. But they should, whenever possible, be given hope and treated with consideration. The first German Republic paid a heavy price for neglect in this respect. It seems to me beyond doubt that the re-establishment of order in Germany and the institution of democracy are almost more critically dependent upon the application of restorative measures than upon the execution of the guilty.

The political mistakes of the first Republic should be particu-

larly instructive for safeguarding the security of the second. The multiplicity of parties, for example, and the tendency toward radicalism fostered in the younger generation by a too early voting age contributed much to the decline of the first Republic and ought to be avoided. It should also be constitutionally guaranteed that no former general or admiral could ever become chancellor or prime minister.

Nothing, however, could be more fatal for the reconstruction of Germany than a further withdrawal from the world. The complete isolation effected by Hitler has undoubtedly left its mark upon the German soul. After years of separation, during which her leaders have deliberately cultivated the false doctrine of cultural, economic, and political autarchy, Germany will be open to a new course only if she can re-establish international contact. If the peace imposes a long quarantine, it will run the risk of severe psychological damage. Germany ought not to be compelled to ask indefinitely for admission to a new community of nations, once the conviction has been established that a new spirit is at work.

The proposal to welcome Germany intellectually and spiritually into a new European order will seem fantastic to all who continue to be dominated by the passions of war—it will seem like inviting a criminal to luncheon. But the procedure outlined here is the path of sober political realism. German education must acquire a democratic orientation in a European cultural community. The German educational system will need not supervision by foreign states but rather the support of a European confederation. Can such a confederation really be effective if some member-states are to be treated as prisoners who need reform? The necessary political measures to be taken with respect to the defeated countries can be the more effectively carried out if these countries are speedily guaranteed a cultural equality. This will require the greatest liberality, the greatest governmental skill, and a comprehensive cultural perspective on the part of the United Nations.

However, the basic responsibility imposed upon humanity by the war has to do with the coalescence of democratic and social principles. The relevant problems are as pressing in America as

in Europe, and in America there is an inclination to admit quite honestly how much there is still to be done. The realization of the democratic idea depends by nature not upon individual nations but upon the whole of humanity. If democracy is to continue to exist unthreatened, it must permeate more thoroughly than hitherto the community sense of nations. The democratic conception of humanity knows no national boundaries. Once this is recognized, new perspectives open toward the future. A century and a quarter ago, Napoleon, reflecting at St. Helena upon the future course of Europe, declared: "Within a century, Europe will be either democratic or cossack." This was about 1820. And though the alternative has since become more complex, Europe could, as a last resort, really be confronted by this decision. The governments of England and the United States have defined the aim of the war as the re-establishment and deepening of the democratic spirit, and it is for this that they are fighting. Without a cultural reincorporation of Germany into a democratic world society, these war aims could not be achieved. If the United Nations fail here, the meaning of the war will have been lost to them.

I think that Germany's right to live is justified by her cultural history. German militarism has never wanted to comprehend the fact that the natural resources and the geographical position of Germany are matters of destiny which cannot be altered by force. The military leaders would not see that the physical conditions of their country could not be corrected by dreams of glory and delusions of grandeur. But history does not always decree that the defeat of a people is an unattonable and incurable fate; it can lead to purification and open horizons which are denied to the victors. Such horizons in the case of Germany would be solely cultural. The scientific revival of Germany after the last war seemed for a time to point in this upward direction. And it seems to me almost symbolic that in the effort to keep the morale of their peoples at a high level the United Nations are making use of a German musical motif for which they are indebted to Beethoven. It is not accidental that the cry for the thoroughgoing eradication of Germany arises from those who have only a superficial understanding of her

cultural heritage. Surely Germany has still more to contribute to the world in a cultural way.

Thus it is to be hoped that, despite all the temptations of the moment, the victorious powers will not succumb to the blinding passion for revenge but will rise to the historical occasion with the measured comprehension which will envisage the future culture of the whole world. Germany for her part will have to recognize that the nationalistic path which she has taken during the last century has been a tragic delusion and that her real talents do not lie in the domain of politics. The Germany of arms and aggression, dreaming of a racial superhumanity, has died. However, the words of one of Germany's greatest and most misunderstood creative spirits are not a seal upon despair and death but a sign of life and hope. "The life of the spirit," said Hegel, "is not that which shuns death but keeps clear of destruction; rather it endures death and in death is sustained. It only achieves its truth in the midst of utter desolation."

CHAPTER NINE

A NEW IDEAL FOR GERMAN EDUCATION

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION IN WESTERN civilization begins with the exclusive prerogatives of the clergy. The Reformation and the Renaissance marked a new movement through which the nobility and the wealthier bourgeoisie were more and more drawn into the educational process. The extension of educational opportunity culminated in the seventeenth century in the practical and worldly ideal of the *galant homme*. The Enlightenment brought on an entirely new phase of development. The philosophical and educational ideas of this period were fostered by the middle classes. For the first time, the aims of education were defined in complete independence of Christianity, even though individual educators remained in the Christian tradition. Humanity and humanism were the slogans of the middle class, who believed in the general ethical progress of mankind; and in the wake of the great enlightened ideas of the French Revolution they desired to allow all mankind to participate in this spiritual and ethical advance. Ever since, the belief in education has been a creed of redemption, constant amid all the changes of civilized life. The most important innovation—the introduction of compulsory public education—is the fruit of this belief in the power of education to make men freer and therefore happier. This process has now reached its zenith.

The bases of these ideas were altered when, as the result of industrialization, labor took the center of the stage in Europe. Although compulsory public education with the consequent reduction of illiteracy was a bourgeois dream, it did not exclude

the workers. In this way the so-called broad masses of the population were to be incorporated into the body politic and thus robbed of the demonic character which is peculiar to an amorphous mass. But this process of education was essentially and necessarily dynamic, which meant that, from generation to generation, the number of those who aspired to higher educational levels continually increased. Educators all over the world were proud of this progress. A generation ago the German philosopher and educator, Friedrich Paulsen, said that no phase of historical inquiry was more heartening than the history of education. Over and above all temporal change the education of the human race had manifested its power and richness. Nations were seeking to learn from one another. Each individual increasingly received the opportunity for maximum personal training and could develop his fullest social worth according to his natural capacities and energies. And ten years ago an American educator advanced the view that, in the new era in which we are living, compulsory education confined to the elementary school and to the elimination of illiteracy would no longer be adequate for the complexity of life in the twentieth century. He assumed that everywhere it was beginning to be recognized that educational opportunities must be available to every man to carry him as high as his capacities would reach, and that objections to such a course did not need to be taken seriously, since exactly a century earlier the same considerations were raised against compulsory elementary education. Widespread elementary education had naturally produced a demand for further opportunity. In his opinion it belonged to the essence of democracy that this demand be met.

When the great world crisis began in an economic breakdown of unprecedented proportions, a large section of the population in Germany took refuge in the educational institutions, either because of unemployment or because of the fear of it. One of the leading German educators described the situation by saying that one half of the German people was now educating the other half. A veritable educational ecstasy had seized the country. People believed that higher educational qualifications must automatically pave the way to better vocational possibilities.

The result was a vocationally motivated overcrowding of the educational institutions which could only lead to a still greater intensification of economic distress.

The problem of overcrowding in the scientific institutes and in those for the training of teachers was transformed from an economic to an educational problem, first in Germany and then in other European countries. The connection between academic surplus and unemployment was illuminatingly discussed a few years ago in an excellent volume by W. M. Kotschnig.¹ France, Austria, and the Balkans suffered in some ways even more from such a surplus. In Germany, responsible authorities saw the problem in time; but it is doubtful whether external organization could have helped, since the situation was symptomatic of an economic and cultural inflammation, the roots of which lay deep. The material assembled by Kotschnig will be permanently valuable. Under no circumstances can the disparity between education and employment be permitted to recur in any country after the war. Economists and sociologists should give themselves, as Kotschnig recommended, to the task of a carefully thought-out employment-planning program. When the National Socialists took power, they believed that they could charm the hydra of academic surplus and unemployment by grotesque witch-doctoring. They prevented those whom they disliked from pursuing their professions, they reduced the entrance of women into intellectual occupations to a minimum, they delayed vocational training by the introduction of compulsory labor for young men and women, they swelled the ranks of bureaucracy beyond count, they guided the stream of youth into the nascent but increasingly demanding army. No parliament in the world could have carried out these surgical and most unimaginative measures; but they did not solve the problem.

The outbreak of war which Hitler forced by his own antecedent activities is decisive proof that national socialism had not mastered the situation in the field of education by its brutal measures, although holes had been momentarily plugged and artificial procedures had brought relief from the despair of the moment, only to issue in greater despair. The immediate question is why America did not face the whole problem to the same

extent. Kotschnig calls America the land of mass education and points out that after 1913 the number of students in America was very much greater than in Germany. Nevertheless, in those vocations open to college students, unemployment had not risen to the same degree as in European countries. The percentage of students during the preceding twenty years had increased much faster than the population. One of the reasons for this was the view that unemployment could be postponed by giving time to further study which could then be applied to the raising of the occupational level. Still more effective was the belief in equality of opportunity and in the miracle of education. The idea of the equality of all men pictures them as pilgrims on an endless way. As Kotschnig puts it: "Through education the American dream of an ever-expanding life was to come true." The frontier spirit was carried over into education. According to Kotschnig, in 1937 every seventh person of college age was actually enrolled in a college. But the college graduates found employment and did not object to taking jobs which did not make use of college training.

In academic callings no real distress had yet appeared. And difficulties could have been met by an equal and systematic distribution of jurists, physicians, etc., throughout the country. Thus America did not feel the European problem in all its acuteness. A mitigating circumstance was the oft cited fact that social stratification and the contrast between the educated and the uneducated is not so definite as in Germany. But it seems to me that still another factor is of special significance. The American student who attends college not with a view toward an academic profession but for the sake of a good education before taking up a practical vocation has studied two years longer than the German student who enters upon a practical vocation. It is well known that the German student graduates from the humanistic or the realistic Gymnasium two years later than an American student graduates from high school. But the German student who does not attend the university has no further opportunity for education at school. Accordingly, if educational achievements are proportional to the time spent, the average level of the so-called educated classes which are not in academic callings

is higher in America than in Germany. The objection that the standard of American college education is not so high as might be expected is disposed of by Kotschnig's judgment that many American institutions rival what European institutions achieve. In any case, the two additional years offer the possibility of obtaining a broader general education than the average graduate of a Gymnasium has.

However, there was in Germany a considerable number of young men who attended the university, not in order to become pastors or physicians or judges or secondary-school teachers, but to earn the doctorate in the fields of commerce, national economy, sociology, literature, and jurisprudence. They then entered upon the available occupations as administrators in industry, trade, and banking or as journalists, social workers, etc. Here new fields within the public economy and public life had opened to young people during the last generation. But these vocations were precisely those most dependent upon the ups and downs of economic life. During the depression after 1925 the number of disappointed, hard-working, academically trained persons was particularly large in these groups. Under such conditions, the American colleges have the advantage of a readier solution of the problem of surplus attendance.

The problem of surplus university attendance heralded extraordinary disturbances in economic and cultural affairs. The introduction of compulsory education had once been an expression of an intense hope of progress. If only everyone received the necessary enlightenment, humanity could be delivered from its inertia. "Enlightenment," said Immanuel Kant, "is the emergence of man from the intellectual minority for which he is himself responsible. Intellectual minority is the inability to make use of one's own understanding without the guidance of another." A man who does not use his own understanding violates the sacred rights of mankind—this was Kant's thesis. Accordingly progress exists. But, from the beginning, reactionary tendencies were also at work. The nobility, who after the Congress of Vienna continually postponed the promised constitutions, found the increasing enlightenment through education a thorn in the flesh. Despotism and absolutism presupposed the

intellectual minority of the people. Yet if education and culture had really been able to guarantee freedom, fascism could never have arisen.

The fact that, despite a century of public education, fascism could triumph in Germany proves that the educational philosophies of the Enlightenment and of German idealism were too optimistic. They did not know that the systematic discipline of intellect could produce a reaction in which the suppressed irrational impulses of the human soul break out in fury. Fascism also regarded the education of the masses as an unwelcome obstacle to its program; but it knew how to overcome this obstacle. Illusion, suggestion, mass-hypnosis, are the means whereby fascism paralyzes the effects of education. Fascism discovered in mass propaganda a parapsychic narcotic through which the reason illuminated by education can again be darkened. A new drug had been invented which could be used to enervate the powers of the mind by the exploitation of the slumbering, aboriginal demonic powers of the human subconscious.

Narcotics are as a rule effective for a short time only; but every psychologist knows that the consequences of narcotics are extraordinarily difficult to overcome and that the mass awareness of a situation is different from that of an individual. However, the only historic instance of a black-out of the mind would never have been possible if it had not been preceded by an extraordinary cultural weariness. Mistrust of the intellect, deep disappointment that fortune did not dwell in the "land of the cultured," to use Nietzsche's phrase, preceded the betrayal of the masses.

It can be assumed that after the war a thoroughgoing reaction will take place. The resurgent masses, after a period of general confusion, will be filled with a new hunger for education; but if the return of the pre-war conditions is to be prevented, something will have to be learned from them. The human thirst for knowledge can temporarily, of course, be artificially assuaged, but in the long run it cannot be stifled. It is like a mighty stream absorbing ever more tributaries as it rushes on to become one with the sea. Meanwhile, the stream cannot be allowed to overflow its banks so that fundamental damage occurs. The continuing extension of

education and the raising of the general cultural level presuppose the possibility of economic and social improvement. If education does not go hand in hand with social progress and social equality, conflicts must arise which will severely threaten the culture of mankind. Humanity has arrived at just such a point of extreme danger. If the cultural rise of mankind is to continue, those who enjoy the benefits of education must be able to expect that they will receive employment in accordance with their proved capacities. But this is possible only in so far as society is correspondingly ordered. Cultural and social equality are parallel. If the nineteenth century was the century of compulsory elementary education, the twentieth century will undoubtedly be the century of higher education. Not every seventh person will aspire to a higher education as heretofore, but *every* person. At the same time, such a development will bring with it a new danger. If the cultural rise continues indefinitely, who will discharge the so-called "menial" tasks? It cannot be said in reply that there will always be people for whom higher education was not intended; for the number of those would not be sufficient to meet the needs of an industrial era. This is the most acute problem of the future. Only that society which finds the solution will be able to endure.

In the face of this reaction, after the collapse of the National Socialist educational system, who could be called upon to integrate German education in a global cultural process? Mr. Henry Wallace touched upon these educational questions in two addresses, the second of which contained a modification of the point of view taken in the first. Although he began by emphasizing the necessity for a thoroughgoing supervision over German education by the victorious powers, he subsequently declared that it was not the business of the United States to determine what should be taught in the future in the schools of Germany. The United States should not take the responsibility for a book-burning in Hitlerian style. Nevertheless, the peace of the world could be guaranteed only if Hitlerism and Prussianism were irrevocably to disappear. There were, according to Mr. Wallace, enough German scholars with an exemplary attitude toward world affairs who could be intrusted with the task of preparing

new textbooks. "I believe," he said "these men would glorify peace and international honesty, promote the re-establishment of the German culture of Beethoven, Schubert, Schiller and Goethe, and the gradual preparation of the German spirit for an appreciation of the fact that a bill of rights for the individual is as vital as the bill of duties toward the state."

The idea of taking from the German people the right of determining its education and bestowing this right upon the victorious powers has an unmistakably Fascist sound. A democratic philosophy of education would then be making use of dictatorial methods for the accomplishment of its aims. But the democratic conception of education is a unified whole and can derive its vitality only from this unity. To be sure, the supervision over German education would be undertaken only for a transitional period. But the result would be that the educational policies of the victors would survive in the memory of the people as a kind of punishment, as something bound up with the armies of occupation. Even if the whole German nation were responsible for the rise and the sovereignty of national socialism, this supervision over education could not be justified. The United Nations would act contrary to their own interests were they to impose foreign control upon the German educational system. Men as widely different as President Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia University and Oswald Garrison Villard, one of America's distinguished liberal journalists, have rejected the proposal that "foreign teachers should supervise German education." The more obviously this education is directed by foreigners, the more the younger generation will inwardly rebel against it. The spiritual life of nations cannot be transformed by compulsory schemes, which are bound to evoke political countermovements.

Among those who are to be educated, the loyalty of generations yet unborn is relatively the simplest problem; and even the youngsters between six and ten years of age do not present significant difficulties. Those who have imbibed so little of the Nazi poison and have seen its consequences will be open to other possibilities if the new government and the new education do their part and if parents are not compelled to face depression,

dishonor, and despair. The democratic spirit could gain strength year by year if only the new Germany is accorded the opportunity to find the way back into the community of European nations.

But the real problem is how to deal with adolescence; for adolescence already presents many baffling psychological problems in the treatment of young people and is least susceptible to rational methods of education. The new day must take up the task of educating an adolescent generation which has been enveloped for years in a cloud of irrationalism and mysticism. The new democratic education cannot be based solely upon a primitive doctrine of attitudes. The National Socialists have attempted that to an incredible extent by means of an extraordinarily skilful adaptation of mass hypnotism. Americans may well have gained some insight into the power of this hypnosis from the experiences in their own camps for the detention of German prisoners of war. The student generation, moreover, returning from the battle fields with all its hopes buried, will be converted to a new ideal of education only as far as all prospects for an occupational future have not disappeared.² Paul Hagen takes the view that in the fact of the collapse of Hitler the young people who have been forcibly drilled by him will free themselves from this influence more easily than one might think. Be that as it may, the report of a minister of education of one of the occupied countries, which suggests that sections of the youth of his own land were fascinated by fascism even during the period of German occupation, shows how potent the influence of the Hitler Youth groups must have been upon young people. Hitler deliberately fostered opposition to the older generation in the youth whom he trained. When he took power, he rapidly succeeded in this. Consequently, the older generation became more and more accustomed to Hitler and adapted itself to the young enthusiasts.

One thing, however, must be kept very clearly in mind. The large majority of the German people cannot be reached directly by formal schooling. It seems to me that many who discuss the future of Germany ascribe too much significance to education as a factor in the immediate reconstruction of the nation. The gen-

eration between twenty-five and fifty, among whom are numbered the real representatives of naziism, will be beyond the influence of the schools. In so far as members of this generation are still active in public affairs, a way of influencing them must be found, about which something will be said later. Adult education, from which modern educators have expected so much, has not been eminently successful—"The sapling bends but scarcely more the tree." It is important, therefore, to remember that, especially during the early years after the war, the influence of education will be very limited. It will increase, however, with each succeeding year.

Let us then ask once more: What can education accomplish? As we have suggested, there are many for whom it is a kind of cult of salvation. American educational literature is still largely permeated by the ancient Socratic doctrine that the goal of education must be a moral one, that virtue can be taught. Only recently the president of an American university charged German education with a "disastrous moral sterility which became apparent already during the last war." He accuses the Germans, regardless of Immanuel Kant, of having always separated the intellectual from the moral in their educational ideal. Indeed, he goes so far as to describe this as characteristically German.⁸ As a matter of fact, German education before Hitler was never guilty of such a separation. The rise and fall in the morals of a nation involve matters which are independent of education for moral progress. If the problem were solely a matter of moralistic tendencies in education, of educational perfectionism like that espoused by the age of Socrates and of the Enlightenment, of individual goodness, the world would already be perfect. But moral progress is withdrawn from such influences the moment the existence of a nation is called into question. Not even America is secure against the possibility—shall we say during the next century or so?—of a revolutionary outbreak which would threaten all the moral achievements of American education. I think, therefore, that no education can overcome the moral cleavage which has divided the world and set up the Kingdom of God on earth.

Furthermore, the re-education of Germany will not be ac-

complished merely by organizational plans and new textbooks, important as these are. Everything depends upon the adoption of a new goal for education which shall unify the whole system. Education in normal times has the great advantage of a continuing tradition. Such a continuity has been completely broken in Germany, and in the victorious nations it has been severely tried. Hitler's appeal was rooted in the deliberate and ultra-noisy demolition of all the canons of the past and the direction of attention toward a misty and magically illuminated future. His transcendent ideal was the "eternal Germany," which led to self-deification. The longing of German individualism for self-admiration drove it into a collective unreality and induced fantastic and feverish dreams of a new heaven and a new earth in which only Germany would live.

But Hitler's ideal was an *ideal*, and, according to the expressed will of Corporal Hitler (every German corporal is an embryonic grade-school teacher), it was intended also to be an educational ideal. A new goal must therefore replace the shattered one. To be effective, it must be more attractive and be expounded with greater intensity than the discredited aim. It must point with confidence toward the future and be fashioned in the context of the time and situation. What this involves can perhaps best be gauged by the consideration that such an ideal would be proposed at a time of deep national humiliation. But do the victorious Western nations have an ideal which can be recommended to a sorely wounded and defeated Germany? Let us not forget that a democratic purpose was offered the German people once before, and the complaint was subsequently bitter that Western ideas had not helped. The question here is not whether such reactions were justified. Our present concern is with the psychological fact. The German people were quick to detect the weaknesses of democracy in other nations. It is idle to suppose that they did not know about lynchings and the plight of the Negro in America, about administrative scandals in American cities, and about the illiteracy rate.

The world as it was before the war is gone. Not even the United Nations can rest upon their educational laurels; they, too, will have to take measures toward a new world in process

of formation. No longer possessing the talisman of educational wisdom, they, too, will have to adapt new principles to a new and different future. "All this, however, makes the situation in Germany more promising than it might seem in view of what has been said. Victors and vanquished cannot live statically side by side. Educationally speaking, victors are collaborators whose wider experience and more fortunate destiny can be placed at the disposal of the vanquished.

But what can the new educational ideal be? What is it that can illumine Germany's darkest hour with light from beyond, that is dynamically disposed toward a new order, that would erect bridges across which Germany could again find her way into the world? Historically, the educational ideals of the West have always been characteristically expressed in terms of a definite and exemplary type of person. The Christian knight, the *galant uomo*, the gentleman, the aesthetic humanist—all have guided the course of European education during the centuries that have gone. I venture to offer the "good European" as the educational type of the future. The metaphysical meaning of the war points in the direction of a new European society. The peoples of Europe do not know one another sufficiently. Despite a common past with its continuous wars and treaties of peace, they really are astonishingly poorly acquainted with each other. There does not yet exist a European historiography; moreover, the whole writing of history has been one-sidedly determined by the national, if not the nationalistic, perspective of separate nations.

When the clouds which now obscure the view have disappeared, the nations will need to strive toward the goal of an economic, political, and cultural community. Otherwise they will not be protected against a repetition of all that has occurred. The American has long since taught the European that national differences are only shadows obviously overstressed by European nations. It may take a long time before the goal of a European federation is reached. Years, if not decades, may elapse before that European comes into being who can be the bearer of a new unified educational conception. This new educational conception must be democratic, federative, social, and Christian,

if it is to be the seed of a cultural rebirth. It will necessarily embody both the cultural heritage of the European peoples and whatever these peoples have to learn from each other in the future.

The ideal of the good European can win the confidence of the German people only if Germany's future incorporation within a European community of nations is contemplated. The European spirit is, as the previous chapter has indicated, also the democratic spirit and is based upon a common cultural tradition in which all European nations share the great heritage of music, poetry, philosophy, and science. The European recognizes the commonalty of this cultural heritage, but he still lacks a unified cultural attitude. The great task of German education is the nourishment of this European cultural spirit in the German people. The path toward this goal can be smoothed only through the creation of a well-tempered spiritual atmosphere. Political considerations would thus no longer stifle cultural considerations in the life of nations. The predominance of cultural considerations has become for Germany a matter of life and death; for I believe that Hitlerism and the second World War have decisively established the political incompetence of Germany.

This European cultural spirit does not mean European exclusiveness but rather a sense of immediate corporateness that is historically and geographically conditioned; for this spirit is a part of a general humanism. It cannot be objected that such a humanism already has been proclaimed for more than a century by philosophers and therefore contains nothing new; for the humanism of the Enlightenment which still permeated the nineteenth century has proved to be too formless and abstract. The problem is to make the humanistic idea concrete for once and to begin with its actualization in a European community. This European humanity must no longer be treated as a pious tale for the nursery or the schoolroom but must reflect itself in every European nation, and thus also in Germany, and replace the nationalism which pushed aside the humanism of the Enlightenment. But if the German educator is to undertake the vitalization of such an ideal, the European cultural community must also find organizational expression.

Just as the European cultural consciousness was not adequately developed when Hitler appeared, so the organizational arrangements for cultural exchange among the nations after 1918 were insufficient. The cultural organization of the former League of Nations was not equal to the task. Neither in Geneva nor in Paris could its purely mechanical operation be overcome. Distinguished scholars, outstanding representatives of education, very quickly withdrew because they found nothing real to do. The organization increasingly confined itself to bibliographical and technical studies. One need only consult its publications and their titles, which included such items as: *University Exchanges in Europe*, *Handbook of Cultural Institutions*, *International Pedagogical Bibliography*, *The Educational Role of Broadcasting*. Here was the measure of the cultural interests of the League organization. Intellectual by-paths were the major concern. By pointing to the variety of educational conditions, each state fearfully sought to safeguard its own freedom of action in all essential matters. Mediocre and pedantic spirits took refuge in this arrangement.

When administrators of scientific institutes came together for co-operative work, the agenda were almost exclusively devoted to matters of external organization. No cultural representative of the great powers would have been able to make commitments or agreements which extended beyond the purely formal facilitation of scientific and educational exchange. Politics on the grand scale determined what could or could not be done. Third-rate diplomats who were unable to meet the demands of major political responsibility sported around in the cultural field. Scholars and educators in almost all countries viewed this busy formalism with quiet amusement. Only a few of the participants managed to rise above this level. The whole machinery moved on the surface and made no essential contact with the decisive spiritual, artistic, and educational energies of the world.

The cultural organization of the League of Nations was a welcome and harmless technical aid, but it was devoid of significance for the spiritual life of the nations. Walter M. Kotschnig, who brings to educational problems the creative insights of a broad perspective, describes the work of the Institute of In-

tellectual Cooperation in the following way: "Those who are acquainted with the work of the League of Nations in the field of intellectual cooperation may object that for all the results achieved, the League might never have entered the field of intellectual relations and of international education. And it might be held that the experience of the League demonstrated conclusively the limitations of international action in educational matters, in other words, that the grandiose schemes put forward at this time are utterly unrealistic."⁴ And Kotschnig admits: "The League itself did next to nothing to influence education in the various countries. It operated on the mistaken notion that education was so much a matter of the several nations that no international agency should interfere. Fascinated by the idea of cultural autonomy, it failed to see the extent to which education could be and was used as a political instrument." On one occasion at the very beginning of the Institute there sat together Henri Bergson, Gilbert Murray, Albert Einstein, Mme Curie, and Robert Millikan. But things did not remain this way. Later on, only the intellectual busybodies swarmed in Geneva.

The consequences of this experiment in international cultural co-operation are almost self-evident. Kotschnig has devoted a section of his book to the future under the caption "Toward an International Authority." He hopes that steps will be taken toward educational reconstruction in Britain or in the United States. Several societies, like the American Association of School Administrators, have given attention to these ideas. The aforementioned association proposes that the peace make use of education for the prevention of future war. There has been no lack of meetings and resolutions. The reorientation of education in the totalitarian states is a special item on the program. The Council for Education in World Citizenship appointed a committee in 1942 "to examine the history of the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation and its advisory committee on League of Nations Teaching, the inadequacy of its work and the reasons for this and to prepare proposals which the Council and the allied groups can recommend to their respective governments concerning the kind of intergovernmental machinery and private unofficial agencies which will be needed

after the war to promote the study of international cooperation." Many other proposals have been made. At a meeting of the ministers of education of the various European nations in London in 1944, which American delegates also attended, certain organizational schemes were developed, and a declaration of mutual assistance was adopted. But all of this is concerned only with advice, perhaps even with the creation of committees. It seems that the London meeting did not find it propitious to take up the question of Germany.

It is not within the province of this book to develop in detail the organization of an international committee on culture. This cannot be the work of a single individual, and it depends upon factors which can be discerned only after the armistice. Nevertheless, one fundamental point must not be overlooked. The cultural arrangements of the last League of Nations were, as we have seen, so bureaucratic that they could not cope with the problem of the creation and nurture of a common European cultural feeling. But if this feeling is to permeate the spirit of European peoples, an international body devoted to this end can never be merely an auxiliary of political authority. There has been so much talk about the spirit of European peoples, so much complaint that the ideas of peace and international reconciliation have not advanced one step in recent decades, that it is certainly high time to take the idea of a common European culture seriously and to prevent its elaboration from being drawn again into the political maelstrom, where it would be condemned in advance to sterility.

It is clear that the governments of the great powers will refuse to the utmost to keep the organization of international cultural understanding independent of power politics. But this is the point at which the world stands at the crossroads. Those who have observed the ridiculous sham of so-called cultural politics as a subdivision of the foreign affairs of nations will know why I demand an end to the connection between foreign politics and cultural politics conducted through official diplomatic channels. This so-called cultural politics was either brutal propaganda or weak and spiritually empty routine. In either case it was ornamentation that served meanwhile to conceal real

political aims and forces. The future of a European cultural ideal depends, therefore, upon the possibility of an international European cultural organization which can work independently of political pressures.

It is self-evident that an understanding must exist between political and intellectual authorities. But cultural agencies have hitherto never been allowed to work freely. I recommend, therefore, the establishment of a new and independent body—a kind of world church, analogous to the World Council of Churches, the creation of a European cultural conscience with its own responsibility for the development of a European sense of culture and community and with sufficient authority to carry out its work. This is not a matter of administrative boards, which tend to be more or less removed from life; nor is it a matter of separating Europe from America. On the contrary, such an organization must be the vehicle for the spiritual life of Europe and must certainly be in continuous contact with America. It must be concerned with the spirit expressed in public affairs, in science, art, and education. The administrative council of this body must be composed of men of spiritual stature. The well-known phrase “a republic of scholars” ought to be actualized in a republic in which all phases of intellectual and cultural life are represented. This “republic of scholars” ought to belong no longer to an unseen world so that one never knows whether it is alive or not. Its members should enjoy the respect of their own countries and of Europe and exercise by word and deed an influence proportional to their responsibility and position.

What I have in mind is not too far removed from Mr. Bertrand Russell’s idea of an “international university,” an educational institution to be set up in a neutral country, “in some territory analogous to the District of Columbia.”⁵ I wish to go beyond the pedagogical task in the service of peace which Russell underlines. My proposal ventures to comprehend the total spiritual life of European nations and to fashion it into a unity. An international cultural interchange would take place such as Europe has never known before. All levels of the educational system would sooner or later be included, and thus the universities would not be the sole beneficiaries of a common or-

ganization. Gradually secondary and elementary education—indeed, the intellectual life of the community as a whole—would be enriched. The organized cultural community would create the atmosphere in which a common European spirit could flourish. It is not difficult to see that in such a world even textbooks would have a place and logic of their own and would cease to be merely texts superficially and artificially arranged by special agents. The textbook question has, of course, a different connotation in Europe than in America. Germans in particular do not have the confidence in the textbook which Americans have and give much more weight to the creative work of the teacher. Hence the provision of new textbooks for Germany could be only one means among many for the reconstruction of the schools.

It is to be hoped that the proposal put forward here will not be regarded as the dream of an impractical idealist; for I am convinced that all talk about international reconciliation, about the prevention of future wars—indeed, about the re-education of Germany—is utopian unless it goes hand in hand with the development of a common European outlook upon life. Certain areas of intellectual inquiry already have developed into more intimate co-operation than others. An interchange exists in medicine, chemistry, and physics which extends beyond the boundaries of Europe; but in matters of education, in the humanities, the social and political sciences, and the history of the arts mutual exchange still leaves much to be desired. One need only examine the citations in scientific and educational publications of the world to be convinced of the limited perspective of scholars.

But, more specifically, if Germany could gradually atone in the cultural sphere for what she has lost through her own responsibility in the political sphere, then the concreteness of the cultural unity of Europe could have great attractive power for the younger generation. German youth would have a new goal which could eventually make up for their disillusionment, the loss of a fool's paradise of inflated hopes. Every step toward the re-education of Germany depends upon the inner assent of youth to the educational ideals. Whatever discontent, inertia,

and pointless regret over days gone by remain to the older generation can be overcome by the intellectual concord of the younger generation in and through the spiritual community of nations. Education would then no longer look backward toward a dead past but would keep pace with expanding international life. The indefinite isolation of Germany behind the barriers of her own cultural tradition alone could hinder the development of European cultural unity. Only the most unimaginative educators can believe that the longest possible occupation of Germany will facilitate her re-education.

After the war the cry for freedom will sweep over Europe like a storm. The oppressed nations will be more hospitable to the idea of freedom than ever before. Since the German government has mercilessly oppressed neighboring states, it is quite understandable that the desire for revenge should take the suppression of Germany for granted. But such a reaction, however understandable it is, can only aggravate the problem of the re-education of Germany; for the German people, having lived for more than a decade under superhuman terror, will also experience the urge toward freedom. Whatever the terms of the armistice or the conditions of peace may be, it ought to be possible, even in defeat, to give more freedom than they have known under Hitler. What else should bring hope into the German situation if not the prospect of a restoration of the conditions of liberty plus an understanding of the value of that liberty?

It is amazing indeed that so many people in recent years have not adequately appreciated the value of freedom. Germans in particular have often been accused of an almost diseased inclination to obey. But the attitude of people toward political liberties has undergone remarkable fluctuations in other nations too. Even in America, especially in the Middle West, the high praise of freedom that public opinion, the press, and the books of educators take for granted is far from unanimous. This indifference can be explained in part by the fact that man tends to regard what he possesses as self-evident and in part by the fact that many people simply cannot imagine what life under a dictatorship is like. Yet there is more to it than that. Let us not forget

that the idea of democracy, as it originated in English and French philosophy, was an intellectual and literary idea. Freedom of speech and freedom of thought were naturally more congenial to intellectuals than to businessmen, workers, or the illiterate. And in a day of advanced secularism the freedom of worship no longer means what it did during the religious struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, since nobody is imperiled by indifference in matters of faith.

The nineteenth century was dominated by the values of an increasingly powerful middle class, for which intellectual independence and freedom propagated in literature and debate were the arteries of existence. This has completely changed in an era which belongs to the masses. It is important to have no illusions about the fact that among the freedoms now proclaimed, those pertaining to speech, the press, and religion will not be nearly so significant among the masses as the freedom from fear and the freedom from want. Since the worker, the merchant, and the artisan, are less conscious of the freedom of speech in daily life, since many are indifferent to religious questions, these liberties seem merely privileges of intellectuals and of little practical importance. When, then, as in America, sections of the population are openly suspicious of the reliability of the press, the value of this liberty sinks still lower. The average man is not always aware of the fact that the freedom of speech and press really make a free society. If some American educators actually believe that education for democracy has already broadly penetrated the masses, they are deluding themselves. The significance of freedom will perhaps be most vitally appreciated after the war by those who have learned through bitter experience what the loss of it means.

In this respect the prospects for the future of Germany are not so dark as many Americans think. The fact still remains that, even before Hitler, daily economic distress had threatened to obscure intellectual interests. The economic crisis which early overtook Germany was instrumental in aligning three-quarters of the electorate with parties of Socialist leanings. Hitler could not have taken power if he had not strongly emphasized Socialist principles in his election campaigns. The

middle and lower middle classes, distraught as they were, fell completely for this deception. Only the workers remained loyal to the socialism expressed in the Social Democratic or the Communist parties. It seems to me that socialism will undoubtedly have decisive drawing power in Germany after the war. Indeed, the whole world is tending toward a more socialized ordering of life and society: England shows all the signs of this development, and the great military success of Russia can only hasten and strengthen it. A land as impoverished as Germany will be will move more strongly in the direction of socialism than other countries. The Nazis, moreover, have made so much of a pretense of socialism, glossing over its sham in their program, that new political appeals will be at a disadvantage from the first—particularly among the youth—unless they are unmistakably convincing in their claim to meet social needs and demands. Democracy in Germany, therefore, will have to have a strongly socialized character if it is to become permanently rooted.

This brings us to a problem of utmost importance for education after the war. The issue is how the democratic and the Socialist conceptions can be correlated. This was the tragic failure of the first Republic. I think it is not accidental that in recent years this problem has particularly engaged the attention of scholars of German extraction. Dr. Joseph A. Schumpeter, formerly professor of economics in the University at Bonn and now teaching at Harvard, has published a penetrating discussion which traces the fluctuations in the relations between socialism and democracy during the last one hundred years.⁶ But in his analysis of the future possibilities of an integration of democratic and Socialist ideas, Schumpeter treats the democratic idea in a purely formalistic way. He sees democracy in the last analysis as only "a political method," the theoretical background of which he instructively analyzes; and he concludes that there is no necessary connection between democracy and socialism. Both can exist independently of each other, though they need not do so. The question of whether capitalism or socialism is more salutary for mankind is said to be unanswerable. Himself a child of capitalism, Schumpeter believes that the fu-

ture belongs to socialism, which will take different forms in different countries.

A still profounder analysis has been undertaken by Karl Mannheim.⁷ The problem is how the Socialist tendencies of the future can contribute to the further development of the possibilities inherent in democracy. Mannheim's thesis is that most nations—England, the United States, France, Russia, and Italy—are moving in the direction of a "planned society." Hence importance attaches to what he calls "militant democracy"; for otherwise the great new technical discoveries will inexorably further the "minority rule," which has already wrought so much havoc in humanity under fascism. "A new military technique allows a much greater concentration of power in the hands of a few than did the technique of any previous period. The depressing experiences of Germany have taught us that a dictatorship can govern against the will of even a large majority of the population. The reason is that the techniques of revolution lag far behind the techniques of government." The concentration of power, however, is not only military; by telephone, telegraph, and airplane similarly concentration is possible in government and in administration. Under such conditions a planned organization of democracy is the only alternative to dictatorship.

The phenomenon of national socialism proves that planning is inescapable. The democracies will have to fight against fascism even after the war; for fascism lives not only in Italy or Germany. But the survival of democracy depends upon the elimination of the disharmonies which currently afflict it; it can no longer be content with an attitude of *laissez faire*. The chaos of contradictory values in the philosophy of life and in the philosophies of states cannot permanently continue—an integration must be achieved. Mannheim sees this integration neither in fascism nor in communism but in what he calls "a new pattern"—a third way, in which the planned society does not surrender freedom and initiative, because they are the guaranties of culture and humanity. Consequently, "social reconstruction" is the watchword of the coming age.

And just here, according to Mannheim, is the responsibility of youth. The oncoming generation will supply the dynamics.

In Germany least of all will the destructive vitalities of Hitlerism be overcome by the static presentation of the idea of democracy. This is exactly the reason why democracy has been and is threatened in countries of established democratic tradition: democracy has become static. With the vigorous co-operation of youth, a society must be fashioned which never loses sight of its unifying purpose and which exercises a deliberate but democratic control over economic and cultural matters. Freedom can be defined only in harmony with the democratically expressed will of the community. But it *must be* so defined. Freedom, too, can be planned. This means that a socialized economy is the requisite for a revived and intensified appreciation of the spiritual freedoms which are so prominent in democratic education.

It is self-evident that this emphasis upon Socialist thinking and its importance for the reorganization of democracy has nothing to do with party slogans. Socialism, once proclaimed by Marx with prophetic fascination, has many habitations and many possibilities of actualization. But after the war the Socialist idea will come to the surface in Europe with elemental vitality and will captivate the younger generation. This idea will have to be incorporated within the total organization of life. And in Germany particularly, it will constitute a counter-pressure which, if rightly used and guided, could sweep away the remains of the dynamics of nazism.

How shall this Socialist trend be expressed in German education? The first Republic was dominated by the individualism of the nineteenth century, which was gradually overshadowed by nationalistic collectivism. The "fatherland" was a kind of sacrament which took on religious meaning in the wake of a growing secularism. The younger generation was inoculated with this collective feeling. Consequently, Germany was unable to find a middle ground between an exaggerated individualism and a social feeling based upon freedom in daily life and commerce. The new education must dispose of this dilemma by training for voluntary social effort within the community. It will be the more successful, the more it can draw upon the pattern of life in the Western nations. To be sure, the social problem has not been

solved, either in France or in England or in the United States; but it is a fact that, on the surface at least, the feeling and the responsibility for community are stronger in America, France, and England than they ever were in Germany.

Obviously the Anglo-Saxon appreciation of social life is possible only at the price of a certain spiritual mediocrity which does not satisfy the German need for self-communication and heavy intellectual intercourse. This is not said arrogantly but in a desire to analyze and understand. Contrariwise, German thoroughness, with its exaggerated individualism, its marked sentimentality, its inclination toward the abstract, has no prospect of providing the necessary equipment for the future struggle for existence. Consequently, German education will have to give more vigorous emphasis to social attitudes than heretofore; and this new social education must aim to develop free persons who find their self-fulfilment in social intercourse. A social solidarity must emerge which is dominated by the will neither of an individual nor of a minority but rather is based upon the rights of others and a voluntary accommodation to the community. Only in this way can Germany overcome her isolation and find the way to freedom.

I believe that after the war the world will be ripe for the kind of ideal herein proposed for Germany. One cannot educate against the stream. If my conception of the future is false, then this educational ideal is false too. Historical development, however, seems to point toward the ideal which has been described. Therefore, education toward this ideal could hasten the transformation of Europe and safeguard it against aberrations and regressions.

The cultural rebirth of Europe has been defined in terms of the democratic, federative, and social character of the education of the future. But this education must also be Christian. Mannheim raises the question of whether the revival of democracy can be promoted by the power of religious institutions.⁸ We shall attempt to answer this question by exploring the significance of Christianity for a new Europe. Europe, like America, is still in the midst of the widespread process of secularization which began with the Renaissance, was interrupted by the Ref-

ormation, and continued subterraneously until it gradually absorbed the substance of the Christian faith in the Enlightenment and the liberal movements of the nineteenth century. The Christian churches, above all the Protestant churches, during the nineteenth century were not in the vanguard of social movements; at best there was a loose co-operation. The secularization of intellectual and social life has gone so far that today the world is faced by the alternative either of abandoning the Christian background of culture or of restoring the relation between culture and the Christian faith. Secularism is on the verge of the complete elimination of Christianity as a spiritual factor in the modern world. Christianity would undoubtedly live on and revive in a new form. The Nazis have shown an extraordinarily instinctive grasp of this situation, far more penetrating, indeed, than that displayed during the last decades by the Christian churches themselves. Hitler was able to introduce his pseudo-religion, with its mystical passion for blood, its fanaticism and narcissism, only because the ground was prepared for it by the fact that the German masses were no longer rooted in Christianity.

However, the systematic persecution of Christianity in Germany, both direct and indirect, has provoked a countermovement. The experience of the war, the reverses in Russia, and the activity of the ecumenical movement herald a new spiritual direction. This is more than a matter of increased church membership, important as that may be. What is at stake is the complex issue as to whether social and cultural life shall be independent of Christianity or fashioned under its influence. In the spiritual chaos created by the war Christianity has an opportunity seldom accorded it in history except in periods of particular fulfilment.

Since the beginning of this century, the great teachers of Christian ethics have recognized that the traditional social doctrines of the church were no longer wholly adequate to the economic and cultural situation. The distinguished German theologian, Ernst Troeltsch, asked as early as 1910 for "new thoughts which have not yet been thought"; and J. H. Oldham has recently renewed the request. "Those who believe that a

'return to Christianity' is the clue to our problem must face the task of recreating Christianity before they can use it as a foundation on which to rebuild the world."⁹ Thus the churches themselves are beginning to see that the rebirth of Christianity is inseparable from a Christian ethic revised so as to take account of the main stream of social life, which will be significantly different after the war. The martyrdom now being endured by the Christian churches in Denmark, Germany, Holland, Norway, and elsewhere could be the prelude to the kind of purification required for new life.

The question remains, of course, as to how far the Christian churches are in a position to make the Christian ethic relevant to the social development of a new world. To what extent is the Christian ideal of life static and consequently limited in its application to this world? As everyone knows, this question has been variously answered by the church at different times. The external connections between the churches and the nations do not yet give any clue to the relations between Christianity and the new forms of public life. There can be no doubt, however, that a Christian view of society, however it might be defined, can no longer be imposed upon the world. The re-establishment of a "Christian state" would really be a dream and, in my opinion, a dream of dubious worth. I agree with the recent declaration of the late Archbishop of Canterbury that "theologians could undertake the task of showing that Christianity enables us to "make sense" of the world with the meaning "show that it *is* sense." We must still claim that Christianity enables us to "make sense" of the world with the more liberal and radical meaning of making into sense what, till it is transformed, is largely nonsense—a disordered chaos waiting to be reduced to order as the Spirit of God gives it shape."¹⁰ But the Archbishop adds that the church must never again be allowed voluntarily to withdraw from the social struggles of the world. Thus, the church will be unable either clerically to impose its social principles upon the forms of society or to surrender, as Christian theologians have sometimes recommended."¹¹

The question about the nature of the influence to be exerted by the churches upon civilization cannot be answered in terms

of a restoration of the unity between church and society which has been increasingly dissipated since the Renaissance. It seems to me noteworthy that the hopes for such a restoration are much more current among American than among European theologians.¹² Theologians like Emil Brunner and W. Visser 'tHooft are correct when they insist that the belief in the continuing upward advance of civilization has been a deception of which Europe ought to be cured after the extraordinary retrogressions which have followed upon the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century confidence in progress. Over against the fictitious conception of a "Christian civilization"—a "corpus Christianum"—Brunner and Visser 'tHooft envisage the aim of the "corpus Christi" according to which the church takes the responsibility for what its members do in the world but has no illusions about society. The church tries in this way to influence civilization indirectly, it calls attention to the Christian truth for the world, it points out the direction to be taken, but it does not try to impose its teaching upon the world. According to this view, every attempt to create new, so-called "Christian" nations is beside the point. But the mission of the church is not thereby restricted; its aims and tasks are rather more clearly defined than has sometimes been the case in the past. The church retains its responsibility for the evangelization of the world but is not drawn into the maelstrom of political and commercial affairs. Indeed, history has demonstrated that it is not good for the church or the world when the church uses worldly power as an instrument of Christianization. The Christian churches will not make an impression upon Europe by identifying the civilization of the future with the Kingdom of God.

Furthermore, the task of the church cannot be the elaboration of a rigorous scheme of positive and negative Christian moral doctrine. Protestantism, at any rate, will not be able to proceed in this way in Germany; for, according to Protestant teaching, so long as man is involved in the created world he is also involved in sin; therefore, no Christian social order in this world is possible. But the Christian, by virtue of his faith, lives in constant struggle against the sinful condition of things in the world.

The Christian who is justified by faith has a place in every world order; for he knows that he does not act as he ought to act according to God's Word, but he believes in the grace of God which includes his justification and deliverance. The Christian lives in the midst of the struggle which sin is compelled to wage against itself and also in the eschatological tension by which he envisages another, and a perfect, world.¹³

This means that a Protestant ethic, in contradistinction to a Catholic, Thomistic ethic, needs no sterile scheme of regulations which must be harmonized with the existing order of things in the world. A Protestant ethic remains an ethic of attitude and is so profoundly conceived as to be called upon to provide new decisions upon ethical situations in every age and time. Obviously, the case is different for Catholicism. Catholic ethics, with the church's sense for the institutional character of society, have made a considerable contribution to social order. The ethical concreteness of the Catholic church is in some respects easier to understand in a secularized world than are Protestant ethics. Germany, however, is only one-third Catholic. Therefore, the relations between the German people and Christianity will be established less in terms of an ethical system of sterile prescriptions and demands than in terms of a continuing search for a fresh and relevant understanding of Christian duty. If the ethics of Protestantism were to establish a system of Christian moral teaching which set up principles for every instance of public life, they would depart from the gospel revelation and seek to penetrate the veil which God Himself has drawn before the human gaze.

These considerations have been purposely pursued because they indicate the great possibilities, as well as the limits which are set, for Christian teaching and the Christian church in the immediate future. I think that for Germany—and perhaps not for Germany only—the socialistic tendencies discussed above must find confirmation and elaboration in a Christian framework, if socialism is not once again to be dominated by a purely worldly utopianism, which would ultimately undermine the strong foundations upon which it rests. If socialism as a cul-

tural movement in Europe remains materialistic and cannot be combined with a theocentric orientation toward the world, its own conception of culture will never be developed.

It would, for instance, be quite impossible to apply secularized conceptions of a Socialist character, as they can be found in the philosophy of Professor John Dewey, to the educational system of Germany or Europe. These conceptions still embody the liberalism of the past epoch and will be unable to provide substantial nourishment for the postwar solution of the cultural crisis. H. Shelton Smith has recently also called attention to the onesidedness of Dewey's view of the influence of Christianity upon American education.¹⁴ If one regards the democratic idea itself as a religious conviction, then, without knowing it, one has succumbed to the same polytheism which has characterized fascism. In the place of a deified race or nation stands a humanitarianism which is also worshiped. It cannot be doubted that such attitudes express the same kind of secularism which has so definitely contributed to the cultural breakdown of Europe.

Thus Christianity and socialism will have to come to terms with each other if the cleavage that has permeated the culture and the point of view toward life in Europe and in Germany is to be bridged. Socialism has fallen into an anticlerical and anti-Christian attitude. But it is almost more serious that the evangelical church in Germany failed to win the confidence of the workers. In this respect Catholicism was much more effective than Protestantism. Speaking purely externally, it was characteristic that even during the Republic the Catholic church and the Centrist party, which for the most part represented it, could collaborate with socialism without adopting its essential claims, whereas the Protestant churches, or at least the church boards, were completely engulfed by conservative and reactionary forces.

Here is the great task of the future. Millions of Christians in Germany look forward to a revival of the churches after the destruction of Hitler. The churches must solve the problem which they were unable to master before 1933. If they could appeal to the workers, the secularism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries would be arrested. Christianity could

then achieve a significance in society unknown since the beginning of the machine age and the industrialization of Germany. Is such a hope merely the idle dream of theologians, a small defending garrison which does not know that it has already been isolated and deserted?

The efforts and achievements of the ecumenical movement indicate a new vitality in Christianity. Not only is the significance of this movement to be found in the mutual understanding among denominations, in confessional agreements, and in the more effective organization of assemblies and pronouncements; but a connection also exists between the German churches and world Christianity which is certain to have an influence upon the cultural and social future of Germany. The representatives of the church in Anglo-Saxon countries are aware of the importance, for the future of the whole Christian church, of the martyrdom of German pastors. They have expressed the hope that this exemplary conduct may so affect Christianity as to give German and European history a completely new direction. Despite all trials and setbacks, the confessional church in Germany has been alone in the victorious affirmation of the Christian faith. This is certain to be accorded a respect which the evangelical Christian churches have not always enjoyed. However, the German churches are dependent for the discharge of their new tasks upon the help of the ecumenical movement and of the Anglo-Saxon churches. The repression of Christianity among German youth and officialdom, the complete lack of pastors and of those theologically trained, the financial destruction—all require the exercise of Christian charity.

English piety with its directness and its far stronger feeling for form is more likely to attract the masses than the creative theology of Germany. The abstract incisiveness and metaphysical depth of German theology place it among the most priceless treasures of Christian faith and life. Nevertheless, there may be some truth in the words of an outstanding German scholar in his book about England: "The danger of this lofty religious attitude is obvious. It kills the religiousness of the average man, who is no saint, but will be a faithful soul, if he is not exposed

to the strongest of temptations, if he can have some prop and hold on externals, on social and religious habits, on a good morale, on a strong church."¹⁵ The influence of the church and of Christianity in any case penetrates the daily life of the people more thoroughly in England than on the Continent. If on this account the spirit does not always search "the deep things of God," it nevertheless more readily checks the destructive skepticism which has burdened the cultural life of Germany since the nineteenth century. The English church has, in addition, offered asylum from Hitler to so many German pastors and laymen that the stream of welcome influences upon the churches in Germany can only be deepened.

Christianity must recover once again the sense for the unconditioned over against the distracting and destructive claims of life in this world. Only if the church can act without tyranny and without compromise can it be an indispensable factor in the ethical and cultural life of a new Germany.

But how shall all of this affect the German educational system? I have said that the probable renewal of Christianity can mean neither the realization of an idle dream nor the misuse of ecclesiastical authority for arbitrarily established political ends. The achievements of Christianity in history are not the fruit of organization. Christian influence upon the educational ideal here discussed is justified by the fact that European civilization has grown and developed in a Christian context. Europe and Germany have not been able completely to eliminate the Christian heritage even in a secular age. Hitler's attempt to break with a two-thousand-year tradition has shown itself to be a satanic frivolity upon which the judgment of God has fallen.

The fate of Christianity does not depend, of course, upon whether or not European culture finds the way back to the wells of living water; but European culture would not be capable of reconstruction if its Christian substance were lost. After the cultural eclipse of the last fifteen years, reconstruction requires the restoration of continuity with the sustaining power of historical tradition. The vitalizing, form-giving power of Christianity expresses itself in new ways in every generation and extends beyond all time. Christianity alone can free Germany com-

pletely from the demons which have obsessed mankind during the last generation. These demons will not be exorcised by destruction alone, because a religious vacuum cannot give rise to healing powers.

Therefore the educational system cannot remain indifferent to Christianity in the hour of Germany's reconstruction. The relations which are to be renewed must assume the separation between church and state inaugurated by the first Republic. They should start from the tradition which allowed religious instruction to be carried on in the schools. Everyone who seeks the interrelation between Christianity and culture envisaged by this discussion must be guaranteed instruction in the Christian faith by way of the educational system of the state.

It is easy to set up an educational ideal in a period of quiet progress; but for the future of a chaotic time a new ideal of education is a risk, a leap into the dark. There is, of course, always another prospect for Germany. This is a complete break with the central European tradition with which German culture has been integrated for fifteen hundred years. If history should take this turn, Germany would certainly be separated from Western civilization. I do not know whether the Western powers have entered the war in order to accomplish the final destruction and elimination of the aggressor; but it seems to me that they have not taken up arms in order to lead the land of the Reformation into the orbit of Eastern culture.

If Germany is to recover her true cultural mission again, only one way is open: this is inclusion in a European, social, and Christian world order. The agony of defeat will arouse the German people from the coma into which it has sunk. Through this agony the German soul will find the way back to contrition, humility, and the wealth of religious faith which is associated with the names of Luther and Bach. And perhaps, through all of this, Germany might learn to pray more inwardly with Augustine: "Where, then, did I find Thee that I might learn Thee?"

THE STRATEGY OF REBIRTH

THE CULTURAL PLURALISM OF THE FIRST REPUBLIC, which ultimately paved the way for Hitler's rise to power, is a thing of the past. Hitler himself set out to destroy this pluralism because he recognized that it would prevent the systematic de-spiritualization of the German people. The reasons for a certain caution about unification on the part of the Republic are no longer relevant today. Nobody will wish to start from the situation as it was in 1914. Catholic circles will scarcely continue to regard this cultural pluralism as a necessary guaranty of their own existence, and the autonomous aspirations of the separate states have been crushed by the mechanical unity of Nazi rule. An age of the telephone, the radio, and the airplane will no longer set store by the racial and territorial differentiations which seemed to justify the multiple minutiae of educational administration. Their perpetuation could only rupture once more the inner cultural unity of Germany and thus create new confusion and new unrest in the world.

The contemplated reform of education can, of course, not employ the methods of national socialism. Vansittartists forget all too easily that their confidence in the commando education of the German people presupposes exactly the same educational procedures as those adopted by the Nazis. Education for democracy is education for freedom.

The first and most difficult problem of every educational reform is the problem of teaching personnel. Only in so far as the right people are available can a reform be undertaken with prospects of success. We have seen what obstacles confronted

the first Republic. These obstacles have to some extent now been removed, since Hitler has crushed prerogative and privilege in a thousand ways so that personal professional rights scarcely even exist. His own solemn oath was the signal for the violation of the constitution; he brutally eliminated millions by fire and sword. There has been no legality in Germany for many a day; thus no one appointed by Hitler can claim any professional rights. It is self-evident that all teaching appointments under the Nazis must be scrutinized and all teachers required to give exact proof of their personal reliability. The countless instructors of proved unreliability must be dismissed, regardless of the social and economic consequences. The real difficulties in the way of this procedure will not come from party members, who have no claim to consideration, but will arise in the many cases of persons who half-heartedly followed the Nazis or could not be thoroughly checked. Events in Italy clearly show this to be so.

In Germany personal policies will be most critically tested when applied to the elementary school. Suppressed for decades by reactionary authorities and thus frequently driven into opposition to the government, the elementary-school teacher became the spoiled child of the Republic. For the first time elementary-school teachers received full recognition; indeed, they often exercised political influence beyond their capacities as so-called experts in educational affairs. But the affection of the Republic was unrequited. The elementary-school teachers were among the first to succumb to Hitler. It is obvious, however, that no new elementary school can emerge under teachers carried over from such a past. No teachers must be so intimately a part of the people as those in the elementary school. The elementary-school reforms described in chapter iv were particularly commendable because they sought to develop a personnel whose human understanding should equal or even exceed its intellectual capacities. But the life of the Republic was so short that only a little of what it attempted could mature, and then all was lost in the Nazi storm. Thus the urgent question is whether, under the distraught conditions of the elementary-school system after Hitler's fall, the problem can be taken up where it remained upon the collapse of the Republic. I do not think so. It is

not a matter of the intellectual achievements of the elementary school, which have often enough been recognized abroad. The issue is much more one of the spirit, of personalities who could create an atmosphere in which the completely altered aims of public education could be furthered. If Germany is to be cleansed once and for all of militarism, of blind obedience to authority, of intellectual inflexibility, of the deadening effects of spiritual goose-stepping, the beginning must be made in the elementary school. If this does not happen, there is no prospect of re-education.

The different sociological structure of the elementary school in America may perhaps shed light upon the German way ahead. It is well known that the American elementary schools—indeed, even the secondary schools—are staffed more completely by women teachers than is the case in any other country. Eighty per cent of the teachers in the elementary and secondary schools of America are women. The number is even higher—about 90 per cent—if the elementary schools are taken separately. There are those who regard this circumstance as a not unmixed blessing: they point to insecurity of tenure, the lower salaries, the frontier tradition, as concomitant factors in the situation. Elementary-school appointments are said to be only transitional for young women anticipating marriage. The complaint is made that salaries are such as to make it impossible for a married man to be an elementary-school teacher. And some even detect a certain feminism in the schools, owing to the preponderance of women teachers. But all of this does not go to the root of the matter. If the American people were really dissatisfied with the elementary school, if they had come to the conclusion that women teachers were harmful, they would long since have altered the situation. The American experience is that, all in all, the elementary school has fared very well under feminine leadership, so well indeed that Americans take it for granted that children will be taught by women. What the American woman has achieved in the kindergarten is recognized on all sides. And in the secondary schools women teachers have also proved equal to their tasks.

When we turn to the situation of the elementary school in

Germany, it is at once clear that so many dismissals will be necessary that an immediate shortage of teachers will result. The elementary school ought not to be intrusted any longer to that unhappy middle class which presided over it during the last century. The alternative seems to point to the desirability of intrusting it more widely to women. There have always been women teachers in Germany, and they have taught in the elementary as well as in the secondary schools; but they were definitely in the minority and taught mostly girls. What, then, would follow from my proposal? Undoubtedly it would mean a departure from the inherited tradition; but it is exactly that which in this case is essential for the German people. Indeed, a new and milder spirit would permeate the elementary school; military influence would definitely be a thing of the past.¹ The dissatisfaction and suspicion which so often inspired the teachers and spoiled the atmosphere might then also become a thing of the past. A wholly different environment would be created.

American experience shows that the younger generation is not weakened by such an environment. Indeed, psychologists are rather agreed that the shock of starting in at school is lessened when the first teachers are women, since the child has been largely under a woman's care since birth. Also, women tend to understand and sympathize more with young children than do most men. If the preparation of teachers is kept on the highest possible level, the German elementary school would be set toward a new future, freed from all the unhappy experiences which have overshadowed it for a century and a half. Moreover, such a break with the educational tradition would also be a good thing sociologically. Where women have equality, democratic tendencies prevail. Germany before Hitler did not lag behind other countries in the position accorded to women; in fact, in many respects, Germany had granted rights to women earlier than Anglo-Saxon countries had. Deprived by Hitler of many vocational opportunities, women would be more easily won over to new developments because they would offer greater opportunities. There is, moreover, no danger that the employment problem for men would be aggravated. The shortage of

teachers will be too acute. Accelerated study will help to some extent. But those women teachers who have been deprived of their profession by Hitler could step into the breach which cannot be filled by men because of military losses and the interruption of basic professional training. The corporal—the type of man who always wants to be in a better position than he is capable of filling—would disappear from the elementary school. And this would be a blessing for German education and the German people. All the more could the feminine influence upon early youth be constructive. Empathy, flexibility, and lightness of touch—attributes not conspicuous in the German character—are more native to women than to men. And who would deny that the moral courage and ethical sensitivity which in the past have not always come into their own in German education could be awakened and strengthened under the influence of women teachers?

Earlier chapters have distinguished between mental training and the collecting of information in relation to the widening of perspective and the development of character. Mental training need not be discussed further; for German education has always excelled in this, and, whatever may be said against overspecialization and intellectualism, it cannot be denied that their fruits have equaled, if not surpassed, those of other countries. There are no illiterates in Germany. The problem of elementary education has nothing to do with the “three R’s.” Nor does the training for practical life need to be improved. Manual training was introduced during the Republic and has since become so important that even Hitler did not try to alter it. But what the German elementary school will require immediately after the war is a completely altered historical orientation, a new anthropological point of view, and a social and ethical redirection. The feeling for law, which has atrophied to a terrifying extent, must be revived. But no matter how well-intentioned the instruction offered by representatives of foreign countries may be, it cannot achieve this fundamental re-education, because the emotions aroused by a century-old national tradition cannot be weakened merely by instruction. A conversion is necessary, and conver-

sion depends upon the mutual confidence of teachers and pupils.

A current case in point is supplied by the doctrine of race. The assertion that the German people have always been thoroughly anti-Semitic contradicts the facts: Germany has been no more and no less anti-Semitic than other nations. German writers have favored and opposed anti-Semitism with native bluntness. And during the nineteenth century a distinction was always evident between the official position and the general popular attitude. No German government took the responsibility for an anti-Semitic policy, and public officials were concerned to uphold the equal rights of the Jews who had enjoyed the privileges of citizenship for a century. Bismarck recommended Jews for important positions, and the emperors included Jews among their intimate advisers. The fact that social equality (*gesellschaftliche Gleichberechtigung*), which is often more important than civil equality, developed only gradually depends upon special historical factors. As for the general popular attitude, the comparison between Germany and other nations in the period before Hitler is even more favorable to Germany. There was much less covert anti-Semitism than in other countries. Subtle economic boycott and instinctive and economically motivated prejudices were not more rife in Germany than elsewhere. Moreover, America and Switzerland prove that, to date, the democracies have been unable to overcome anti-Semitism.

German youth, fanatically inoculated for more than a decade with anti-Semitism, has no direct perspective which could lead unaided to a new point of view. The whole population must be dehypnotized, and public enlightenment on a large scale must be inaugurated. Since untainted German anthropologists are few in number, the widespread popular errors must be initially discredited with the help of foreign scholars. The doctrine of race—no special subject of instruction before the Nazis—will now have to be deliberately counteracted until the harm of Hitler's psychopathic influence has been overcome.

A fundamentally different conception of man must be intro-

duced to the German people on all educational levels. The war has undoubtedly dulled the feeling for humanity all over the world. Experience shows that all countries will become aware of this misfortune as the armies return. The callousness brought to the surface by the war must be softened by a different evaluation of human life and human dignity. But owing to the Nazi sickness it will be particularly difficult to introduce new political and social principles into the German schools. Simple moralisms will easily arouse the resentment of the younger generation, so that the aims of instruction will have to be adapted to the juvenile mind. Thus a heavy responsibility rests upon education and upon those who will have to make the initial preparation for such teaching. The cultivation of a sense for realities, for what is possible and impossible, will require utmost patience after a decade of isolation and political megalomania. The cause and the meaning of the defeat must be made clear both to German youth and to the nation as a whole.

This does not mean that a nation can be permanently suppressed in sackcloth and ashes. It will not be possible continually to tell the new generation that their fathers were responsible for what has come to pass. This was the spirit which tempted youth to regard the older generation as impotent and guilty and, with juvenile frivolity, to disregard its own responsibility for the future of the nation. What German education needs is the kind of training which fosters the appraisal of world affairs with utmost sobriety and accuracy.

In a day when the educational system will require strong centralization if changes are to be effected, the secondary-school reforms established by the Republic will have to be simplified. Those reforms were inspired, as we have seen, by a thoroughly liberal point of view. They were a reaction against the same education offered to every German regardless of his individual aptitudes and his future occupation. The hope was that this would at least build character. But the differentiations in secondary education involved greater financial resources than the nation could provide. This will be no less true for the predictable future. But, more than that, preservation of the four types of secondary schools would disregard the fact that the spiritual

situation in Germany and in the world has meanwhile changed completely.

The Oberschule did not justify its existence. It violated the fundamental educational principle that man does not develop apart from the struggle with what is strange and different. Moreover, the humanistic Gymnasium, which for decades dominated the whole intellectual life of Germany, will no longer be of decisive importance. The problems faced by this type of school after the first World War have already been dealt with; but there can be no doubt that the course of events of the last decades has essentially aggravated these problems. Many a humanist may well regret that the aesthetic optimism of classicism is no longer relevant to the brutal realities of the machine age. But the horrible experiences through which men have passed since 1914 permit no further illusions. The humanistic Gymnasium can be only a side issue in the educational system of the future. As in England, so in Germany, the aristocrats of the spirit should be made to live in the reflected glory of antiquity.

The humanistic secondary school can offer the opportunity for training along lines of special interest and thus do a more effective work than has previously been the case. But the vast majority of the population needs other food. I do not overlook the fact that a complete repudiation of the classical spirit in education involves a break with the German tradition. But such a break has long been prepared for, and only the tenacity and inertia of tradition have delayed it. It would, of course, be fatal if the connection of European and German education with the classical tradition should be severed. The spiritual tie between classicism and the European languages prevents a complete separation. But the humanistic Gymnasium is not the only route to classical education. There is another way. This is the education in the liberal arts, about which more will be said in connection with the universities.

If classical education were to be reserved for those with theoretical interests and capacities, this would not mean that education had turned pragmatic. It has been noted that American pragmatism is out of line with the German tradition. Nevertheless, a touch of pragmatism could be salutary for German

education. The secondary school of the future must take account of the dominance of social ideals after the war. The masses returning in numbers from the battlefields usually incline toward radical measures. One thinks at once of the Russian system of education which, though still in its early stages, has broken new ground in establishing its secondary schools. "In no branch of education," Kandel writes, "has the Soviet regime so completely broken with tradition as in what is usually termed secondary education."² The secondary school, in the judgment of the Kremlin, had been too traditional: it led the student away from work and from life, and it was an instrument for the perpetuation of class distinction, which served only to widen the breach between the so-called educated people and the workers. Thus the secondary school under the Soviet government acquired a totally different character. It was to be the continuation of the work school and to guarantee the unity of the educational system.

Nothing was to be taught in the secondary school pertaining to the so-called *études des intéressés*; for this would be a return to the discarded liberal secondary school of central and western Europe. The secondary school of the Soviets had to serve the social, political, and economic ideology of communism in conformity with Marxian teaching. Central and western Europe will scarcely follow this example as long as democratic ideas determine European political systems. Russian development has always followed a separate pattern. The great difference between the Eastern form of Russian education and the new Western forms, is that, in the West, tendentious teaching cannot meet the new demands and that the single idea of *work* is no substitute for the cultural heritage which the western and central European nations must incorporate within the cosmos of their pedagogical conceptions.

Educational literature bearing upon the matter of social education in secondary schools has in recent years given attention to the question of how far the study of the social sciences could be usefully undertaken. Robert Ulich speaks about the great advantage which these studies could have because they can be related to immediately acute problems.³ They should offer a

"unity in variety," a synthesis in which the explanation of political, social, and intellectual history could be more easily grasped. However, there are reservations against placing the social sciences in the center of the secondary school. In the first place, there is some doubt as to whether an intellectual discipline combined with such studies can even approximate what was formerly achieved by instruction in the humanities. A second reservation is that students could become involved too early in complex problems which even the most experienced understanding has not been able to master.

Such studies place the emphasis upon the present, upon an ever changing situation, upon what Spencer has called "the action of circumstances upon man." All educators accept as axiomatic the fact that culture cannot be produced solely from without and does not consist of the possession of information but of a creative point of view. Hence the substantial extension of knowledge alone does not achieve very much. The social conception of education could be realized as little by the study of the social sciences alone as the humanistic conception could have been furthered by permitting students to learn the rules of aesthetics and the laws of ethics. As sociology is still widely studied, it often leads to a relativism which adds observation to observation, theory to theory, or to a close imitation of the method of the natural sciences, which substitutes a spiritually enervating use of empirical standards of measurement for the hardly won knowledge of higher truth. This is particularly true of the German secondary school because sociology is a much younger discipline in Germany than in America. The social sciences have not been sufficiently widespread in Germany as to command the public recognition essential to an appraisal of the educational content of these studies in secondary schools.

In an earlier chapter the efforts to bring about a closer relation between the German secondary school and the reality of modern life were examined. These efforts were focused in the so-called "realistic education." The Republic divided this kind of education into two courses of study: the first was centered upon western European languages and culture, the second upon the natural sciences and mathematics. With the best of will, this

education was unable to penetrate the paper wall of formalized learning and communicate a really living content. Nevertheless, German secondary education must be realistic in a wholly new sense.

Education is on the threshold of a new world in which what the Russians have begun and English educators have taken up will be extended. The Russians were trying to establish what Marx called "polytechnical education." Technical education, said Marx, is an "education which inculcates the general principles of all the processes of production and at the same time gives the child or youth practical training in the use of the simplest tools of all trades." The Russian schools include under polytechnical education "a general understanding of the major processes of production and distribution and at the same time experience in practical work with machines and in all kinds of enterprise." The Russian example will have to be modified in other countries; but the technical perspective has acquired such an extraordinary importance for modern life that no educational system can ignore it.

Outstanding professors in Germany struggled during the twenties to formulate a conception of education based on the spirit of techniques, and people spoke of a "technical humanism." What was meant was a spiritualization of techniques so that the cultural value of technical thinking and technical work would be as significant as practical information and experience. England is also wrestling with such ideas; and it seems to me unusually interesting that Sir Cyril Norwood, the president of St. John's College in Oxford, predicts a great new development of technical education in England.⁴ The future organization of the secondary schools of Germany must somehow take account of these realistic tendencies. It is superfluous to offer a detailed plan of curriculums and types of schools; this cannot be done until the German situation has more definitely clarified.

As in the case of the elementary school, a new anthropology must find a place in instruction; but, in addition, the curriculum of the secondary school must be enlarged to include several specific areas of study. A certain grasp of the principles and procedures of economics is essential to counteract a tradition of too

abstract thinking and to further the understanding of an industrial society. More systematic attention must also be given to the knowledge of foreign countries. Geography and languages have always been studied, but the new emphasis must fall upon the living conditions of other peoples. In this connection the facilities for international student exchange must be greatly expanded and include the secondary schools. German youth would benefit especially thereby, since it has lost the possibility of viewing the responsibilities and the resources of Germany in the light of a world community.

This leads us to the most important new area of secondary education. It has to do with the development of a democratic attitude. What the first Republic attempted but failed to achieve must be renewed with maximum intensity and skill. As it is, the time will be long before the Machiavellian poison of nazism can be expunged from the minds of the German people. Legal instruction must therefore be joined to instruction in political ethics. The secondary school can go much further toward the creation of a new feeling for law than can the elementary school.

In the face of the variety of new and old problems it will not be easy to safeguard the unity of the secondary school. Since the secondary school will also provide education for the masses, curricular and vocational problems cannot be separated. An overcrowding of professions is certain to follow the raising of the general educational level of the population. America has been able to evade this problem so far; but a surplus in the professions would seriously imperil the future of Germany. We have already seen that this academic surplus was the pivotal point of Hitler's rise to power. Nothing could be more ominous than that Germany should again have to wrestle with an academic proletariat as a center of disaffection. War casualties may defer the difficulties for a little, but the problem is certain to emerge unless it can be faced and mitigated in time. The danger will be the more probable, since Germany will have no army with which to absorb a portion of the younger generation. Only the co-operative efforts of educational and economic administrative agencies will be able to solve this problem.

Since other countries may face a similar situation, the com-

mon counsel of an international cultural organization would be desirable and promising. The regulation of academic employment will henceforth be a necessary and important phase of educational administration. German governments before Hitler have always hesitated to adopt a so-called "number clause." Such a regulation seemed to contradict the long-standing liberal tradition of German education, for free enterprise was the rule even in the professions. But the experiences of the past show that the moderate regulation of professional employment, far from hampering democracy, can act only to the advantage of democratic order.

The secondary schools prepare for such a variety of vocations that in all probability no regulation will be necessary; but the case is different with the universities. Precisely because of their surplus population they became the breeding places of national socialism. The number of students attending universities and technical schools will have to be fixed for definite periods according to a sliding scale. The regulatory procedure will have to take account of the need for pastors, physicians, lawyers, teachers, and scientists by a realistic appraisal of the total economic situation of the nation. Such an arrangement will also make for a higher degree of selectivity and enable only qualified persons to enter the professions. In Germany during the twenties attempts of this sort aroused hostility because people were convinced adherents of academic *laissez faire*. Today, after all that has happened since 1933, nobody would dissent. Other countries, too, are moving in a similar direction. Commenting upon the future of the universities of Cambridge and London, Sir Cyril Norwood declares that Cambridge and Oxford cannot be expanded. He writes that "it would be a sorry return for the destruction of their unique quality if the only result were the production of a large number of academic 'intellectuals' of second class standard, who would find it hard to obtain employment and a living wage";⁵ and he points to the danger inherent in intellectual overproduction for the future of the world.

In Germany, however, the previous oversupply of intellectuals was connected with a phenomenon of which those who prophetically anticipated the coming cultural crisis were aware.

Nietzsche was one of the few who saw that the production of second-rate intellectuals could diminish the respect for culture among the people; but his voice was either misunderstood or ignored by his contemporaries. The cultural nihilism of the Nazi decade with its mob contempt of the things of the spirit increased in direct proportion to the number of second- and third-rate intellectuals. Intellectual mediocrity on a large scale has always paved the way for the cynical distrust of the mind; and there can be no doubt that the German system unwittingly encouraged second-rate intellectual work. University standards were very high, and those who met them became outstanding in their professions; but the same standards and the same curriculum were applied to those who could not measure up. Consequently, the mediocre were in pursuit of an ideal which lay beyond them. Since they could not reach it, they imitated the élite on a lower level. Intellectual sterility and pedantry, preoccupation with the insignificant, and routinized instruction, were the result. Thus there appeared the tedious, heavy-footed, overcautious academic craftsman, "whose greedy hands for hidden treasure grope, and who is glad when any worm appears."⁶

The weakness of such a system is brought to light by comparison with the totally different organization of education in America. Here expectations are set in terms of the average. The German system could provide an élite with a uniquely excellent education; but the emphasis upon this kind of education was carried to extremes. Its standards were falsely applied to the average, with the result that they were forced into a fruitless scheme. Such a vain course must be avoided in the future at all costs. The introduction of the number clause will help toward this end. Moreover, the differentiation between those who are highly gifted and the rest ought to be made earlier than formerly; for only in this way can the gulf between effort and achievement be bridged. I think that the German student should also have the opportunity to determine his vocation sooner than has hitherto been the case. The standards of secondary education could be lowered a little, especially if this education were open to all the people. I propose, therefore, the broadening of

the center of the pyramidal structure of the educational system while at the same time narrowing the top. This means a shortening of the time spent in the secondary school. I believe that the shortening of the time spent in the secondary school, on the one hand, and the extension of the normal course of education beyond the elementary school, on the other, leave the way open for a middle course whereby the benefits of education could be systematically distributed. Such a course may well follow the pattern of the American college.

The introduction of the college into Germany would mean a fundamental change in the educational system, but it offers educational and economic advantages which would necessarily accrue also to the political situation. Graduation from the secondary school would occur two years earlier than formerly. The transition from general education to the so-called professional education of the universities would no longer be so abrupt. The level of public education would be considerably higher but not quite so high as that formerly achieved by the secondary schools. Finally, the college would come in the middle, between general and professional education. This procedure, so self-evident in America, would be revolutionary in Germany.

Those American educators who have been working for the dissolution of the college may find this proposal somewhat anachronistic. But in my opinion, the college is unusually well adapted to bridge the gap between professional and general cultural training. The student, moreover, is in a position to decide two years later what kind of an occupation he shall follow. This alone is a great advantage. A certain separation between general education, with its aims of culture and character building, and purely professional education, if carefully and perspicaciously conceived, can only accrue to the well-being of developing young people. The tempo of modern life and the struggle for existence have scarcely made this possible in German education, although the original plan of the university contemplated it. Immediately upon leaving the secondary school, the student was, as we have seen, too forcefully urged to do research, which for the most part he never intended to do and in any case could not maintain in his later life.

The years between seventeen and twenty-one are, on the whole, the most critical years in the intellectual development of youth. The college includes the period between seventeen and twenty-one as a unit. Here young students not only make the transition from one school to another but have access to guidance and study until the difficulties of maturing are overcome. The student who can make his vocational decision at twenty-one and not at eighteen, as it used to be in Germany, and who has meanwhile experienced the group life of a dormitory can make his decision responsibly. It is not yet too late for him to turn from an intellectual occupation, since the alteration of his plans is still an open matter. I think that the division and distribution of the academic course into undergraduate and postgraduate work could prevent many of the factors which threatened the general cultural situation in Germany and which will still be a danger after the war if they are not dealt with in time. Precisely on this account, an intensive effort must be made to establish the college more purely as an institution devoted to the service of culture and not of vocation.

In the new German college those values which had been denied to German education by the limitations of the humanistic Gymnasium would be retrieved in another form. Liberal-arts education is "reflective in approach"; it develops mind and spirit without being bound to the stuff of instruction; it is primarily concerned about the human being and not about the extension of knowledge; and it is devoted to the search for truth and is not satisfied with practical expedients for getting along in the world. Liberal education follows Plato's principle that the only worth-while education is philosophical in the sense that it seeks to disclose the unity amid the variety of the studies pursued. Liberal education tries to correlate the separate branches of learning with the purpose of education as a whole so as to give meaning and importance to the life of the spirit and thus prepare the way for a point of view toward life according to which self-awareness and self-control are the highest goods.

It is plain that such a conception of liberal education can be fruitful only if it is not introduced too early. The classical Gym-

nasium in Germany could no longer fulfil its mission because the students were, on the whole, too young to appreciate the nature and value of the spirit of antiquity. If education in the liberal arts comes between a school directed toward concrete life-situations and the professional training of graduate schools, it has found its proper place. Such a college should find students mature enough to reflect upon the higher values of existence so that the foundation could be laid for a more inward world view. I do not wish to go so far as to share the well-intentioned judgment of some that democracy and education in the liberal arts are interdependent. Plato and Aristotle, the great forebears of reflective humanity, were not democrats, and history has shown that education in the liberal arts can be carried on under monarchical governments. The task confronting Germany, however, is the incorporation of the idea of democracy in a liberal-arts education.

The introduction of the college into Germany is especially to be recommended on two further grounds. Germans are intrinsically more abstractly reflective than other peoples: they are continually asking not only about "what" and "how" but also about "why," and they are not so facile in the daily routine of life as the English are. This inclination toward preoccupation with the abstract, toward flight into the metaphysical stratosphere, may be criticized, but it cannot be eradicated. Consequently, Germany will require such a direction of education as will be able to regulate the urge toward the transcendent and protect it against exaggeration. Liberal-arts education can do precisely this. But the other ground for introducing the college is the fact that the idea of education in the liberal arts was insufficiently applied by the German universities during the last half-century. Universities increasingly became graduate schools. The idea of liberal education persisted in the philosophical faculties, especially in the humanities, political science, and languages, and in the theological faculties, but most certainly not in medicine, law, and some of the natural sciences. The medieval conception of a *facultas artium liberalium*, which underlies the college, was increasingly dissipated by specialization and professional preparation.

In one respect, however, the introduction of the college into Germany could have an important political consequence. At long last a sound basis for the community life of German students would be available. The shortcomings in this respect due to the lack of dormitory facilities in the universities have been alluded to. The fraternities, which Hitler forcibly dissolved because he feared the revival of conservatism, quite one-sidedly embodied the traditions of special classes of the population. They became, as we have seen, foci of nationalistic intolerance and dominated the life of the universities out of all proportion to their minority position. Politics in the first Republic were severely damaged by this situation. The fraternities are now dead, destroyed by Hitler after holding the stirrup for him. Moreover, Hitler's collapse will also mean the end of the Hitler Youth groups. The problem will be to prevent the organization of youth as a spearhead of political sabotage. This is a problem which must not be underestimated; for the peril of a continuing underground movement is not slight. One thinks at once of the possibility of establishing democratic youth groups. But this cannot be done because such societies contain the hidden seed of opposition and because the purposes of such societies sooner or later shift.

The new German state has every reason to learn from the past—it must not again organize its own opposition. After the experience of the first Republic the victors will not trust organized activities of youth. It would, of course, be highly desirable to lead the mystical ecstasy and the pathological enthusiasm of German youth into new channels and to transform them. Thereby a new outlet would be provided for the activities and impulses that have misled German youth. However, this could be risked only if a universal democratic movement of European youth, of which German youth could be a part, were to come into being. But at this moment it seems rather unlikely that youth of other European countries would associate with German youth. Thus an alternative must be found for the community life of the oncoming generation. The pattern is at hand in the dormitory life of Anglo-Saxon countries. In this way community life could be made vital, while at the same time

political problems could be kept in the background. The dormitories would seek to create a community exclusively devoted to common daily needs and duties, to common aspirations toward learning and character. Such an arrangement presupposes that the German student body is committed to the fundamental principles of the government. A democratic state could not once again tolerate political antagonism in the universities without undermining its own existence. Political agitators who set out to trap the students and drive a wedge between them and the government must not be allowed to play their wicked game again. The community of teachers and students in the colleges and universities must grow so solidly that the atmosphere of mutual confidence cannot be disturbed from without. Students who attend the university in the forenoon, only to return to private life or to a society which is devoted to undermining the government, will not be responsible citizens of the new Germany.

Consider how German youth will return from the war—bitterly disappointed, humiliated, robbed of the hopes which had been dangled before its eyes, still partly caught in the madness artificially developed by Nazi education! The conditions of peace will aggravate the economic situation to the utmost. Possibilities for emigration will be very limited, and the probable reduction of German territory will further diminish occupational opportunities. As in other countries, many returning soldiers will be able to resume normal life only gradually.

How may these difficulties be overcome? The answer depends upon the measure of freedom which the new government can permit during the first years. It would be incredibly shortsighted to believe that a government, after an era of the wildest treachery, conspiracy, and sycophancy, of lawlessness and suspicion, could restore all political liberties at one stroke. It will be said that exactly for this reason a long period of occupation seems desirable, and such an occupation, especially if it includes the whole nation, will certainly prevent chaos. Necessary as it is, I doubt whether it can solve a single problem. There is talk about a cooling-off period. But the Italian experience shows that occupation can take effective prohibitive measures which

do not, however, reduce the difficulties of reconstruction. We have seen that teachers and students in the German universities before Hitler possessed a freedom certainly not surpassed by any other nation on earth. Those who have seen how this freedom was most insolently misused for violence against teachers and how the majority of professors disdainfully surrendered it will certainly not countenance a demand for the immediate restoration of the academic privileges which existed before 1933. German professors, who shortly before had insisted loud and long upon the rights and privileges granted by the government, have shamefully aided the Hitler regime in burying academic freedom—indeed, have even glorified its demise.

No! Among German professors there have not been many heroes and martyrs of the spirit. Some justified their attitude by declaring that resistance would have been useless. That is true; but in history everything depends upon the way one meets one's fate. Compared with the confessional church, the difference is plain. The situation of German professors would be quite different today if history could record the heroic resistance of the universities. Lukewarmness, passivity, and self-interest were decisive even among those who inwardly repudiated national socialism. Only a small number of professors came to the defense of the freedom of the spirit. Under these circumstances the universities can scarcely appear as the harbingers of academic freedom after Hitler's fall. The new democracy should grant them no special privileges. It will bestow upon all citizens and institutions the same measure of liberty on the condition that such liberty will be used in support of, and not in contempt of, the state. After the last twelve years, there is no ground for according German universities more rights than those enjoyed by universities in other democratic states. The freedom of the German universities must be won anew. As Goethe put it:

Yes! to this thought I hold unswerving,
To wisdom's final fruit, profoundly true:
Of freedom and of life he only is deserving
Who every day must conquer them anew.

The question of the extension of academic freedom ought to be raised only after the universities have been reformed in body

and soul. Until then they will have to be integrated with the total educational organization of the state; for the government will need every possible guaranty against political misuse. Years will be required to prove the unexcelled political faithfulness of teachers and students. Toward this end the common life in the universities will be of great importance. The indispensable condition will be the unquestioned loyalty of professors to the new democratic state, and this should be the decisive criterion for academic selection. After the historical continuity of the German spirit has been re-established, all who have counterfeited learning by laying a "philosophical" foundation for National Socialist half-education have outlived their academic usefulness. The appointment of younger teachers, over which pre-Nazi German governments have scarcely had any influence at all, should now be regulated by the state. Moreover, the discipline of students, which had eluded the monarchy and wrought havoc in the Republic, should no longer be administered without the co-operation of the state. The new democracy, regardless of the number of regulations, would always be much more liberal than Hitler who enslaved the universities. The government will certainly not need to infringe upon the freedom of research, so long as professors do not misuse this freedom for tactless political sabotage. The restitution of confidence abroad in the sense of responsibility of the German professor will take much time; for national socialism has brought things to such a pass that even the achievements of German scholars are no longer accorded the respect which they deserve.

The future task of scholarship in Germany cannot be overestimated; for how else than through learning and art shall the restoration of cultural community among the nations be hastened? Here is undoubtedly one of the best chances for Germany to recover the respect abroad which has been compromised by the guilt of her rulers. If the German scholar understands the signs of the times, if he does not continue his isolation in self-righteous stubbornness, he will be able to make a decisive contribution to the health of the nation and to renew its moral prestige.

The common life of the universities also depends upon the

loyalty of students. If a specific group of students should again oppose the state, the educational administration must find a way to increase the number of students committed to the government. Only a large-scale organization of grants-in-aid can guarantee that at long last all those whose capacities and political attitude qualify them have access to the universities. All countries anticipate an expansion of stipends. The exponents of the college in America admit that its existence is bound up with the opportunity for every qualified applicant to secure a college education. Germany will have to recognize that financial provisions toward this end are more important than anything else. Such a scheme should begin with the secondary schools and influence the selection of candidates for study in the universities. The qualifications for higher learning should be loyalty to the democratic government, intellectual proficiency and conscientiousness, moral reliability, and a sense of social responsibility.

The strategy of rebirth which we have been pursuing could not be directed toward all phases of future educational policies. At some points it will seem that the recommendations made are not directly connected with the urgent task of the political re-education of Germany. But even though some proposals are theoretical, they nevertheless affect the regeneration of the German spirit.

Two considerations remain which do not, to be sure, concern the training of youth but do have a bearing upon educational policies. It has been noted that the government will scarcely be able to reach those between perhaps twenty-five and fifty years of age by way of the schools. What can be done to fill this gap? Those who are government officials will need a new orientation. The first Republic experimented with training periods for public administrators; but these periods tended to be regarded as a kind of holiday. The reorientation of officials under the second Republic will have to proceed more systematically; participation must be mandatory, and promotion must be dependent upon achievement. Only in this way could the new government hope by and by for a thoroughly reliable officialdom. Such a program would not be merely a *donum superadditum* but would be as important a branch of the educational system as the schools

and universities. Such advanced training must, however, also be obligatory for public professions like law and medicine, engineering and political economy, which often supplied the nuclei of opposition to the first Republic. The difficult situation of the second Republic will be enough to justify the requirement of a special certification of the diplomas of those who entered these professions under Hitler. The certification of public professional practice should, in the case of all who began under the Nazis, be dependent upon the successful completion of courses in democratic theory.

But the second consideration has to do with informing the German people about the past. I do not mean the organization of another propaganda machine in the manner of Hitler and Goebbels; I mean, rather, the broadest possible systematic instruction designed to heal the German people of intellectual isolation and spiritual blindness. Foreigners can scarcely imagine the virtual imprisonment in which the whole population has lived for years. Countless Germans have extremely meager information about what has been going on both inside their country and abroad. Many exemplary citizens have withdrawn from public life during the Nazi rule and have pursued their ways with utmost reticence. No German outside the party or the ranking bureaucracy or the General Staff could get a picture of events. The press, the radio, and other means of communication were corrupted, and public opinion was systematically deceived. As long as listening to foreign broadcasts was permitted, gaps in the news could be filled, at least accidentally. For example, the message of President Roosevelt to Hitler during the Munich Conference was withheld from the German people and only those who, like the author, accidentally heard the Italian radio could welcome this news. Later, listening to foreign broadcasts was strictly forbidden. In short, the information of the German people is so fragmentary that it will take a long time to supply what is lacking.

The average German will find it very difficult to believe the truth. Accustomed to think politically in a rather disconnected fashion, he has not been in a position to appraise events in sequence and to discern the line of cause and effect. He lived from one stormy moment to another. Hitler deliberately exploited

this situation; hence the average German, unable to comprehend the total course of events, succumbed completely to apocalyptic enthusiasm which excluded ordinary conceptions of time and space. Thus maximum human effort will be required for the instruction of the German people. In an article written in December, 1943, Vladimir Hurban, the Czechoslovakian envoy to Washington, said that "instead of seizing the Nazi books and burning them—which is the accepted Nazi procedure—the books should be left in the hands of German youth. In opening their eyes by presenting to them truthfully the record and deeds of the Nazi regime, the Nazi books will be the most effective testimony to the betrayal of German youth. I do not deny that such an undertaking will take time, great patience, and wisdom, but I firmly believe that the German problem can be solved only if and when the Germans themselves honestly reach the conviction that aggression and self-willed supremacy do not pay in the long run."⁷

The means are at hand to bring the German people to this conviction. Hitler's speeches must be broadcast again and again along with the facts; his declarations must be compared with the results. The writings of German scholars in support of national socialism must be held up to ridicule. In season and out of season the German people must be informed about the reign of terror. Martyrs to the anti-Nazi cause must be honored. As soon as possible a documentary history of the Nazi era must be written, and the period should be unsparingly exposed in the school books. Publishing in all its phases has been so corrupted by the Nazis as to require for a time at least the supervision of the new government. Incredible and hitherto unknown facts will be uncovered. The institutes established by Hitler for racial and National Socialist "research" should be turned to the service of democracy. Germany, indeed the whole world, is entitled to the unvarnished truth. The Allies have a vested interest in the fact that the German people understand the conditions of the peace even though they find them bitter. The health of Germany and the stability of Europe depend upon this work of enlightenment.

But the restoration of the sober truth and the destruction of illusions must not be the final goal of reconstruction. The Germans have an uncommonly strong urge for political recognition—

they like to live in the respect and admiration of other nations. The exaggerated nationalism of the last decade was undoubtedly a compensation for the protracted denial of this recognition. Allied statesmen will have to keep the psychological effects of a prolonged outlawing of Germany clearly in mind. It is not humanly possible so to anticipate all future political alignments as to guarantee the indefinite subjugation of any nation on earth; but German statesmen, too, must take account of psychological factors. Therefore, I include what I should like to call the "symbolism of political life" among the problems of public education. Democracy rests primarily upon rational foundations. But even the established democracies have understood how to appeal to the senses and the irrational impulses of their people. The first Republic did not understand, as we have said, how to make the life of the state and its ceremonies attractive. Democracies like Switzerland and France have always known how to arouse the joy of citizens in public pronouncements and policies. French democracy was certainly not weakened by the possibility of awarding the medal of the Legion of Honor. Germany needs the adornment of public life even more than other nations. If the new state desires to take root in the difficult situation confronting it, it must not repeat the fatal errors of the previous Republic. Political symbols are undoubtedly also educational, for they make an impression on youth; but they must not be received and revered with the bombast of the Nazis or the romantic enthusiasm of "shining armor." They must acquire the kind of self-evident simplicity so remarkable in the national celebrations of Switzerland.

Let me emphasize in conclusion what is really at stake in the re-education of Germany. Germany can be driven by economic and political measures into decades of hopelessness and lethargy for any independent ordering of her life. In this event, all proposals for the constructive cultural development of the German people are utterly superfluous. The re-education of Germany could then be pursued only as a colonial policy. And there would still be the question of whose colony Germany would be. A common administration of education by the United Nations would be impossible. A choice would have to be made between the Anglo-

Saxon and the Russian educational systems. In either case, Germany would be conformed to the educational colonizing power.

Military occupation will make less of a contribution to the educational problem than some enthusiasts imagine. A protracted occupation may be necessary; but the solution of the educational problem would thereby be delayed. One could scarcely wish to replace the onetime Prussian noncommissioned officer of the elementary school by American, English, or Russian duplicates; for no educator can sit indefinitely on a bayonet. Such a system would certainly provoke a passionate underground movement and a passive resistance which could only be fatal for the future. It is, moreover, illusory to suppose that a system could be set up by which the occupying power could issue general directions behind the scenes which would then be carried out by willing German educators. The educator who seems to be under the influence of the occupying authorities will sooner or later be completely discredited by his own people; and Germany would associate education for democracy with military occupation for all time to come. Constructive work can be certain of success only if the victors are moved by mercy instead of by force in cultural and spiritual matters and if sufficient confidence is extended to those Germans who are willing to devote themselves with all their energies to the democratic reconstruction of the educational system. Without the hope and the conviction that Germany has her own resources of rebirth this book would never have been written.

The insanity and criminality of Hitler and his gangsters have dragged Germany into an abyss. Things have happened which cannot be atoned for. How can it be otherwise than that the passion of subjugated nations and individuals for revenge should send the cry for retribution echoing around the world! But the statesmen for whom history reserves immortal praise have never surrendered to the moment. They have been guided by a spirit of universality which does not give way to fleeting human passions, but rather transcends the contemporary events of one or two generations. Germany is not the only nation in history which has forgotten itself and lost its honor. There have also been historical moments in England, France, Italy, Russia,

and Spain in which the dignity of man has been obscured. Those whom blind hatred and historical myopia lead into a contempt for every German as such are not so far removed in spirit from the anti-Semitic demonry of fascism which has bedeviled the world. They have only partly understood the events of the last decade in Europe and in Germany. The German people has suffered from a severe spiritual sickness which cannot be healed by outlawry and punishment. I think that a nation which by twelve hundred years of cultural tradition has enriched the world with Meister Eckhart, Luther, Dürer, Bach, Händel, Leibniz, Kant, Haydn, Mozart, Goethe, Schiller, Hegel, Beethoven, Schubert, Schumann, Brahms, Wagner, has certainly a right to be judged by other criteria than the span of twelve humiliating years. If Germany should disappear from the earth, her cultural achievements in philosophy and science, in poetry and music, would be transfigured like those of ancient Greece.

The Lord God was prepared to spare Sodom and Gomorrah if only ten righteous could be found. What man among us would venture, however, to declare that he is righteous? "There is none righteous, no not one." Germany will be able to walk the way of purification only by herself discovering, once again, the riches of her heritage and by undertaking the restoration and elaboration of her culture. As Lot fled from Sodom, the angel of the Lord called out to him: *Salva animam tuam! noli respicere post tergum!* ("Deliver your soul and do not look back!") The way of purification lies ahead; but it must lead to a European community in which freedom, equality, and brotherhood inspire and control the nations.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

FOREWORD

1. Jacob Burckhardt, *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*, ed. R. Marx (Leipzig), p. 181.
2. Gustav Freytag, *Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit*, Vol. III (Leipzig, 1887).

CHAPTER I

1. General Friedrich von Bernhardi wrote *Our Cavalry in War* (2d ed.; Moritz, 1903) and *Germany and the Next War*, translated by A. H. Powles (pop. ed.; Longmans, 1914).
2. Walter Rathenau gives a vivid account of this contempt of the spirit among the ruling classes of old Germany in his book entitled *To German Youth* (Berlin, 1918).
3. G. W. F. Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History*, ed. J. Loewenberg (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. 397; cf. also Franz Rosenzweig, *Hegel und der Staat* (Munich, 1920), pp. 166, 224 f.
4. I. L. Kandel, *Comparative Education* (Boston, 1933).
5. The reforms introduced into Germany after the severe defeat of Prussia by Napoleon at Jena in 1806 were political and cultural. They led to the elimination of serfdom and the inauguration of compulsory education. The founding of the University of Berlin in 1810 was part of the program of cultural reform initiated by Wilhelm von Humboldt. Napoleon fell only five years later.

CHAPTER II

1. Friedrich Meinecke, *Die Entstehung des Historismus* (Berlin, 1936), II, 632 ff.

CHAPTER III

1. See below, pp. 44.
2. The struggle between Bismarck and the Catholic church after the war of 1870 extended over half a generation. It is this struggle to which the term "Kulturkampf" refers. The term itself was coined by the distinguished pathologist, Virchow, in order to emphasize the fact that the real issue concerned the decision between two opposing cultural ideals, the one Protestant, the other Roman Catholic.
3. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York, 1926).
4. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
5. The "Karlsbad Resolutions" were drawn up by the governments of the German states in 1819 upon the request of the Austrian chancellor, Metternich. They were directed against the German universities, whose rights were being delimited. The student movement which had precipitated such measures was committed to the idea of German unification and was strongly nationalist but also had democratic leanings. The German princes felt themselves threatened by the anti-dynastic aims of the students. Metternich, who really inspired the "Karlsbad Resolutions," fought against the universities because he regarded them as the spearhead of the liberal revolution.

6. Until 1933, Germany had had no national or Reich Ministry of Education. Every state had had its independent administration of cultural affairs, although the size of Prussia naturally gave to its policies a commanding influence over other states. The small secretariat for cultural affairs attached to the Department of the Interior of the Reich, referred to above, had no significant incumbents. It operated mainly as an instrument of mediation, safeguarding and facilitating the relations between the educational administrations of the several states. See also above, p. 31.

7. Carl Heinrich Becker, *Kulturpolitische Aufgaben des Reichs* (Leipzig, 1919).

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 2 and 13.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

10. See above, n. 2.

11. Becker, *op. cit.*, pp. 36, 46, 48.

12. The German National party was the conservative party with monarchist leanings. Hindenburg stood nearest to this group in his political sympathies. It was this party which facilitated Hitler's accession to power, since he did not have a majority of votes cast in the last legal election of the first German Republic. Hitler was able to form a government only because the "German National party" entered a coalition. As a reward, Hitler very soon eliminated the members of this party from the government.

CHAPTER IV

1. For a fuller discussion of the secondary-school reforms of the first German Republic see Hans Richert, *Richtlinien für die Lehrpläne der höheren Schulen Preussens* (Berlin, 1931); and Carl Heinrich Becker, *Secondary Education and Teacher Training in Germany* (New York, 1931).

CHAPTER VI

1. Carl Heinrich Becker, *Gedanken zur Hochschulreform* (Berlin, 1920).

2. See below, chap. x, p. 198.

3. It is important to bear in mind that such a faculty of liberal arts was to be a part of the university and is thus to be distinguished from the liberal-arts college which is proposed in chap. x.

4. Ernst Troeltsch, *Der Historismus und seine Probleme* (*Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. III) (Tübingen, 1922).

5. Cf. especially the volumes, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik* (3d ed.; Halle, 1927); *Vom Umsturz der Werte* (Leipzig, 1919); *Vom Ewigen im Menschen* (Leipzig, 1921); *Die Wissenschaftsformen und die Gesellschaft* (Leipzig, 1926).

6. Quoted in Friedrich Meinecke, *Die Entstehung des Historismus* (Berlin, 1936), pp. 632 ff.

7. Every professor had the right to present his demands to the Ministry of Education in person. He was not obliged to submit them in writing, as was the case for other officials and for teachers in the elementary and secondary schools.

8. Friedrich Schiller, "Worte des Glaubens," Stanza IV.

9. The Brothers Grimm who founded the science of German grammar and collected the well-known *Fairy Tales* belonged to the "Göttingen Seven." Seven Göttingen professors vigorously protested against the king of Hanover because he had violated the constitution. They were dismissed from their positions and since then have been looked upon as martyrs in the cause of political and academic freedom.

10. Paul Tillich, *The Religious Situation*, trans. H. Richard Niebuhr (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1932), pp. 116 and 114.

11. See especially the writings of the German educator, G. J. Kerschensteiner, who is well known in America; his *The Idea of the Industrial School* (New York, 1913) is particularly instructive in this connection.

12. The Dresden Student Aid Society was directed by Reinhold Schairer, whose initiative and zeal are evident in all the publications of the society.

13. Hermann Pongs, "Vom Naturalismus bis zur neuen Sachlichkeit," in *Auflriss der deutschen Literaturgeschichte*, ed. H. A. Korff and H. Linden (Leipzig and Berlin, 1931), p. 198.

CHAPTER VII

1. I. L. Kandel, *The End of an Era* (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1941), p. 51.

2. Quoted by Kandel (*ibid.*, p. 35).

3. *Ibid.*, p. 104.

4. John Dewey, *Education Today*, ed. Joseph Ratner (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1940), pp. 357-58.

5. John Dewey, *Experience and Education* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1938), p. 113.

6. Dewey, *Education Today*, p. 311.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 336.

8. Kandel, *op. cit.*, p. 380.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 296.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 302.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 160.

12. Abraham Flexner, *Universities: American, English, and German* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 305.

13. Robert Ulich, *Fundamentals of Democratic Education* (New York: American Book Co., 1937), p. 129.

14. Dewey, *Education Today*, pp. 47 ff.

15. Flexner, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

16. Dewey, *Education Today*, p. 90.

17. Norman Foerster, *Humanism and America* (New York, 1930).

18. R. M. Hutchins, *The Higher Learning in America* (5th printing; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940); also *Education for Freedom* (Louisiana State University Press, 1943).

19. Hutchins, *The Higher Learning in America*, p. 65.

20. Ulich, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

CHAPTER VIII

1. Harold Callendar, *A Preface to Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1944).

2. The discussion of the possibility of a permanent peace has recently been enriched by a book by Mortimer Adler, *How To Think about War and Peace* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1944). Professor Adler deals with the problem ontologically and comes to the conclusion "that a lasting world peace will be made, but not in our time; and therefore, that we can expect more wars, even world wars, in the interim" (p. 281). The consequence is the demand that "all those who are in any way responsible for the education of others should employ education as a prime instrument for effecting the mental, moral, and cultural changes prerequisite to peace" (p. 281).

Adler's conclusions stand in marked contrast to the well-known thesis of William James that "the believers in war as a divinely ordained necessity of the race had the better of the argument with the pacifists. The horrors make the fascination. War is the strong life, it is life in extremis" (quoted by Callendar, *op. cit.*, p. 33).

3. Cf. E. H. Carr, *Conditions of Peace* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1942), p. 43: "This potential incongruity appears to have been ignored by the peacemakers of 1919 who were unconscious of any discrepancy or indeed any distinction between the principle of self-determination and the principle of nationality."

4. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

6. Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), 722.

7. I have made this charge against Lord Vansittart precisely because, in my opinion, he has not succeeded in meeting it in his recently published autobiography, *Lessons of My Life* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1943). He tries in this apology for his statecraft to offer an alibi for the politics of appeasement of the Chamberlain period, which was pursued during Vansittart's responsibility for English diplomacy. It permitted the rise of Hitler at a time when he might still have been overthrown and ought to have been overthrown. Vansittart quotes from the private diary which he kept during his term of office as the British undersecretary for foreign affairs. The diary contains mental reservations, the implications of which Vansittart never followed through. Yet he did not offer his resignation. The excuses which he offers fatefully resemble the accusations which were justifiably made against officialdom in Germany: German officialdom "obeyed even though of a different mind" or it "covered up the worst" because friends requested it.

The paradoxical exaggerations and prejudices of the book are not made clearer and more convincing by the mixture of superstition, sarcasm, and charm through which they are expressed. Vansittart writes: "The school textbooks in use under the Republic without Republicans were as 'vindictive' as under the Kaiser" (p. 27). "I cannot recall that any Peace Prize went to a German" (p. 161). "It brought to Stresemann, annexionist and admirer of Frederick the Great, the Nobel Prize" (p. 247). Are these the utterances of a statesman with a sense for political realities?

On the last page of the book this sentence appears: "It is an utter impossibility to feel for Europe without feeling against Germany." Vansittart is farsighted enough to declare that it would be a "calamity" if England failed to go along with Europe and if she failed to think and feel in European terms. Against Vansittart, I am convinced that a European spirit cannot develop so long as one European nation hates another. Vansittart's book is conclusive proof that the author's thesis is calculated, as no other thesis could, to perpetuate hatred and to make impossible an enduring peace.

8. Callender, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

9. Paul Hagen, *Germany after Hitler* (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1944), pp. 33 f.

10. Reinhold Niebuhr, "The German Problem," *Christianity and Crisis*, IV, No. 10 (January 10, 1944), 2.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

12. Quoted in Wright, *op. cit.*, II, 987.

13. William Temple, *The Hope of a New World* (2d ed.; New York: Student Christian Movement Press, 1943), p. 40.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

15. Hagen, *op. cit.*, pp. 157 ff.

16. Recent utterances like those of the former undersecretary of state, Mr. Sumner Welles, in his very interesting book (cf. Sumner Welles, *The Time for Decision* [New York, 1944]) belong in this category. It can only be noted that the attempt to eliminate Prussianism by drawing lines on a map is singularly innocent of the course of recent history and of the changed relations between geography and power in a technical society. Such proposals are, in the last analysis, political and cultural cartography and cannot lead to an enduring peace.

17. Visser 'tHooft, "Notes on the European Situation," *Christianity and Crisis*, III, No. 21 (December 13, 1943), 3.

18. Jacob Burckhardt, *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*, ed. Marx (Leipzig), p. 187.

19. Paul Hagen, *Will Germany Crack? A Factual Report on Germany* (New York, 1942), pp. 247 ff.

CHAPTER IX

1. Walter M. Kotschnig, *Unemployment in the Learned Professions* (London: Oxford University Press, 1937).

2. Lord Vansittart in *Newsweek* (October 9, 1944, p. 107) writes: "I have no hope, nor has any other wise European, of re-educating the present generation of German savages. We can, however, prevent them from contaminating the younger generation, and hope to 'catch it young.' It is on the very young that our hopes and efforts must be concentrated, while time pushes up and out the generation above. This is one of the many reasons why the occupation of Germany must needs be prolonged." At the same time Vansittart wants the Allies (apparently the Americans, British, and Russians) to "supervise German re-education not positively but negatively, to ensure and enforce, what the Germans shall *not* teach each other." The task is very simple. It concerns only the future generation, which will be tamed and educated to democratic ideas in the midst of the captivity of the generations above. I take it that the occupation would have to last at least thirty years. For otherwise there would not be a majority of those educated according to Vansittart's negative precepts, which could outvote the remainder of the German savages.

3. Henry M. Wriston, "Higher Education in the Present and the Post War Period," *Educational Yearbook*, ed. I. L. Kandel (New York, 1943), p. 200.

4. Walter M. Kotschnig, *Slaves Need No Leaders* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1943), p. 256.

5. Bertrand Russell, "Proposals for an International University," *Fortnightly Review*, July, 1942, pp. 16-18.

6. Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1942). About the German Republic, Schumpeter says: "It is true that in 1918 the Social Democratic party of Germany had a choice, that it decided for democracy, and (if this is a proof of democratic faith) that it put down the communists with ruthless energy" (p. 239).

7. Cf. Karl Mannheim, *The Diagnosis of Our Time* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 3, 4, 9, 13.

8. Mannheim, *Ibid.*, 141.

9. Quoted by E. H. Carr, *Conditions of Peace* (New York, 1942), p. 120.

10. William Temple, "What Christians Stand For in a Secular World," *Christianity and Crisis*, XIV, No. 1 (February 7, 1944), 2 ff.

11. European Lutheranism has always been much more willing to surrender than either Calvinism or Roman Catholicism.

12. Cf. the instructive account of the matter by John Bennett in *Christendom*, Vol. IX, No. 2 (1944).

13. Cf. on this point the unusually clarifying and illuminating article, "Toward a Protestant Analysis of the Ethical Problem," by Paul Lehmann in *Journal of Religion*, Vol. XXIV, No. 1 (January, 1944).

14. H. Shelton Smith, *Faith and Nurture* (New York, 1941).

15. Wilhelm Dibelius, *England* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1930), p. 403.

CHAPTER X

1. This suggestion is made in spite of Lord Vansittart's assertion (in *Newsweek*, October 9, 1944, p. 107) that the reintroduction of conscription by Hitler "was hailed with as great enthusiasm by German women as by German men." Vansittart's generalization is exactly as superficial as his emphasis on Hitler's boasting statement: "I have found my most fanatical supporters among women." Vansittart is apparently not aware of the neurotic basis of Hitler's relation to women. Hitler's statement is as reliable as all of his other assertions.

2. I. L. Kandel, *Comparative Education* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1933), 780.
3. Robert Ulich, *Fundamentals of Democratic Education* (New York: American Book Co., 1937), pp. 207 f.
4. Sir Cyril Norwood, "The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge," in *Educational Yearbook*, ed. I. L. Kandel (New York, 1943), pp. 50 ff.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
6. Goethe, *Faust*, trans. G. M. Priest (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941), Part I, l. 604.
7. Vladimir Hurban, "The Winning of the Peace," in *Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors*, XXIX, No. 5 (December, 1943), 636.

ADDITIONAL REFERENCES

- CRIPPEN, H. R. *Germany: A Selfportrait: A Collection of German Writings from 1914-1943*. Edited with an Introduction and Chronicle. London, 1944.
- CROCE, BENEDETTO. *Germany and Europe*. Translated by V. SHEEAN. New York, 1944.
- HEIMANN, E. *Communism, Fascism, or Democracy*. New York, 1938.
- HERMENS, F. A. *The Tyrants' War and the Peoples' Peace*. Chicago, 1944.
- KUHN, H. *Freedom Forgotten and Remembered*. Chapel Hill, 1943.
- LUETKENS, C. *Die deutsche Jugendbewegung: Ein psychologischer Versuch*. Frankfurt a.M., 1925.
- MAN, HENRI DE. *Die Intellektuellen und der Sozialismus*. Jena, 1926.
- THIBAUDET, A. *La République des professeurs*. Paris, 1927.
- ULICH, ROBERT. "Significant Trends in Education during the Republican Era" [in Germany]. In I. L. KANDEL (ed.), *Yearbook for Education*, Vol. XIII. New York, 1936.

INDEX*

-
- Adler, Mortimer (American philosopher), 217
 Allies, 136, 212
 Alsace-Lorraine, 3
 Anti-Fascists, 149, 193, 214
 Anti-Semitism, 74
 Archbishop of Canterbury, 144, 145, 181
 Argentina, 151
 Aristotle (Greek philosopher), 204
 Armistice of 1918, xx
 Augustine, St., 139, 187
 Austria, 74, 140, 158
- Babbitt, Irving (American author), 121
 Bach, J. S. (German composer), 187, 214
 Badoglio (Italian general), 136
 Balkans, 158
 Barth, K. (Swiss theologian), 89
 Bavaria, 99, 146
 Becker, Carl Heinrich (Prussian minister of education), viii, 20, 24, 45, 47, 52, 72, 75, 77, 79, 80, 85, 105, 216
 Beethoven, Ludwig von (German composer), 10, 154, 163, 214
 Belgian constitution, 100
 Bennett, John (American theologian), 219
 Bergius, Fr. (German scientist, Nobel Prize winner), 104
 Bergson, Henri (French philosopher), 170
 Berlin, 50, 67, 77
 Bernhardt, Fr. von (German general and author), 2, 215
 Bethmann-Hollweg, Th. von (German chancellor), 16
 Bismarck, O. von (German chancellor), xvii, 1, 2, 6, 11, 18, 30, 35, 66, 77, 193, 215
- Blücher, G. L. von (German field marshal), 11
 Bolshevism, 148
 Bonn, 21, 33
 Bookkeeping, 120
 Bosch, Carl (German industrialist, Nobel Prize winner), 104
 Boyen, H. von (German general), 5
 Brahms, J. (German composer), 214
 Braunschweig, 24
 Briand, A. (French statesman), 22, 67
 Brüning, H. (German chancellor), 7, 67
 Brunner, Emil (Swiss theologian), 182
 Bülow, B., Prince von (German chancellor), 6
 Bundesrat, 30
 Bunsen, R. (German scientist), 25
 Burckhardt, Jacob (Swiss historian and philosopher), xvii, 148, 215, 218
 Bureau of education and culture, 31
 Butler, Nicholas Murray (president of Columbia University), 163
- Callendar, Harold (American author), 133, 140, 217, 218
 Calvinism, 33, 51, 219
 Carr, E. H. (professor of international politics), 133, 134, 135, 138, 217, 219
 Carthaginian peace, 133
 Catholicism, ix, 19, 26, 31-35, 41, 46, 47, 50, 51, 85, 183, 184, 188, 215, 219
 Chamberlain, N. (English statesman, prime minister), 218
 Chemistry, 173
 China, 130, 131, 136
 Christianity, 97, 144, 145, 156, 167, 179-84, 186
 Church, 22, 23, 26, 27, 34, 48, 49, 172, 181-86, 207; *see also* Protestantism; Catholicism
 Churchill, Winston (English prime minister), 136

* The author wishes to thank Rev. R. Klepper for helping him in making the Index.

- Civil War, 152
 Clausewitz, K. von (German general), 5
 Colleges, 112, 202-5, 209
 Commerce, 117, 120
 "Common system," system of education, 51
 Communism, 19, 26, 132, 150, 176, 196
 Congress of Vienna, 41, 134, 160
 Constitution, national, of the Reich, 31-36, 48, 52, 100
 Crippen, H. R. (American author), 220
 Croce, Benedetto (Italian philosopher), 220
 Crusades, 139
 Curie, Mme (French scientist), 170
 Curtius, E. R. (German author), 9
 Czecho-German boundary, 131
 Czechoslovakia, 134
- Danzig, 131, 134
 Darlan (French admiral), 136
 Darwinism, 112
 Democracy, viii-x, xix, 16, 19, 20, 22, 28, 29, 30, 36-42, 44, 46, 48, 52, 64, 66, 69, 70, 77, 92, 94, 98, 103, 105, 107, 110, 112, 127, 128, 132, 134-38, 144, 146, 147, 153, 154, 157, 163, 164, 166, 167, 175-78, 191, 193, 199, 200, 204, 206-9, 211, 212, 219
 Denmark, 181
 Denominations, 33
 Deutsche Oberschule, 60, 61
 Dewey, John (American educational philosopher), x, 37, 38, 110, 113, 114, 117, 120, 122, 125, 184, 215, 217
 Dialectical theology, 49, 88, 89
 Dibelius, Wilhelm (German author), 219
 Diesel, E. (German author), 9
 Dismemberment of Germany, 146-47
 District of Columbia, 172
 Dresden Student Aid Society, 107, 217
 Dühring, E. (German philosopher), 89
 Dürer, A. (German painter), 214
- Eckhardt, Meister (German mystic), 214
 Education: elementary, reform of, 54-65 (*see also* Schools, elementary); secondary, reform of, 54-65, 216 (*see also* Schools, secondary)
 Educational philosophy, 112, 115
 Ehrlich, P. (German scientist), 5
 Einstein, Albert (German physicist, Nobel Prize winner), 86, 104, 170
 Elmhurst College, x
 Emigrés, 148, 149
 Engineering, 117
 England, 1, 2, 3, 15, 22, 29, 36, 71, 87, 92, 111, 114, 128, 130, 140, 154, 170, 175, 176, 177, 179, 185, 186, 195, 198, 213
 Enlightenment, 41, 156, 160, 161, 165, 168, 180
 Europe, xviii, xxii, 13, 21, 33, 67, 70, 73, 74, 76, 99, 102, 106, 108, 118, 119, 125-31, 134-36, 138, 140, 146, 148, 153, 154, 156, 164, 167-69, 171-73, 178, 179, 182, 184, 186, 187, 195, 196, 205, 211, 214, 218
 European confederation, 153
 Existential philosophy, 88, 112
- Fallersleben, Hoffmann von (German poet), 76
 Fascists, 76, 135, 137, 139, 140, 161, 163, 164, 177, 184, 214
 Federal system, 29
 Fichte, J. G. (German philosopher), 2, 6, 7, 8, 79, 95, 96, 113
 Fischer, Aloys (German educator), 9
 Fischer, Hans (German scientist, Nobel Prize winner), 104
 Flexner, Abraham (American educator), 103, 111, 120, 217
 Foerster, Norman (American author), 121, 217
 Fourteen Points, 138
 France, xx, 3, 15, 22, 29, 36, 68, 71, 80, 131, 133, 134, 137, 140, 142, 148, 158, 175, 177, 179, 212, 213
 Franck, James (German scientist, Nobel Prize winner), 104
 Franco (Spanish dictator), 136
 Frankfurt, 70
 Fraternities, 69, 71, 72, 77, 78, 205
 Frederick II, the Great (king of Prussia), 2, 5, 10, 218
 Frederick William IV (king of Prussia), 6
 Freedom: academic, 99, 100; from fear, 175; of the press, 175; of religion, 175; of speech, 175; from want, 175; of worship, 175
 Freytag, Gustav (German poet), 89, 215

- Gasset, Ortega y (Spanish author), 98
 General Staff, 15, 16, 210
 Geneva, 169, 170
 Geography, 117, 199, 218
 Geology, 95
 George, Stefan (German poet), 4
 German collapse of 1918, 15, 16
 German National Party, 48, 216
 Gibraltar, 136
 Gneisenau, N. von (German general), 5
 Goebbels, J. (Nazi minister), 210
 Goerres, L. (German author), 76
 Goethe, J.W. von, (German poet), 2, 6, 10, 49, 57, 59, 71, 163, 207, 214
 Gomorrah, 214
 Greece, 117, 136, 214
 Grey, Edward (British foreign minister), 1
 Grimm brothers (German authors), 216
 Gymnasium, 25, 51, 59, 159, 195, 203, 204
 Haber, F. (German scientist, Nobel Prize winner), 104
 Haeckel, E. (German scientist), 27
 Händel, G. F. (German composer), 214
 Hagen, Paul (American author), 143, 147, 149, 164, 218
 Haldane, Lord (English statesman), 18
 Hamburg, 21
 Harnack, Adolph (German theologian), 35, 98
 Hauptmann, Gerhart (German poet), 4
 Haydn, J. (German composer), 11, 214
 Hegel (German philosopher), 6, 8, 88, 96, 155, 214, 215
 Heidelberg, 21
 Heimann, E. (American economist and sociologist), 220
 Heine, H. (German poet), 8
 Heisenberg, W. (German scientist, Nobel Prize winner), 86, 104
 Helmholtz, A. von (German physicist), 5, 25
 Herbart, J. F. (German philosopher), 124
 Herder, G. (German philosopher), 88
 Hermens, F. A. (American author), 220
 Hertz, G. (German physicist, Nobel Prize winner), 104
 Hindenburg, P. von (German general, president), 7, 17, 18, 140, 216
 History, 117
 Hitler, A. (German dictator), ix, xiii, xxi, 7, 12, 24, 42, 51, 60, 75-78, 114, 116, 118, 129, 131, 134-42, 146-50, 153, 158, 162, 164-66, 168, 169, 174, 178, 180, 184, 186, 188, 189, 191-93, 199, 200, 205, 207, 208, 210, 211, 216, 218, 219
 Hohenzollern, 70
 Holland, 17, 181
 Home economics, 120
 Hoover, Herbert (president, United States), 142
 Humanism, 50, 56-60, 62, 81, 83, 84, 88, 89, 106, 113, 115-18, 120, 121, 122, 125, 156, 168, 195, 203
 Humanities, 197, 204
 Humboldt, Wilhelm von (German statesman and author), 57, 59, 79, 81, 95, 97, 215
 Hungary, 142
 Hurban, Vladimir (Czechoslovakian envoy to Washington), 211, 220
 Hutchins, Robert Maynard (president, University of Chicago), 121, 217
 Ibsen, H. (Norwegian dramatist), 4
 Idealism, 112, 113, 124, 161
 Individualism, 57, 113, 116
 Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, 169-70
 Instrumentalism, 112
 Intellectualism, 56, 110
 Islam, 21
 Italy, 45, 137, 151, 177, 189, 206, 210, 213
 James, William (American psychologist and philosopher), 217
 Japan, 131, 142
 Jena, 215
 Journalism, 120
 Junkers, xiii, 3
 Kaiser, xvii, 17, 18, 218
 Kaiser Wilhelm Society, 102
 Kandel, I. L. (American educator), 9, 11, 196, 215, 217, 219
 Kant, Immanuel (German philosopher), 2, 6, 7, 8, 160, 165, 214
 "Karlsbad Resolutions," 43, 215
 Kerschensteiner, G. J. (German educator), 216

- Keyserling, Count (German philosopher), 9
 King, James C. (American author), 141
 Kingdom of God, 13, 165, 182
 Koch, Robert (German physician and bacteriologist), 5
 Königsberg, 7
 Kotschnig, Walter M. (American educator), 158-60, 169, 170, 218, 219
 Kremlin, 196
 Kuhn, H. (American author), 220
 Kulturkampf, 35, 46, 85, 215
 "Kulturunterricht," 62, 63

 Languages, 62, 117, 118, 119, 122, 197, 199
 Lassalle, F. (German Socialist), 32
 Latin, 117
 Laval, P. (French politician), 22, 67, 68
 League of Nations, 131, 152, 169, 170, 171
 Lehmann, Paul (professor of biblical history, Wellesley College), xiv, 219
 Lehmann, Timothy (president, Elmhurst College), xv
 Leibniz, G.W. (German philosopher), 113, 214
 Liberal arts, 84, 117, 121, 195, 203, 204, 216
 Liberals, 3, 12, 16, 20, 21, 25, 32, 34, 35, 37, 42, 43, 49, 57, 60, 70, 79, 85, 86, 89, 134, 180, 184, 203, 215
 Liebermann, M. (German painter), 4
 Lippmann, Walter (American author), 136, 137
 Lloyd George (English statesman, prime minister), 40
 London, 171
London Times, 133
 Long, Huey (American politician), xxi
 Lot, 214
 Ludendorff, E. (German general), 17, 18, 65, 146
 Luetkens, C. (German author), 220
 Luther, Martin (German Protestant reformer), 187, 214
 Lutheranism, 27, 33, 51, 219

 Macdonald, R. (English prime minister), 22
 Machiavellianism, 133, 199
 Man, Henri de (Belgian sociologist), 220

 Mannheim, Karl (British sociologist), 177, 179, 219
 Marx, Karl (German Socialist), 8, 19, 21, 106, 196, 198
 Mathematics, 119, 122, 197
 Medicine, 173, 204, 210
 Meinecke, Friedrich (German historian), 19, 215, 216
 Metternich (Austrian prime minister), 43, 96, 215
 Meyerhof (German scientist, Nobel Prize winner), 104
 Militarism (German), xiv, 6, 7, 23, 52, 67, 133, 146, 152, 154, 190, 191
 Millikan, Robert (American scientist), 170
 Ministries: of Education, viii, ix, 20, 23, 24, 42, 43, 48, 52, 64, 76, 94, 216; of Finance, 101, 102, 103; of the Interior, 31, 44, 216
 Moltke, H. von (German field marshal), 5, 11
 Mommsen, Th. (German historian), 5, 25, 85
 Monarchy, xvii, 16, 19, 26, 33, 42, 48, 55, 63, 67, 68, 69, 77, 80, 87, 93, 99, 103, 208, 216
 Mozart, W. A. (German composer), 11, 214
 Münster, 33
 Munich, 24, 140, 146
 Munich Conference, 210
 Murray, Gilbert (British philologist), 170
 Mussolini, Benito (Italian dictator), 129, 142

 Napoleon I (French emperor), xx, xxi, 6, 11, 41, 76, 133, 134, 148, 154, 215
 Napoleon III (French emperor), 3, 11
 National socialism, vii, viii, 12, 17, 72, 74, 75, 98, 188, 208, 211
 Nationalism, 141, 142, 205, 212
 Natural science, 120, 122, 123, 197, 204
 Nazis, xiii, 8, 12, 55, 64, 110, 134, 137, 139-43, 147, 149-52, 163, 165, 176, 178, 180, 188, 189, 194, 201, 210-12
 Negro, 166
 New European order, 153
 Niebuhr, Reinhold (American theologian), 141, 218

- Nietzsche, F. (German philosopher), 4, 28, 84, 107, 161, 201
 Nihilism, 49, 50, 108, 201
 Norway, 181
 Norwood, Sir Cyril (president, St. John's College, Oxford), 198, 200, 219

 Oberrealschule, 58, 60, 195
 Occupation, military, of Germany, 129, 206, 213
 Oldham, J. H. (British theologian), 180

 Pacifism, 12, 21, 67
 Pan-Germanism, 74
 Papen, F. von (German politician), 50, 51
 Paris, 169
 Paulsen, Friedrich (German philosopher and educator), 62, 157
 Peace, vii, xiii, xxii, xxiii, 19, 127, 130-38, 142-45, 174, 206, 217, 218
 Pedagogical academy, 56
 Pediatrics, 95
 Phenomenology, 88
 Philology, 117
 Philosophy, 2, 6, 11, 204, 214
 Physics, 117, 173
 Planck, M. (German physicist, Nobel Prize winner), 86, 104
 Plato (Greek philosopher), 203, 204
 Poland, 131, 136, 137, 147
 Political economy, 117
 Political reconstruction, 150
 Political science, 117, 173
 Pongs, Hermann (German author), 217
 Pope Pius XII, 50
 Positivism, 57, 84, 85, 87, 112, 124
 Potsdam, 6
 Pragmatism, 112, 195
 Prague, 136
 Priest, G. M. (American author), 220
 Professionalism, 90, 121
 Protestantism, ix, 31, 33-35, 46-49, 51, 180, 182-84; *see also* Lutheranism; Calvinism
 Prussia, viii, 8, 9, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 30, 31, 43, 50, 51, 53, 55, 79, 95, 102, 116, 146, 147, 162, 213, 215, 216, 218
 Prussian Advisory Council, 43
 Psychology, experimental, 118
 Ranke (German historian), 5, 19, 25, 85, 87
 Rathenau, Walter (German industrialist and statesman), 215
 Realgymnasium, 58, 60, 122
 Realistic education, 122, 124
 Reformation, 156, 180, 187
 Reich, 1, 30, 36, 48, 77, 146, 147
 Reichsrat, 30
 Reichstag, 1, 30, 35, 42
 Religion, 120
 Religious instruction in the schools, 47, 48, 50
 Renaissance, 137, 156, 179, 182
 Republic: French, xx; German, viii, ix, x, xiii, xiv, xix, xxi, 8, 12, 17, 18, 20, 29-31, 35, 41, 44, 48-51, 63, 65-71, 74, 75, 77-80, 88, 93, 95, 96, 98, 99, 102, 103, 109, 146, 152, 153, 176, 178, 184, 187-89, 192, 194, 197, 199, 205, 208-10, 212, 216, 218; of scholars, 172
 Reuter, Fritz (German poet), 76
 Revolution, xvii, xviii, 20, 25, 26, 38, 43, 55, 71, 75, 77, 79, 96, 109, 128, 129, 135, 140, 141, 150, 165, 215; of 1848, 6, 26; French, 3, 27, 29, 156; of 1918, 4, 43, 50, 69; of 1933, 4, 18, 20, 24, 41; Russian, 38
 Rhineland, 19
 Rilke, R. M. (German poet), 4
 Rockefeller Foundation, 103
 Romanticists, 10, 84
 Roosevelt, F. D. (American president), 210
 Rosenzweig, Franz (German author), 215
 Russell, Bertrand (American philosopher), 172, 219
 Russia, 2, 19, 68, 130, 131, 136, 176, 177, 195, 196, 198, 213

 St. Germain, treaty of, 74
 Saxony, 23, 26, 79
 Scharnhorst, G. D. (German general), 5
 Scheler, Max (German philosopher), 86
 Schelling, F. W. (German philosopher), 6, 79, 96
 Schiller, Fr. von (German poet), 9, 10, 40, 57, 59, 163, 214, 216
 Schleicher, K. von (German general and chancellor), 17

- Schleiermacher, Fr. (German theologian and philosopher), 50, 57, 59, 89, 95, 96, 113
- Schlieffen, A. von (German general), 5
- Schmitt, Bernadotte E. (American historian), 133
- School: of commerce, 117; country home, 56; elementary, 22-24, 32, 35, 51, 52, 54-56, 63, 64, 97, 189-92, 198, 202, 213; graduate, 25, 204; high, 111, 119; private, 52; secondary, 24, 25, 51, 57, 59-62, 64, 67, 82, 97, 112, 116, 119, 123, 160, 190, 191, 194-202, 209, 216; technical, 33, 81, 83, 198, 200; vocational, 36, 117, 120
- "School compromise," 48
- Schools; reform of, 54-65; Russian, 198
- Schopenhauer, A. (German philosopher), 89
- Schroedinger, E. (German scientist, Nobel Prize winner), 104
- Schubert, F. (Austrian composer), 163, 214
- Schumann, R. (German composer), 214
- Schumpeter, Joseph A. (professor of economics at the universities of Bonn and Harvard), 176, 219
- Schurz, Carl (German-American statesman), 64, 76
- Secularism, 180
- Shakespeare, W. (English poet), 2
- Silesia, upper, 19
- "Single-ladder system," 61, 125
- Smith, L. P. (professor of biblical history, Wellesley College), xi, xv
- Smith, Shelton H. (American theologian), 184, 219
- Social democracy, 3, 19, 20, 26, 31, 32, 39, 43, 47, 60, 66, 68, 70, 105, 106, 147, 149, 176
- Social life, 113
- Social principles, 153
- Social sciences, 88, 173, 196, 197
- Socialism, x, 18, 20, 21, 27, 32, 33, 35, 37, 39, 40, 42, 48, 52, 65, 67, 69, 70, 78, 79, 106, 107, 134, 175, 177, 178, 183, 184, 219
- Socialization, 39
- Sociology, 87, 197
- Socrates (Greek philosopher), 165
- Sodom, 214
- Sorel, G. (French sociologist), 7
- South America, 152
- Spain, 214
- Spemann, H. (German scientist, Nobel Prize winner), 104
- Spencer, H. (English philosopher), 197
- Spengler, Oswald (German author), 35
- Staatsrat, 43
- Streicher, J. (Nazi ringleader), 24
- Stresemann, G. (German statesman), 42, 68, 218
- Student unions, 73-76
- Sunday School, 47
- Switzerland, 29, 36, 71, 193, 212
- Teacher's College, 110
- Technology, 117
- Temple, William (late Archbishop of Canterbury), 144, 145, 181, 218, 219
- Theological faculties, 33, 34, 35, 204
- "Theology of crisis," 89
- Thibaudet, A. (French author), 220
- Thirty Years' War, xix
- 'tHooft, Visser (Dutch theologian), 218
- Tieck, Ludwig (German poet), 2
- Tillich, Paul (American theologian), 106, 216
- Tirpitz, A. von (German admiral), 16
- Toennies, F. (German sociologist), 87, 113
- Troeltsch, E. (German theologian), 86, 180, 216
- Tübingen, 33
- Ulrich, R. (American educator), 112, 123, 196, 217, 219, 220
- Underground, 149, 151, 205
- Unemployment, 158
- United Nations, vii, viii, 128, 150, 152-54, 163, 166
- Universities, ix, xx, 24-26, 33, 51, 55, 57, 63, 68-71, 73, 80, 82, 83, 90, 91, 93, 111, 112, 114, 120, 160, 200-210, 215; appointments in, 89-96; Berlin, ix, 11, 93, 96, 215; Bonn, 21, 176; Cambridge, 200; Chicago, 121; Columbia, 110, 163; English, ideal of, 55; "extension course," 105; faculties of, 34, 89-94, 99; Göttingen, 103, 216; Greifswald, ix; Hamburg, 21; Harvard, 112, 176; Heidelberg, 21, 103; Jena, 71; London, 200; Marburg, 103; Oxford, 200; reform of, in Germany, 79-109
- University College of Wales, 133

- Vansittart, Sir Robert, 133, 139, 140, 142, 188, 217, 218, 219
 Versailles, 21
 Versailles Treaty, 12, 21, 40, 217
 Victoria, Queen, 3
 Victory of 1870, 54
 Virchow, R. (German pathologist), 215
 Volksschule, 22
 Voltaire, J. M. (French philosopher), 6
 Wagner, R. (German composer), 214
 Wallace, Henry (American statesman), 162
 War, 133, 136, 139, 194, 217; of 1870, 19
 Warburg, O. (German scientist, Nobel Prize winner), 104
 Weimar, 21; "spirit of," 6
 Welles, Sumner (American statesman), 218
 Wellesley College, xi, xiv, xv
 "Westernization," 28
 Wieland, H. (German scientist, Nobel Prize winner), 104
 Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (German philologist), 82
 Wilhelmian era, 41
 William I (king of Prussia, German emperor), 6, 16
 William II (king of Prussia, German emperor), 1, 3, 5, 10, 15, 17, 25, 26
 Wilson, Woodrow (United States president), 134, 138
 Windaus, A. (German scientist, Nobel Prize winner), 104
 Women teachers, 190-92
 World Council of Churches, 172
 World War I, 58, 85, 102, 104, 195
 World War II, 125
 Wright, Quincy (American author), 139, 217, 218
 Wriston, Henry M. (president of Brown University), 219
 Youth movement, xiv, 56, 66-78, 107, 164, 173, 205, 206, 211, 215
 Zsigmondy, R. (German scientist, Nobel Prize winner), 104

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY



126 673

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY